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The International Resource Panel was established to provide independent, coherent and authoritative scientific 
assessments on the use of natural resources and their environmental impacts over the full life cycle. The Panel aims 
to contribute to a better understanding of how to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation while 
enhancing well-being. 
Benefiting from the broad support of governments and scientific communities, the Panel is constituted of eminent 
scientists and experts from all parts of the world, bringing their multidisciplinary expertise to address resource 
management issues. The information contained in the International Resource Panel’s reports is intended to be evidence 
based and policy relevant, informing policy framing and development and supporting evaluation and monitoring of policy 
effectiveness. 
The Secretariat is hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UN Environment). Since the International 
Resource Panel’s launch in 2007, twenty-six assessments have been published. The assessments of the Panel to date 
demonstrate the numerous opportunities for governments, businesses and wider society to work together to create 
and implement policies that ultimately lead to sustainable resource management, including through better planning, 
technological innovation and strategic incentives and investments. 
Following its establishment, the Panel first devoted much of its research to issues related to the use, stocks and scarcities 
of individual resources, as well as to the development and application of the perspective of ‘decoupling’ economic growth 
from natural resource use and environmental degradation. These reports include resource-specific studies on biofuels, 
water and the use and recycling of metal stocks in society. 
Building upon this knowledge base, the Panel moved into examining systematic approaches to resource use. These 
include looking into the direct and indirect impacts of trade on natural resource use; issues of sustainable land and food 
system management; priority economic sectors and materials for sustainable resource management; benefits, risks and 
trade-offs of Low-Carbon Technologies for electricity production; city-level decoupling; and the untapped potential for 
decoupling resource use and related environmental impacts from economic growth. 
Upcoming work by the International Resource Panel will focus on governance of the extractive sectors, the impacts of 
land-based activities on marine and coastal resources, land restoration, scenario modelling of natural resource use and 
resource efficiency links to climate change.
More information about the Panel and its research can be found at:  http://www.resourcepanel.org/.
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Foreword
Global gross domestic product has doubled since 1970, enabling immense progress, and lifting of billions of people out 
of poverty. At the same time, this economic growth has been fueled by a relentless demand for natural resources. At no 
point in time nor at any level of income, has our demand for natural resources wavered. 
Our consume and throwaway models of consumption have had devastating impacts on our planet. This report finds that 
90 per cent of biodiversity loss and water stress are caused by resource extraction and processing. These same activities 
contribute to about half of global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Moreover, the benefits of this type of resource use remain limited to but a few. Inequalities in the material footprint of 
countries, i.e. in the quantity of materials that must be mobilized globally to meet the consumption of an individual 
country, are stark. High-income countries maintain levels of per capita material footprint consumption that are 60 per 
cent higher than upper-middle income countries and more than thirteen times the level of the low-income countries. 
Economic growth which comes at the expense of our planet is simply not sustainable. Our challenge is to meet the needs 
of all people within the means of our planet. Realizing this ambitious but critical vision calls on governments, business, 
civil society and people to reshape what we understand by progress and innovate to change people’s choices, lifestyles 
and behaviours. 
Through a combination of resource efficiency, climate mitigation, carbon removal, and biodiversity protection policies, 
this report finds that it is feasible and possible to grow our economies, increase our wellbeing and remain within our 
planetary boundaries. But action must begin now. While the report highlights some progress, it is clear that much more 
needs to be done. 
Scientific findings such as those by the International Resource Panel and other global assessments, presented at the 
2019 United Nations Environment Assembly, provide us an opportunity to take a close look at the global use of natural 
resources and importantly, identify action that can have the maximum impact on our planet and ensure we sustainability 
manage natural resources for generations to come. 
Joyce Msuya, 
Acting Executive Director 
UN Environment
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Preface
For over 10 years, the International Resource Panel has provided scientific assessments of the trends in, patterns in and 
impacts of the way societies and economies extract, use and dispose of natural resources. This research has shown that the 
way in which we use natural resources has profound implications for the health and wellbeing of people and the planet, now 
and for future generations. Not only is the sustainable management of natural resources critical to achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals, but also, the International Resource Panel findings point to its essential ties to international aspirations 
on climate, biodiversity and land degradation neutrality. 
The Global Resources Outlook 2019 builds on this body of evidence to present the story of natural resources as they move 
through our economies and societies. It is a story of relentless demand and of unsustainable patterns of industrialization and 
development. Over the last 50 years, material extraction has tripled, with the rate of extraction accelerating since the year 
2000. Newly industrializing economies are increasingly responsible for a growing share of material extraction, a situation 
largely due to the building of new infrastructure. Virtually none of the massive growth in materials consumption in the new 
millennium has taken place in the wealthiest countries; however, not much of it has taken place in the poorest countries 
either, which make up the group in the most urgent need of higher material living standards.
This is the story of the unequal distribution of the benefits of resource use and its increasingly global and severe impacts 
on human well-being and ecosystem health. While extraction and consumption are growing in upper-middle income 
countries, high-income countries continue to outsource resource-intensive production. An average person living in a high-
income country consumes 60 per cent more than someone in an upper-middle income country and over 13 times what is 
consumed by someone in a low-income country. Overall, the extraction and processing of natural resources account for 
more than 90 per cent of global biodiversity loss and water stress impacts and for approximately half of global greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
Finally, it is a story that can, and must, be changed. Modelling undertaken by the International Resource Panel shows that 
by 2060, with the right resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and production policies in place, growth in global 
resource use can slow by 25 per cent, global gross domestic product could grow by 8 per cent - especially for low- and 
middle-income nations - and greenhouse gas emissions could be cut by 90 per cent as compared with projections for 
continuing along historical trends. Such projections are based on the understanding that growth rates in emerging and other 
developing economies must be balanced by absolute reductions in resource use in developed countries.
There exist economically attractive and technologically feasible innovations and policy actions that can transform our 
production and consumption systems in such a way as to achieve our global sustainability aspirations. However, action 
must start now. The International Resource Panel welcomes this opportunity to provide to the international community 
science-based and policy-relevant recommendations for sustainable management of natural resources that enables 
economic prosperity and human wellbeing while also remaining within planetary boundaries. We will continue to produce 
the Global Resources Outlook publication every four years to support essential global deliberations that include natural 
resources as part of the solutions towards sustainability, climate, biodiversity and land aspirations. As Co-Chairs, we wish 
to thank the scientists and steering committee members of the Panel for their dedicated efforts towards this aim.
Izabella Teixeira
Co-Chair, 
International Resource Panel
Janez Potočnik 
Co-Chair,  
International Resource Panel
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Executive Summary
The international community has set ambitious goals for 
global prosperity and protecting the planet, including the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and 
environmental conventions such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). 
Progress towards these ambitions is in our grasp – but 
a fundamental change in how natural resources are 
used around the world is necessary if these objectives 
are to be achieved. Natural resources are used to build 
infrastructure and drive economic progress, but they also 
have consequences in terms of negative impacts for the 
environment and human well-being.
Fundamental change is embodied in the principles of 
sustainable consumption and production, which address 
the entire life cycle of economic activities from the 
extraction of natural resources, through the production 
and use phase of products and goods, and finally to 
the disposal of resources. Harnessing this change 
will promote a sustainable transition to a world where 
economic development is pursued while negative impacts 
to the environment and humans are reduced in absolute 
terms (in other words, decoupling). 
Decoupling occurs when resource use or a pressure on 
the environment or human well-being grows at a slower 
rate than the activity causing it (relative decoupling) or 
declines while the economic activity continues to grow 
(absolute decoupling) (IRP, 2011). Absolute decoupling 
in high-income countries can lower average resource 
consumption, distribute prosperity equally and maintain a 
high quality of life. Relative decoupling in developing and 
economies in transition can raise average income levels 
and eliminate poverty, while still increasing levels of natural 
resource consumption until a socially acceptable quality of 
life is achieved. While past IRP reports have focused largely 
on decoupling resource use and impacts from economic 
growth, this report also considers another dimension of 
decoupling: well-being decoupling. Well-being decoupling 
means increasing the service provided or satisfaction of 
human need per unit of resource use.
The Drivers-Pressures-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) 
framework is one type of systems approach that can be 
used to analyse how society is using natural resources 
and the various implications of this use. This report is 
structured along the DPSIR framework, with Chapter 2 
describing the drivers and trends of materials, land, and 
water resources use and explaining how these create 
pressures on the environment. Chapter 3 continues 
the analysis through the lens of life cycle assessments. 
It takes the results from Chapter 2 and calculates the 
environmental impacts generated from the extraction 
and processing of these natural resources. Chapter 4 then 
provides two different outlooks – one based on Historical 
Trends and the other modelling the effects of concerted 
policy and societal actions to drive a transition Towards 
Sustainability. Finally, Chapter 5 reflects on the messages 
of chapters 2, 3 and 4, and then offers recommendations 
to policymakers, the private sector, and civil society that 
can support innovations for environmental challenges and 
sustainable consumption and production.
1.1 Drivers, Pressures, and Natural Resource Use Trends
Since the 1970s, global population has doubled and global 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown fourfold. These 
trends have required large amounts of natural resources 
to fuel economic development and attendant increase in 
human well-being. Indeed, there has not been a prolonged 
period of stabilization or decline in global material demand 
in the last 50 years. Rather, global resource extraction has 
grown rapidly in that time. Extraction reached 92 billion 
tons in 2017, compared with 27 billion tons in 1970. 
Global material extraction has also become slightly 
more concentrated over the last five decades, with 10 
economies responsible for over 68 per cent of global 
extraction in 2017. Upper-middle income economies 
GLOBAL RESOURCES OUTLOOK 2019: NATURAL RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE WE WANT |
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dominate extraction of resources, even on a per capita 
basis (accounting for 56 per cent of the global total). Two 
key dynamics are at play here: an increasing demand to 
build up new infrastructure, especially in developing and 
emerging economies, and the outsourcing of the more 
materials and energy intensive stages of production 
chains by higher income countries to lower income but 
transitioning countries. 
However, the global share of domestic material 
consumption by low-income countries has remained 
unchanged at below 3 per cent, despite this group posting 
1 Chapter 3 describes the impacts of natural resource extraction and processing, and in selected cases, extends this coverage to the economy-wide 
impacts.
the highest population growth rate among the different 
income categories. Further, looking at the material footprint 
per capita, the high-income countries maintain the highest 
material footprint consumption of approximately 27 tons, 
which is 60 per cent higher than the upper-middle income 
group and more more than 13 times the level of the low-
income group. 
For water, a slight relative decoupling of water use from 
population growth began in the 1990s, but global water 
use is increasing and 30 per cent of global river basin area 
has been under severe and mid water stress since 2010.
1.2 Environmental Impacts of Natural Resource Use
Natural resource extraction and processing1 make up 
approximately 50 per cent of the total greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. Resource-related impacts on water 
stress and biodiversity loss due to land use are even more 
significant at over 90 per cent. If the rising trend in resource-
related impacts persists, the goals of the Paris agreement 
will become difficult to meet and the achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, including SDG 15.5 to halt 
biodiversity loss, will be put at risk. 
Moreover, an estimated 11 per cent of existing species 
will become globally and irreversibly extinct due to global 
land use activities. The consumption of water contributes 
to water stress, threatening the sustainable supply of 
freshwater to humans and ecosystems (UNEP SETAC, 
2016). Agriculture is the main water consumer in the 
global economy, and accounts for approximately 85 per 
cent of global water stress. Other impacts of resource use 
include eutrophication and eco-toxic effects caused by 
the overuse of fertilizers in certain areas – and which can 
ultimately lead to biodiversity loss.
The good news is that, between 2000 and 2015, there was 
a relative decoupling of resource-related environmental 
impacts from GDP and a moderate relative decoupling of 
impacts from the extracted mass of resources. However, 
impacts still increased on an absolute scale, including 
global average per capita climate change and health 
impacts. Climate change impacts increased by a factor of 
1.4 between 2000 and 2011, following a similar trend to 
that of total extracted mass of resources, which increased 
by a factor of 1.6. During the same time frame, water and 
land use-related impacts also increased, but by a lesser 
degree (indicatively, by a factor 1.2 for water stress) due to 
increased productivity in food production. Action is needed 
to reach absolute decoupling and remain within planetary 
boundaries.
Resource-related value added has doubled, although 
impacts and value creation are not equally distributed 
around the globe. Per capita impacts of high-income 
regions are between three and six times larger than 
those of low-income regions. This pattern is a result of 
globalization, with high-income countries specializing in 
high value-added product development and management 
activities while resource-intensive added manufacturing is 
located in low-cost countries.  
Capital investments for the build-up of infrastructure were 
the main driver of resource use in emerging economies, 
while in industrial economies consumer goods dominate 
final demand. While general trends exist, such as increased 
impacts with increased income, there are also cases of 
low-emission households within high-income segments 
(showing that decoupling is possible).
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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1.3 Two Outlooks for Resource Use
2 www.resourcepanel.org/reports/global-resources-outlook.
The analysis and modelling results presented in this report 
represent a first attempt to develop coherent scenario 
projections for resource efficiency and sustainable 
production and consumption that decouple economic 
growth from environmental degradation, as called for by 
SDG 8.4 and SDG 12.2.  This decoupling seeks to meet 
essential human needs for food, water, energy and shelter 
(represented by SDGs 2, 6, 7, and 9) while protecting 
natural and social capital (represented by SDGs 13, 14, 15, 
and 17) that underpins all life and earth system functions. 
Well-chosen and coordinated sustainability actions 
– particularly resource efficiency and sustainable 
consumption and production policies – can achieve 
significant decoupling, while achieving increased economic 
growth and a more equitable distribution of income and 
access to resources. Ambitious actions modelled in 
the Towards Sustainability scenario see incomes and 
resource-based services increase significantly across 
all groups of countries, while environmental pressures 
and impacts fall dramatically.  This is in sharp contrast 
to the outlook under Historical Trends, which has similar 
projected increases in income, but with higher resource 
extractions and escalating and clearly unsustainable 
environmental pressures – including increases in 
greenhouse gas emissions and pressure on water 
sensitive ecosystems, and reductions in the quality and 
extent of forests and other native habitats. Notably, under 
Historical Trends, global resource extraction grows to 190 
billion tons by 2060, compared to 143 billion tons under 
Towards Sustainability – which is 25 per cent lower than 
historical trends. Decision makers and policymakers today 
can work to achieve this ambitious outcome.
The absolute impact decoupling and relative resource 
decoupling outlined in this model is not at the expense of 
economic growth. The policy packages implemented in this 
scenario lead to global net economic benefits from 2030 
onwards. Global GDP reaches 8 per cent above Historical 
Trends by 2060, and economic growth increases relatively 
more quickly in low- and middle-income countries at 11 per 
cent on average compared to high-income nations at 4 per 
cent on average, denoting a more equitable distribution of 
GDP per capita while all country groups still benefit from 
economic gains.
1.4 A Societal Response to Determine Our Shared Future
Obstacles, such as environmental challenges and 
fundamental changes in consumption and production 
systems, come with opportunities. In particular, 
transformations in how natural resources are extracted, 
processed, used and disposed of around the world can be 
harnessed through the collective action of governments, 
the private sector and civil society organizations. 
To translate the assumptions made in the Towards 
Sustainability scenario into policymaking and decision-
making contexts, real world examples of policy 
implementation aligned with the model are presented in 
the report. Moreover, eight approaches for multi-beneficial 
policymaking are outlined. A separate Summary for 
Policymakers is available on the International Resource 
Panel website2 that explains in detail the most relevant 
findings for policymakers.
The eight strategies include the use of indicators and 
targets at all levels of governance to inform national 
plans for a sustainable use of natural resources and 
enable governments to identify priorities and proceed 
in a coordinated way. Transitions to sustainability will 
require complementary measures that combine to achieve 
domestic objectives. The scope and context of each set 
of instruments will depend on the national situation. In 
all cases, the policy mixes developed to improve the use 
and management of natural resources should be closely 
coordinated with policies for climate mitigation, adaptation 
and biodiversity protection. Actions towards a circular 
economy promote value-retention and environmental 
impact reduction while simultaneously reducing costs 
and creating economic opportunities, thus contributing 
to resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and 
production.
GLOBAL RESOURCES OUTLOOK 2019: NATURAL RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE WE WANT |
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Furthermore, engaging in dialogue to connect with citizens, 
civil society and the private sector builds consensus. 
International exchanges and cross-country cooperation 
can accelerate the transition to sustainability and support 
national decisions, thereby helping to: create a level 
playing field for businesses and goods, navigate obstacles, 
promote shared experiences and find ways to leapfrog. 
While it is clear that resource and impact decoupling and 
improving resource efficiency should be an internationally 
pursued effort with the involvement of all countries, 
due consideration will have to be given to the different 
responsibilities and capabilities of countries. These 
different aspects call for a global discussion.
The final message of this report should be one of hope 
and optimism. While additional research is needed, there 
is nonetheless already an extensive knowledge base about 
natural resources use, pressures and impacts. Existing 
or feasible technologies can be applied in the short 
term across all sectors and countries to improve natural 
resource use and management. Emerging business models 
and best practices that embrace the circular economy and 
leapfrogging technologies generate enormous resource 
and economic savings, while still driving development. 
Policymakers and decision makers have tools at their 
disposal to advance transformative change. Importantly, 
this involves national actors working together across 
borders to achieve this change. Using the results from 
this report, multi-stakeholder collaboration and innovative 
solutions, we can resource the future we want.
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Glossary
Based on IRP, 2017a, online IRP glossary, and technical 
online annex.
Capital formation: Capital formation refers to additions 
of capital stock, such as the build-up of infrastructure, 
equipment and transportation assets. In multi-regional 
input output assessment, this is reported as part of the 
final demand per sector and region.
Circular economy: The circular economy is one in 
which the value of products, materials and resources is 
maintained in the economy for as long as possible, and the 
generation of waste is minimized. This is in contrast to a 
‘linear economy’, which is based on the “extract, make and 
dispose” model of production and consumption.
Consumption: The use of products and services for 
(domestic) final demand, i.e. for households, government 
and investments. The consumption of resources can 
be calculated by attributing the life-cycle-wide resource 
requirements to those products and services (for example 
by input-output calculation).
Consumption-based perspective: The consumption-
based perspective allocates the use of natural resources 
or the related impacts throughout the supply chain 
to the region where these resources, incorporated in 
various commodities, are finally consumed by industries, 
governments and households
Cradle-to-gate: Denotes the system boundaries of a life 
cycle assessment study that only covers the first stages 
of the life cycle, which in this report refers to the resource 
extraction and processing stage (including the full supply 
chain of all inputs and disposal phase of all outputs arising 
in these stages). 
Cradle-to-grave: Denotes the system boundaries of a 
full life cycle assessment study, considering all life cycle 
stages, including raw material extraction, production, 
transport, use and final disposal. Also termed “life cycle 
perspective”.
Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs): Measure for health 
impacts (human toxicity and particulate matter health 
impacts). It quantifies the amount of life years lost or lived 
with health impairment (based on WHO).
Decoupling: Decoupling is when resource use or some 
environmental pressure either grows at a slower rate 
than the economic activity that is causing it (relative 
decoupling) or declines while the economic activity 
continues to grow (absolute decoupling). The concept 
of decoupling is represented in figure 1.2, which shows 
increasing trajectories for economic activity and human 
well-being. The figure also shows that resource use can 
increase at a much slower rate than economic activity 
(relative resource decoupling) and environmental impacts 
may actually decline (absolute impact decoupling). This 
conceptual figure therefore indicates the ideal goal of 
resource efficiency, through the notion of decoupling – that 
economic output and human well-being will increase at 
the same time as rates of resource use and environmental 
degradation slow down and eventually decline to levels 
compatible with planetary boundaries (thereby enabling 
resource use and the delivery of ecosystem goods and 
services to be sustained for future generations). 
DPSIR (Drivers-pressures-state-impacts-response) 
framework: The DPSIR framework (see, inter alia, EEA, 
1999) aims to provide a step-wise description of the causal 
chain linking economic activity (the drivers), the pressures 
(such as emissions of pollutants), changes in the state of 
the environment (including land cover change) and impacts 
(diminished human health and others). This then leads to a 
societal response aimed at adapting those driving forces 
to reduce impacts. It must not be understood as a reactive 
governance approach that waits for irreversible changes to 
the environment before responding, but rather an approach 
that supports preventative action and can be used as an 
analytical tool for linking human-nature systems in future 
modelling to help steer a transition.
Employment: This term denotes the number of full-time 
equivalent positions (chapter 3).
Environmental Impacts: Harmful effects of human 
activities on ecosystems. In the present report, the 
following methods and impact categories are used to 
assess environmental impacts:
1. Climate change impacts: Greenhouse gas emissions 
are weighed according to the concentration change 
they produce in the atmosphere multiplied with the 
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radiative forcing of the respective gas, a substance 
property describing how much energy the substance 
can absorb. This effect of altering the energy balance 
of the earth is accumulated over a defined time horizon 
(typically 100 years) and published by IPCC as “Global 
Warming Potentials, GWPs” (IPCC, 2013). Impacts are 
called climate change impacts, but are also known as 
a carbon footprint. All emissions are expressed as “kg 
CO2-equivalents”.
2. Ecotoxicity: Emissions of toxic substances are 
transported, degraded and transferred between various 
environmental compartments (air, water and soil), where 
they may lead to direct exposure (for example, inhalation 
of air with pollutants) or indirect exposure (for example, 
crop uptake of pollutants from soil and ingestion of crop 
as food). Toxic effects may occur after exposure. 
3. Land-use related biodiversity loss: Land use reduces 
natural habitat size and degrades ecosystems, thereby 
leading to species extinctions. 
4. Water stress: Water stress addresses the impacts 
of water consumption on the water resource as a 
flow resource.1 Additionally, absolute water scarcity 
(availability per area) is considered to combine natural 
and human-induced water stress in a single indicator 
(Boulay et al., 2018).
Footprints: Within this report, the term footprints is used 
to represent the whole system of environmental pressures 
exerted by a human activity, including direct pressures 
occurring within the geographical boundary where the 
activity occurs and indirect/or supply chain pressures 
outside (transboundary ones). Footprints can measure 
different types of pressures including resource use (such 
as materials and water), pollution emissions (including 
emission in air) and environmental impacts (climate 
change, water scarcity, biodiversity losses and so forth). 
The material footprint in this report encompasses all 
material resources used (biomass, fossil fuels, metals and 
non-metallic minerals extracted/harvested for use; unused 
extraction is not yet accounted for). To compare footprints 
across cities or nations, some type of normalization is 
necessary (although this has been the subject of much 
debate). 
Health impacts: Harmful effects of human activities on the 
health of a population. In the present report, the following 
impact categories were used to assess health impacts:
1 Flow resources are non-exhaustible and have a limited availability at a certain time (Udo de Haes et al., 2002), which means that they have to be 
used as, when and where they occur.
1. Human toxicity: Emissions of toxic substances are 
transported, degraded and transferred between various 
environmental compartments (air, water and soil), where 
they may lead to direct exposure (for example, inhalation 
of air with pollutants) or indirect exposure (for example, 
crop uptake of pollutants from soil and ingestion of 
crop as food). Toxic effects may occur after human 
exposure. The full impact pathway is modelled for each 
substance in the impact assessment, as documented in 
Rosenbaum et al. 2008. 
2. Particulate Matter (PM) health impacts: 
Cardiovascular and respiratory diseases caused by 
fine primary particulate matter emissions or secondary 
particulate matter, which is formed from precursor gases 
transformed to particulate matter in the atmosphere 
(SOx, NOx, ammonia).
Impact Assessment: Here used interchangeably with the 
term life cycle impact assessment. It denotes a “phase 
of life cycle assessment aimed at understanding and 
evaluating the magnitude and significance of the potential 
environmental impacts” of a system (according to ISO 
14040). It links environmental impacts to emissions and 
primary resource use.
Income Groups: This report provides analysis based on 
income groups. The income group classification comes 
from the United Nations, which is based on thresholds 
established by the World Bank to ensure compatibility with 
classifications used in other International organizations. 
There are four income group categories: high-income, 
upper middle-income, lower-middle income and low-
income (DPAD, 2018). These categories are used in 
all explanations in this report, except for the analysis 
concerning the scenarios in chapter 4. Chapter 4 uses 
three income categories (high-income, middle-income 
and low-income), as it assumes that some convergence 
of income will occur by 2060, and there is a certain level of 
uncertainty around country mobility within income groups.
Life Cycle Assessment: Compilation and evaluation of 
the inputs (resource use), outputs (emissions) and the 
potential environmental impacts of a system throughout 
its life cycle (according to ISO 14040).
Life Cycle Perspective: A life cycle perspective includes 
consideration of the environmental aspects of an 
organization’s activities, products and services that 
it can control or influence. Stages in a life cycle include 
acquisition of raw materials, design, production, 
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transportation/delivery, use, end of life treatment and final 
disposal (ISO, n.d.). Also termed “cradle-to-grave”.
Production-based perspective: The production-based 
perspective allocates the use of natural resources or 
the impacts related to natural resource extraction and 
processing to the location where they physically occur 
(Wood et al., 2018).
Resource efficiency: In general terms, resource efficiency 
describes the overarching goals of decoupling — increasing 
human well-being and economic growth while lowering the 
amount of resources required and negative environmental 
impacts associated with resource use. In other words, this 
means doing better with less. In technical terms, resource 
efficiency means achieving higher outputs with lower 
inputs and can be reflected by indicators such as resource 
productivity (including GDP/resource consumption). 
Ambitions to achieve a resource-efficient economy 
therefore refer to systems of production and consumption 
that have been optimized with regard to resource use. This 
includes strategies of dematerialization (savings, reduction 
of material and energy use) and re-materialization (reuse, 
remanufacturing and recycling) in a systems-wide 
approach to a circular economy, as well as infrastructure 
transitions within sustainable urbanization.
Resource productivity: Resource productivity describes 
the economic gains achieved through resource efficiency. 
It depicts the value obtained from a certain amount of 
natural resources. It may be presented together with 
indicators of labour or capital productivity. 
Resources: Resources — including land, water, air and 
materials — are seen as parts of the natural world that 
can be used in economic activities to produce goods and 
services. Material resources are biomass (like crops for 
food, energy and bio- based materials, as well as wood for 
energy and industrial uses), fossil fuels (in particular coal, 
gas and oil for energy), metals (such as iron, aluminium 
and copper used in construction and electronics 
manufacturing) and non-metallic minerals (used for 
construction, notably sand, gravel and limestone).
Shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP): SSPs 
are socioeconomic narratives that outline broad 
characteristics of the global future and country-level 
population, global domestic product and urbanization 
projections. SSPs are not scenarios themselves, but their 
building blocks (Riahi et al., 2016).
Sustainable consumption and production: At the 
Oslo Symposium in 1994, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Environment defined sustainable consumption and 
production as: the use of services and related products 
that respond to basic needs and bring a better quality of 
life while minimizing the use of natural resources and toxic 
materials as well as the emissions of waste and pollutants 
over the life cycle of the service or product (so as not to 
jeopardize the needs of future generations). Ensuring 
sustainable consumption and production patterns has 
become an explicit goal of the SDGs (Goal number 
12), with the specific target of achieving sustainable 
management and efficient use of natural resources by 
2030. The concept thus combines with economic and 
environmental processes to support the design of policy 
instruments and tools in a way that minimizes problem 
shifting and achieves multiple objectives — such as SDGs 
— simultaneously.
Sustainable resource management: Sustainable resource 
management means both (a) ensuring that consumption 
does not exceed levels of sustainable supply and (b) 
ensuring that the Earth’s systems are able to perform their 
natural functions (i.e. preventing disruptions like in the 
case of GHGs affecting the ability of the atmosphere to 
“regulate” the Earth’s temperature). It requires monitoring 
and management at various scales. The aim of sustainable 
resource management is to ensure the long-term material 
basis of societies in a way that neither resource extraction 
and use nor the deposition of waste and emissions will 
surpass the thresholds of a safe operating space.
Systems approach: This approach is derived from 
systems thinking, which is used to identify and understand 
systems, as well as predicting their behaviours and 
devising modifications to produce desired effects (Arnold & 
Wade, 2015). This report applies the DPSIR Framework to 
assess the linkages between the use of natural resources 
in society, through production-consumption systems and 
essential infrastructure and food provisioning services, as 
they impact economic development, human well-being 
and the environment (as reflected in multiple SDGs). 
The system approach (1) considers the total material 
throughput of the economy from resource extraction 
and harvest to final disposal, and their environmental 
impacts, (2) relates these flows to activities in production 
and consumption across spatial scale, time, nexus and 
boundary dimensions, and (3) searches for leverage 
points for multi-beneficial changes (technological, social 
or organizational), all encouraged by policies to achieve 
sustainable production/consumption and multi-scale 
sustainable resource management.
Work risks: Work risks represent an aggregated indicator 
for social risks related to employment.
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Key Messages 
1 . The use of natural resources has more than tripled from 1970 and continues to grow.
2 Materials include biomass, fossil fuels, metals and non-metallic minerals, while natural resources encompass all 
materials plus water and land.
3 The focus is on resource extraction and processing up to “ready-to-use” materials and fuels (including waste disposal 
processes in the extraction and processing phase). This is also termed ‘cradle-to-gate’. 
4 Material use can be measured by domestic material consumption or through the material footprint. Domestic material 
consumption is a direct measure of the materials that are consumed in a national economy, while the material footprint 
attributes all of the material resources mobilized globally to the final domestic demand of a country.
Global population has doubled and global gross domestic product has grown fourfold since 
the 1970s. This has been fuelled by an ever-increasing supply and extraction of materials, 
thereby intensifying pressure on land and water. From 1970 to 2017, the annual global 
extraction of materials grew from 27 billion tons to 92 billion tons, while the annual average 
material demand grew from 7 tons to over 12 tons per capita.2 
2 . Historical and current patterns of natural resource use are resulting in increasingly negative impacts on the environment 
and human health.
The extraction and processing3 of materials, fuels and food make up about half of total global 
greenhouse gas emissions (not including climate impacts related to land use) and more than 
90 per cent of biodiversity loss and water stress. Agriculture is the main driver of biodiversity 
loss and water stress, while all types of resources carry a significant share of the climate 
change and health impacts from particulate matter. In emerging economies, the build-up of 
infrastructure plays an important role in resource-related climate change impacts. 
3 . The use of natural resources and the related benefits and environmental impacts are unevenly distributed across 
countries and regions.
The material footprint4 of high-income regions is greater than their domestic material 
consumption, indicating that consumption in these countries relies on materials from other 
countries through international supply chains. Material footprints in high-income countries 
are around 27 tons per person; 60 per cent higher than the upper-middle income group in 
2017; and more than 13 times the level of the low-income group. Per capita impacts of 
consumption in high-income countries are, depending on the impact category, between three 
and six times larger than those of low-income countries. 
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4 . In the absence of urgent and concerted action, rapid growth and inefficient use of natural resources will continue to create 
unsustainable pressures on the environment.
A scenario developed by the International Resource Panel on Historical Trends of material use 
shows that, unless a fundamental change drives natural resource use away from the status 
quo, this use will continue to grow to 190 billion tons and over 18 tons per capita by 2060. 
Moreover, under Historical Trends greenhouse gas emissions increase by 43 per cent from 
2015 to 2060, industrial water withdrawal increases by up to 100 per cent from 2010 levels, 
and the area of agricultural land increases by more than 20 per cent in that time, reducing 
forests by over 10 per cent and other habitat (such as grasslands and savannahs) by around 
20 per cent. 
5 .The decoupling of natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic activity and human well-being is an 
essential element in the transition to a sustainable future.
Decoupling occurs when resource use or a pressure on the environment or human well-
being grows at a slower rate than the activity causing it (relative decoupling) or declines 
while the economic activity continues to grow (absolute decoupling). A relative decoupling 
of resource-related environmental impacts from GDP and a relative decoupling of impacts 
from extracted mass of resources has occurred since the year 2000. However, impacts still 
increased on an absolute scale. Absolute decoupling in high-income countries can lower 
average resource consumption, distribute prosperity equally and maintain a high quality 
of life. Relative decoupling in developing economies and economies in transition can raise 
average income levels and eliminate poverty, while still increasing levels of natural resource 
consumption until a socially acceptable quality of life is achieved. 
6 . Achieving decoupling is possible and can deliver substantial social and environmental benefits, including repair of past 
environmental damage, while also supporting economic growth 
and human well-being. 
The Towards Sustainability scenario developed for this report shows that global resource 
use can slow down, while continuing to grow in emerging and other developing countries to 
meet their sustainable development needs. Well-being indicators grow faster than resource 
extraction, with improved resource productivity and a relative decoupling of well-being from 
resource use. Moreover, environmental pressures fall, achieving an absolute decoupling of 
environmental impacts from economic growth and resource use. This is feasible through 
absolute reductions in high-income countries. The Towards Sustainability scenario assumes 
implementation of a combination of resource efficiency policies across different time frames, 
based on scientific research and development, climate mitigation and carbon removal 
policies, as well as widespread biodiversity protection measures. These policy packages are 
complemented by societal change, marked by healthier diets and reduced food waste.
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7 . Policymakers and decision makers have tools at their disposal to advance worthwhile change, including transformational change 
at local, national and global scales.
Decoupling will not happen spontaneously, but will require well-designed and concerted 
policy packages. Well-chosen and coordinated sustainability actions – particularly resource 
efficiency, sustainable consumption and production and circular economy5 policies – can 
achieve decoupling. The context and scope of the set of instruments required will depend on 
the national situation. These include setting targets and indicators, developing national plans 
for a sustainable use of natural resources, using existing or feasible technologies to improve 
natural resource use and management, as well as embracing emerging business models and 
leapfrogging technologies. In all cases, multiple benefits can be achieved by coordinating 
national plans for decoupling the use of natural resources with plans for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, as well as with national plans for the protection, conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. 
8 . International exchanges and cooperation can make important contributions to achieving systemic change.
Decoupling environmental impacts and resource use from economic activity and human 
well-being is required to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals while remaining inside 
the planetary boundaries. This further contributes to the achievement of the UNFCCC Paris 
Agreement, the Aichi Targets of the UNCBD and the Land Degradation Neutrality Objectives 
of the UNCCD. International exchanges and cross-country cooperation can accelerate 
transitions towards sustainable natural resource use, support national decision-making and 
create a level playing field for goods and services from different countries. While it is clear that 
decoupling should be an internationally pursued effort with the involvement of all countries, 
due consideration will have to be given to the different responsibilities and capabilities of 
individual countries. Agreed international guidelines may support the process of finding 
solutions to these global challenges. These different aspects call for a global discussion. 
5 The circular economy promotes value-retention and environmental impact reduction while simultaneously reducing costs 
and creating economic opportunities.
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1.1 The Role of Natural Resources Across International Agreements
The international community has widely committed 
to combat climate change through the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and the Paris Agreement; biodiversity loss through 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); and land 
degradation through the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD). These conventions 
are further incorporated in the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which emphasizes the key role they play in 
achieving international sustainability ambitions. 
Until now, the importance of natural resources has not 
been in the implementation domain of those internationally 
agreed-upon conventions. Natural resources – biomass 
(wood, crops, including food, fuel, feed and plant-based 
materials), fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil), metals (such as 
iron, aluminium and cooper), non-metallic minerals (including 
sand, gravel and limestone), water and land – provide the 
foundation for the goods, services, and infrastructure that 
make up our socioeconomic systems (IRP, 2017a). How 
society uses natural resources today will determine the 
course of environmental impacts, human well-being and the 
prosperity of national and global economies, as well as our 
success in achieving international commitments. 
Natural resources are closely linked to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs aim, among other 
ambitions, to eradicate poverty, reduce inequalities, ensure 
prosperity and enhance the efforts to fight climate change 
(UN, 2015). Natural resources can directly or indirectly 
impact all 17 of the SDGs. Figure 1.1 shows the direct (blue 
outline) and indirect (yellow outline) relationships between 
Main findings
  Natural resources are inextricably linked to combatting climate change, biodiversity loss, and desertification, 
as well as the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. The achievement of these aims requires the 
use of natural resources. This use has consequences, and the uptake in natural resource use has contributed 
to the situation where four out of nine planetary boundaries are surpassing their recommended limits. 
  Decoupling – when resource use or a pressure on the environment or human well-being grows at a slower 
rate than the activity causing it (relative decoupling) or declines while the economic activity continues to grow 
(absolute decoupling) – is necessary because the way in which society uses natural resources today will 
determine the course of environmental impacts, human well-being and the prosperity of national and global 
economies – as well as our success in achieving international commitments. 
  Innovative solutions for environmental challenges and sustainable consumption and production can be key 
drivers for decoupling.
  Using a systems approach helps to identify solutions for improving natural resource use. The Drivers-
Pressures-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) framework (which is one such systems approach) creates 
linkages and feedback loops between the different components, making it an appropriate tool for locating 
the flows of natural resources in global society’s interaction with the environment.
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FIGURE 1.1 Direct (blue outline) and indirect (yellow outline) relationship of natural resources to the three dimensions of 
sustainability (social, economic, and environmental) in relation to the SDGs.
RELATION BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES 
AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
ENVIRONMENT SOCIAL ECONOMY
Direct linkage Indirect linkage
Source: this figure is re-drawn from IRP, 2017a; SRC, 2017)
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the SDGs and natural resources and how the SDGs are 
connected to the three dimensions of sustainability.
Many SDGs require a build-up of infrastructure, which 
requires the use of natural resources, to achieve social and 
economic progress. At the same time, certain Goals are 
dependent on protecting and improving the use of natural 
resources. Pursuing the former while delaying action on 
the latter will not work. This demands a fundamental 
transformation in how policymakers and decision makers 
prioritize the use of natural resources (UNEP, 2015). 
However, the use of natural resources has consequences. 
The uptake in natural resource use has contributed to the 
situation where four out of nine6 of the planetary boundaries 
are surpassing their recommended limits (IRP, 2017a; 
Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). The planetary 
boundaries framework, which is based on the understanding 
of the long-term behaviour of the Earth system, underscores 
why it is necessary to change how natural resources are 
currently being used and managed. A global society living 
outside of the planetary boundaries may lead to an altered 
Earth system that is less hospitable than the current one 
(Steffen et al., 2015). Two of the planetary boundaries, 
climate change and biosphere integrity (including 
biodiversity loss), are regarded as core boundaries because 
the coevolution of life on Earth and the physical climate are 
defining aspects of the Earth system. Due to the interactions 
and feedbacks between life and climate, changes to either 
boundary have the potential to cause changes in the entire 
Earth system (Steffen et al., 2015).
6 The nine planetary boundaries are: climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone, global phosphorus and nitrogen cycles, atmospheric 
aerosol loading, freshwater use, land use change, biodiversity loss and chemical pollution (Rockström, et al., 2009).
7 A full catalogue of definitions, including an expanded definition of decoupling, can be found on the IRP website: http://www.resourcepanel.org/
glossary.
Fundamental change is embodied in the principles of 
sustainable consumption and production (SCP). SCP 
considers the entire life cycle of economic activities, 
from the extraction of resources, processing these 
resources into materials and products, the use of these 
products, and finally their disposal as wastes or emissions. 
Systemic changes that drive sustainability throughout the 
life cycle promote SCP and help mitigate environmental 
challenges related to the planetary boundaries (UNEP, 
2018a), as well as those associated with negative 
human well-being impacts. Changes in consumption and 
production patterns promote decoupling and can trigger 
transformations toward sustainability as envisaged 
in international obligations. Through a combination of 
extended product life cycles, intelligent product design 
and standardization, reuse, recycling and remanufacturing, 
the concept of the circular economy operationalizes 
SCP ambitions and promotes value-retention and 
environmental impact reduction, while simultaneously 
reducing costs and creating economic opportunities 
(IRP, 2018b). New environmentally sound technologies 
provide innovative solutions that advance circularity and 
also support sustainable consumption and production. 
Particularly relevant SDGs for this process include Targets 
8.4 and 12.2. Target 8.4 aims to progressively improve 
global resource efficiency in consumption and production 
while decoupling economic growth from environmental 
degradation by 2030. Target 12.2 proposes to achieve 
the sustainable management and efficient use of natural 
resources by 2030. 
1.2 Decoupling Natural Resource Use and Negative Environmental 
Impacts from Economic Growth
Decoupling occurs when resource use or a pressure on 
the environment or human well-being grows at a slower 
rate than the activity causing it (relative decoupling) or 
declines while the economic activity continues to grow 
(absolute decoupling)7 (IRP, 2011). The decoupling aim is 
important because, as we aspire to improve human well-
being and drive economic development around the world, 
we will continue to rely on natural resources for the goods 
and services we need. Extracting, processing and using 
these resources has serious environmental and human 
health impacts. Achieving decoupling can reduce the rate 
at which resources are consumed and, most importantly, 
diminish environmental degradation and the negative 
effects on human health caused by this use. 
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Figure 1.2 demonstrates the decoupling concept. Human 
well-being and economic activity are following increasing 
trajectories, while resource use is increasing, but at a much 
slower rate. This indicates relative well-being decoupling 
and relative resource decoupling, respectively. Moreover, 
economic activity is increasing while the environmental 
impacts are declining (absolute impact decoupling). This 
situation shows how decoupling will promote advances 
in human well-being, economic development and the 
well-managed deployment of natural resources, all while 
reducing the negative environmental (and health) impacts 
arising from natural resource use. Ultimately, the long term 
aim is for the absolute decoupling also of resource use 
from economic activity and human well-being.
Decoupling can be achieved at the national level by 
outsourcing production activities and their impacts. This 
situation can lead to a ‘delusion’ in terms of decoupling 
results (Jiborn et al., 2018). As a result, the International 
Resource Panel advocates the use of a consumption-
based perspective, which means one that allocates the use 
of natural resources or their related impacts to the region 
where these resources are finally consumed. 
A true decoupling of the impacts related to natural 
resource use requires a systemic transformation of how 
natural resources are used and managed in our economic 
and social systems (IRP, 2017a). All countries are urged to 
consider innovative solutions to address the environmental 
challenges associated with natural resource use and more 
sustainable methods of consumption and production. 
These innovative solutions can be thought of as “business 
unusual” approaches, as opposed to the traditional 
business-as-usual policies. 
1.3 A Systems Approach: The DPSIR Framework
Focusing on resources, economic sectors, or different 
environmental or human impacts as individual silos will 
not encourage progress towards improved resource use or, 
more broadly, the achievement of international agreements 
and the SDGs. Addressing one area without consideration 
of the others may even have negative consequences.
A systems approach is crucial to maximize benefits across 
sectors and mitigate trade-offs from natural resource 
use. The authors of this report have chosen the Drivers-
Pressures-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) framework, 
one type of systems approach, to analyse natural resource 
use. The DPSIR framework is an appropriate tool for 
locating the flows of natural resources in global society’s 
interaction with the environment, as the framework 
creates linkages and feedback loops between the different 
components. The DPSIR framework also shows how 
societal, political and economic actions can affect the 
system (Müller et al., 2017). 
Socioeconomic drivers from human activities are the 
first factors in the chain of causal links. These drivers 
cause pressures on the environment, which in turn affect 
the state of the environment. The changing state of the 
environment can be seen through environmental and 
human impacts. A response is needed that can influence 
the key drivers and enable positive changes throughout the 
entire system through a continuous process.
This approach enables an integrated view of how society is 
using natural resources and the various implications of this 
use. Natural resource management benefits from a systems 
approach, as it provides insight and enables policymakers to 
steer development towards the SDGs (IRP, 2017a).
FIGURE 1.2 Decoupling Concept
 
Decoupling concept 
time
Well-being
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activity
Resource 
use
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Well-being decoupling
Resource decoupling
Impact decoupling
Source: This figure is re-drawn from IRP, 2017a by Zoi Environment Networks
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1.4 The DPSIR Framework and the Structure of this Report
This report is structured according to the DPSIR framework 
(see figure 1.4). The analysis in this report is divided into 
to seven regional groups to provide an encompassing 
view of the global situation: Africa; Asia and the Pacific; 
Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA); 
Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; North America; 
and West Asia (see UNEP, 2012). Natural resource use is 
also examined according to income groups. The income 
groups used in this report are high-income economies, 
upper-middle income economies, lower-middle income 
economies and low income economies (see DPAD, 2018). 
With some exceptions, which are noted after their use, 
these aggregations are used throughout the report.
Chapter 2 describes the overall trends of natural resource 
use. It shows that the global extraction of natural resources 
increased from 27.1 billion tons to 92.1 billion tons between 
1970 and 2017. In the same period, the average person 
consumed 65 per cent more natural resources in 2017 
compared to 50 years ago, despite an increase in per capita 
GDP of only 50 per cent. Even with global slowdowns of 
GDP and population since 2000, the accelerated demand 
and use of natural resources continues. Such a historic 
overview of natural resource use helps to identify points 
of change that explain how drivers are creating pressures. 
Chapter 3 continues the analysis by adopting a life cycle 
assessment approach. It takes the amounts of natural 
resources used (from the previous chapter) and calculates 
the environmental pressures and impacts generated from 
the extraction and processing of these natural resources. 
This approach provides information about the state of 
FIGURE 1.3 DPSIR Framework and the SDGs
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the environment, and how this changing state generates 
impacts on human health/well-being and the environment. 
Chapter 3 finds a relative decoupling of resource related 
impacts from GDP, as well as a moderate relative 
decoupling of impacts from the extraction of resources 
occurred between 2000 and 2015. However, it also reveals 
a serious cause for concern: the overall impacts from 
the extraction and processing of natural resources is 
increasing in absolute terms. 
Resource extraction and processing of materials account 
for about half of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
This impact has increased by a factor of 1.4 since the 
year 2000. Additionally, the extraction and processing of 
natural resources contribute to over 90 per cent of global 
biodiversity loss and water stress impacts. 
This report adopts a production and consumption 
perspective when analysing resource use and the 
associated environmental impacts. Chapter 2 adopts 
these perspectives to study natural resource use 
across countries and regions, while Chapter 3 adopts 
these perspectives to describe the impacts of resource 
extraction and processing. The production-based 
perspective allocates the use of natural resources or 
the impacts related to natural resource extraction and 
processing to the location where they physically occur. 
The consumption-based perspective allocates the use or 
impacts throughout the supply chain to the region where 
these resources, incorporated in various commodities, 
are finally consumed by industries, governments and 
households (Dao et al., 2018; Wood et al., 2018). 
Chapter 4 posits that without fundamental changes, 
the use of natural resources will continue as in the past, 
making it difficult to achieve international agreements 
such as the Paris Agreement and the SDGs. In the same 
chapter, however, an alternative is provided in the form of 
a much more optimistic outlook. Adopting a combination 
of societal changes as well as resource efficiency policies 
based on scientific research and development, climate 
mitigation and carbon removal policies, and widespread 
biodiversity protection measures can lead to an absolute 
decoupling of negative environmental impacts from 
natural resource use and economic growth and a relative 
decoupling of natural resource use from GDP per capita. It 
is possible to achieve dual decoupling that can lead to well-
being decoupling and impact decoupling (see figure 1.2). 
Chapter 5 reflects on the messages of chapters 2 to 4, 
and then offers a response to the natural resource use 
and management evaluated in this report. This includes 
practical examples of polices that are used in the Towards 
Sustainability scenario and eight elements for multi-
beneficial policymaking. The response is largely relevant 
for policymakers in the public sector or at international 
levels, and is also important for the private sector and civil 
society.
FIGURE 1.4 DPSIR Framework underlying the structure and findings of this Report
CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 5
CHAPTER 4
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Main findings
  Global population has doubled and global economic activity (GDP) has grown fourfold since the 1970s, raising 
living standards and human well-being in many parts of the world. The growing population and expanding 
global economy were fuelled by a fast-growing material supply and extraction of primary materials, increasing 
pressure on land and water. During the period 1970 to 2017, annual global extraction of materials grew from 
27.1 billion tons to 92.1 billion tons (average annual growth of 2.6 per cent). The global average of material 
demand per capita grew from 7.4 tons in 1970 to 12.2 tons per capita in 2017.
  Domestic material consumption patterns have changed rapidly in the last 50 years. In 1970, Asia and the 
Pacific, Europe, and North America each required equal shares of primary materials of about a quarter of the 
global total. In 2017, Asia and the Pacific accounted for almost 60 per cent of the global total.
  Global inequalities in material use have continued. The material footprint - a final demand-based measure of 
material use - attributes global material extraction to the point of final use. High-income countries consume 
27 tons of materials on average, which is 60 per cent higher than the upper-middle countries and more than 
thirteen times the level of the low-income group (at two tons per capita).
  Global material productivity (the efficiency of material use) has grown substantially slower than labour and 
energy productivity. Global material productivity started to decline around the year 2000, and has stagnated 
in recent years. Even though material productivity improved rapidly in both the old and new industrialized 
countries, the simultaneous shift in shares of global production away from economies that have a higher 
material productivity, to economies that have a lower material productivity explains how difficult it is to bring 
about a rapid improvement in global material efficiency.
  Although slight relative decoupling of water use from population growth began in the 1990s, global water use 
is increasing and 30 per cent of global river basin area - excluding hyper-arid1 zones and Antarctica - have been 
under severe and mid water stress since 2010. Between 2000 and 2010, total global cropland area increased 
by 1.34 per cent from 15.2 million to 15.4 million km2.
  The integration of economic and environmental policies needs to continue to facilitate improvements in 
resource productivity, and to promote production and consumption systems that provide essential services 
such as housing, transport, food and energy, with much lower material and energy throughputs and lower 
levels of emissions. This probably requires a fundamental rebalancing of the trade-off between increasing 
resource and labour productivity, in favour of resource productivity and ultimately allowing for an absolute 
decoupling of human well-being and resource use. 
1 Aridity index ≤ 0.05.
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 authors
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2.1 What Drives Our Resource Use Trends?
2 The Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia (EECCA) region is composed exclusively of independent nations that formed following the 
dissolution of the USSR. Of those successor states, the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) are not included in the EECCA region.
Population growth and economic activity (measured by 
growth in gross domestic product (GDP) are commonly 
seen as the two most important drivers of natural resource 
use (UNEP, 2016b). Overall, global population has doubled 
and global GDP has grown fourfold since the 1970s, 
thereby requiring large amounts of natural resources to 
fuel economic development and human well-being.
Since the 1970s, global population has grown by a yearly 
average of over 1.5 per cent, increasing from under 
3.7 billion people in 1970 to over 7.5 billion people in 2017 
(UNDESA, 2017). Asia and the Pacific remained by far 
the most populous region across the entire period, but 
the rapid rate of increase in Africa’s population is another 
salient feature with implications for future natural resource 
use distribution (see figure 2.1). The share of people living 
in the high-income group of countries has fallen from 
23 per cent of the global total in 1970 to around 16 per cent 
in 2017. This indicates that lower population growth rates 
are linked to higher per capita wealth, a relationship that 
is validated by examining each band of the four individual 
income bands in figure 2.2, with the low-income band 
experiencing the fastest growth in population (at almost 
2.7 per cent average per year).
GDP expanded much faster than global population, at 
a yearly rate of 3 per cent from 18.9 trillion US$ in 1970 
to 76.5 trillion US$ in 2016 (measured in constant 2010 
prices) (UN, 2017a). Asia and the Pacific experienced the 
highest rate of growth, averaging 4.5 per cent per year, and 
accounted for the largest single share by 2011 (increasing 
from 17 per cent of the global total in 1970 to 32 per cent 
in 2016). All other world regions experienced growth in 
GDP of over 2.2 per cent per year throughout the period. 
However, those with the lowest growth rates - EECCA2 
and Europe - saw their share of global GDP decrease 
markedly, from 4 per cent to 3 per cent and 39 per cent 
to 27 per cent respectively (see figure 2.3). The group of 
high-income countries produced 80 per cent of global GDP 
in 1970 and was still responsible for 65 per cent of global 
GDP in 2016, while experiencing the slowest growth at 
an average of 2.6 per cent per year. The fastest growth of 
GDP was experienced by the lower-middle income group of 
countries at 5.1 per cent per year (see figure 2.4). 
FIGURE 2.1 Distribution of population among seven world 
regions, 1970 – 2017, million people  
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FIGURE 2.2 Distribution of global population among four 
national income bands, with ratio of high-income group 
to total, 1970 – 2017
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Per capita GDP is a better predictor of material living 
standards than total GDP. Global per capita GDP doubled 
between 1970 and 2016, and reached an average per 
capita of around 10,000 US$, with substantial ongoing 
inequalities among world regions. However, the decrease 
in per capita incomes following important historical 
events is mirrored in the per capita GDP trajectories of 
the seven world regions (see figure 2.5). In West Asia, for 
example, levels of GDP per capita have never recovered to 
levels seen during the second oil price shock of the late 
FIGURE 2.5 Per-capita GDP for seven world regions, plus 
global average, 1970 – 2016, US$ per capita (Constant 
2010 prices)  
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FIGURE 2.6 Per-capita GDP for four national income 
bands, plus global average, 1970 – 2016, US$ per capita 
(Constant 2010 prices), with ratio of high income group to 
world total 
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FIGURE 2.3 Distribution of global GDP among seven world 
regions, 1970 – 2016, billion US$ (Constant 2010 prices)  
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FIGURE 2.4 Distribution of global GDP among four national 
income bands, with global total and ratio of high income 
group to total, 1970 – 2017, billion US$ (Constant 2010 
prices)
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1970s-early1980s, as a result of the protracted reductions 
in real oil prices for many years, combined with the most 
rapid, sustained population increase of any region over 
the period (with average growth of over 3.3 per cent per 
year). There was also a noticeable decrease in wealth for 
people in the EECCA region in the decade following the 
dissolution of the former USSR, while the impact of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) can be seen as a clear imprint 
on national incomes in Europe and North America. 
Grouping countries by income groups provides a clearer 
illustration of the effect that rising population has on 
individual wealth (in the form of GDP per capita) (see 
figure 2.6). In contrast to the clear decrease in the share 
of global GDP of high-income nations seen in figure 2.4, 
the ratio of per capita income to the global average in 
high-income countries increased between 1970 and 
2016. All of this relative increase happened prior to the 
new millennium, at which point rapid growth of GDP in the 
upper-middle income group (4.7 per cent per year from 
2000 to 2016, driven by the industrialization of parts of 
Asia and the Pacific and Latin America), combined with 
a major moderation in population growth in the Asia and 
the Pacific region (1.1 per cent for 2000 to 2016 per year 
as compared to 1.8 per cent per year from 1970 to 2000) 
began to reduce this ratio. Importantly, the detailed data 
summarized in figure 2.6 indicates that the ratio of high-
income countries’ per capita GDP to low-income countries’ 
GDP per capita doubled over the period as a whole, 
signalling rising income and wealth inequality among and 
within wealthy and poor economies (Alvaredo, et al. 2017). 
In combination, the growing population and expanding 
global economy have required an ever-increasing supply 
of materials and extraction of primary materials, thereby 
intensifying pressures on land and water usage.
In the following sections we investigate the trends in 
environmental pressures caused by the drivers of global 
economic and population growth by assessing global 
demand trends in materials, water and land (as these 
are the essential natural resources that fuel economic 
processes and societal well-being).
2.2 Historical Analysis of Material Resource Use
Material resources are biomass, fossil fuels, metals and 
non-metallic minerals used in the economy (IRP, 2017a). 
What were the trends in natural material use over the last 
five decades and has there been a trend of decoupling of 
economic growth and human well-being from the demand 
for material resources? 
2.2.1.   Global Trends in Material Extraction
Economic activity, infrastructure and material standards 
depend on a permanent throughput of materials to fuel 
the economic process and underpin social well-being. 
Materials are extracted and traded, then transformed 
into goods or used to enable services. They are finally 
disposed of in the environment as waste or emissions. 
Environmental impacts occur at all stages of the supply 
chain, and have been intensifying in proportion with the 
growing global demand for materials.
The global data show that there has been no prolonged 
period of stabilization or decline in global material demand 
over the last five decades. 
During the period 1970 to 2017, annual global extraction 
of materials grew from 27.1 billion tons to 92.1 billion tons 
(see figure 2.7), an annual average growth of 2.6 per cent. 
The new millennium ushered in a major increase in global 
material requirements, which grew at 2.3 per cent per year 
from 1970 to 2000, but accelerated to 3.2 per cent per year 
from 2000 to 2017 (UNEP, 2016; Schandl et al., 2017). The 
growth of global material demand was largely driven by 
major investments in infrastructure and increased material 
living standards in developing and transitioning countries, 
especially in Asia (Schandl & West, 2010). While there 
was a brief slowdown in the growth rate of demand for 
materials between 2008 and 2010 as a result of the global 
financial crisis, this has clearly had a very limited impact 
on the overall trajectory. 
The global average of material demand per capita was 
7.4 tons in 1970 and grew to 12.2 tons per capita in 2017. 
During the same time, per capita GDP grew from 5,198 US$ 
per capita to 10,606 US$ per capita. While per capita GDP 
more than doubled, material use grew by around two thirds 
between 1970 and 2017. It is important to note, however, 
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that the acceleration of global material extraction since 
the year 2000 has coincided with a slowdown in GDP and 
population growth. One driver of this phenomenon is likely 
to be the disproportionate concentration of GDP growth in 
economies that are moving through a stage of transition 
from an agrarian based to an urban-industrial economic 
mode that is particularly intensive in material and energy 
(Krausmann et al., 2008). 
Biomass – crops, crop residues, 
grazed biomass, timber, and wild 
catch of fish – accounted for one 
third of all extracted materials in 
1970, and by 2017, its share of 
total materials had been reduced to 
just over one quarter. This reflects 
the greater reliance of countries at 
early stages of economic development on 
biomass-based materials and energy systems. As an 
increasing proportion of the global population began to 
transition to higher levels of industrialization during the 
last five decades, the materials demand profile increasingly 
reflected the higher demand for minerals-based material 
and energy systems that characterize industrialized 
nations.
It is important to note that, while the share of biomass 
decreases in industrialized countries, the total amount 
used per capita often continues to grow. Thus, even as the 
share of biomass decreased, the total tonnage of biomass 
demand increased from 9.1 to 24.1 billion tons between 
1970 and 2017. This is an average 2.1 per cent increase 
per year, considerably higher than the corresponding 
growth rate of global population of 1.6 per cent per year. 
Crop harvest has grown at an annual rate of 2.2 per cent 
over the last five decades and was the most important 
component of biomass extraction in 2017 (9.5 billion tons 
accounting for 40 per cent of the total). Grazed biomass 
for livestock animals has grown at a similar average rate, 
reflecting the growing importance of an animal and dairy 
based diet for the expanding middle class in many parts of 
the world (Myers and Kent, 2003). The rate of growth has 
been slowest in biomass sub-categories for which non-
biomass alternatives are most easily substituted (such 
as wood - as fuel and building material) and where there 
are hard limits on yields that are not easily improved by 
advancing technology (such as for wild-caught fish).
Fossil fuels – coal, petroleum, natural 
gas, oil shale and tar sands – have 
grown in absolute terms from 6.2 
billion tons to 15 billion tons, but 
their share in global extraction 
decreased from 23 per cent in 
1970 to 16 per cent in 2017. 
They grew by a yearly average 
of 1.9 per cent between 1970 and 
2017. Natural gas had a growth rate of 2.8 per cent 
average yearly growth and coal displayed 2.1 per cent 
yearly growth, which were higher than for petroleum with 
1.3 per cent yearly growth. This is mainly a reflection of the 
expanded electricity generation capacity of coal/gas-fired 
power stations. More recently, coal use has nevertheless 
stagnated as lower gas prices, a surge in renewables and 
energy efficiency improvements have contributed to a 
slowdown in global coal consumption (IEA, 2017). 
Metal ores – iron, aluminium, 
copper and other non-ferrous 
metals – accounted for 9.5 per cent 
of global material extraction (2.6 
billion tons) in 1970, which grew 
slightly to around 10 per cent (9.1 
billion tons) in 2017. This represented 
average growth of 2.7 per cent per year 
and reflects the importance of metals for the construction 
industry, energy and transport infrastructure, equipment, 
manufacturing and for many consumer goods. The 
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FIGURE 2.7 Global material extraction, four main material 
categories, 1970 - 2017, million tons. Obtained by 
totalling domestic material extraction for all individual 
nations
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extraction of ferrous ores grew much faster, at a yearly 
average of 3.5 per cent compared to non-ferrous ores, 
which grew at 2.3 per cent per year. The high average 
growth rates for ferrous metals and non-metallic minerals 
for construction reflect the major build-up of urban and 
transport infrastructure in transitioning countries.
Non-metallic minerals – including 
sand, gravel and clay – are the 
largest component of material 
use and posted the largest 
growth in relative terms up 
from 34 per cent (9.2 billion 
tons) in 1970 to over 48 per cent 
(43.8 billion tons) in 2017. This reflects the major shift in 
global extraction from biomass to mineral-based natural 
resources. While all minerals can be thought of as non-
renewable in human time scales, the bulk of non-metallic 
minerals are construction aggregates (essentially crushed 
rock with some sand). While there may be local shortages 
of these materials, there is no prospect of any major global 
supply constraints for centuries to come. This contrasts 
with some smaller but extremely important sub-categories, 
such as fertilizer minerals and minerals in the fossil fuel 
and metal ore categories.
The transition in the material composition of the global 
economy from biomass and renewables towards minerals 
and non-renewable based systems has changed the 
nature of major environmental pressures, and increasingly 
moved impacts from the local to the global scale.
Global material extraction has also become marginally 
more concentrated over the last five decades, with ten 
economies responsible for over 68 per cent of global 
extraction in 2017, compared to around 64 per cent in 1970. 
More than a third of all materials in 2017 were extracted 
in China, followed by 7.6 per cent in India and 7.1 per cent 
in the United States. Of the ten largest extractors in 2017, 
shown in figure 2.8, Australia had by far the highest material 
extraction per capita at 93.3 tons, which was over two and 
a half times the next highest (Canada with 36.7 tons per 
capita), and almost four times China’s per capita rate. While 
India had the second highest total domestic extraction (DE) 
in 2017, it is significant that this is even with current per 
capita extraction levels at less than a quarter of the Chinese 
rate. If India follows broadly similar patterns of historical 
industrialization, the impact on global materials extraction 
will be similarly profound.
The pattern of global materials extraction in 2017 by 
world region (figure 2.9) clearly shows the dominant role 
of the Asia and Pacific region, as it accounts for over 
57 per cent of total extraction. This level reflects the very 
large population, combined with a per capita domestic 
extraction rate slightly higher than Europe (12.6 tons per 
capita compared to 12.1 tons per capita). North America 
has the highest per capita domestic extraction, followed 
by West Asia and EECCA, which are characterized by a 
heavy reliance on the extraction and export of fossil fuels 
for export income. 
The pattern of global materials extraction for country 
groups by income (figure 2.10) shows that materials 
extraction is dominated, in absolute terms, by upper-
middle income countries, which account for 56 per cent 
of the global total. Per capita levels of extraction are also 
highest for this group, at almost 15 per cent higher than for 
the high-income group. This reflects two major dynamics. 
The first is the demand for materials to build up the 
infrastructure required for newly industrializing countries. 
A second driver is likely to be the outsourcing of the more 
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FIGURE 2.8 Domestic extraction of materials – the ten 
largest extractors in 2017, million tons, with tons 
per-capita.
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material- and energy-intensive stages of production chains 
by higher income countries to lower-income transitioning 
countries. This relocation of material-intensive processes 
to middle-income countries is encouraged by lower 
environmental standards (especially in terms of local 
pollution) compared with those typically enforced in 
countries of the higher-income group. 
2.2.2.   Global Trade of Materials
Global trade in primary materials mitigates regional 
imbalances in material resource availability, supporting 
global systems of production and consumption (Dittrich 
and Bringezu, 2010). While some materials (such as 
biomass or sand/gravel) are locally sourced in the main, 
others such as metal ores and fossil fuels are often 
disproportionately concentrated in some world regions or 
else impractical to exploit where present in other locations. 
Fossil fuels are the most traded primary material, 
accounting for half of the global total of 11.6 billion tons of 
direct physical exports in 2017. Metal ores accounted for 
a further quarter of the global total (figure 2.11).
Markets and supply chains for many materials that are 
strategically important for production systems and 
essential service provision have become globalized. As a 
result, the prices paid and received for these commodities 
locally are in large part determined by world events, and 
reflect global market prices and volatility (UNEP, 2016). 
The physical trade balance (PTB) is an indicator of whether 
a country or region is a net importer or exporter of primary 
materials, and gives an idea of a country’s position and 
role in global supply chains. PTB is calculated as physical 
imports minus physical exports. Regional PTB shown in 
figure 2.12 indicates that Europe was the world’s major net 
importer region for most of the 1970 to 2017 period, but 
that its total balance remained relatively stable at around 
1 billion tons (with moderate volatility of around +/- 300 
million tons around the average over time). This volatility 
reflected events such as a move away from Middle Eastern 
sources of petroleum in the early 1980s, as the North Sea 
sources increased production in the wake of the Oil Price 
Shocks, and reduced demand for imports more generally 
during the GFC because of the economic slowdown. 
FIGURE 2.9 Domestic extraction of materials by seven 
world regions in 2017, million tons, with corresponding 
DE tons per-capita
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FIGURE 2.10 Domestic extraction of materials by four 
national income bands in 2017, million tons, with 
corresponding DE tons per-capita
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In contrast, the Asia and Pacific region saw ongoing growth 
in its requirement for net imports, with a rapid acceleration 
in the new millennium mainly resulting from this region’s 
growth. Growth in the Asia and Pacific region’s PTB was 
5.9 per cent per year from 2000 to 2017, which led to it 
supplanting Europe as the world’s major net importing 
3 A noteworthy detail is that the decline in net exports for the upper-middle income group began two years ahead of the global financial crisis, and so 
the industrialization process appears to have been an established dynamic behind rebalancing, which was then just accelerated by the GFC. 
region by 2009, and then continuing to be 70 per cent 
higher than Europe just eight years later. West Asia was the 
largest net exporting region from 1970 to 2006, at which 
point it was supplanted by EECCA. In both cases, fossil 
fuels dominate exports. The rapid global substitution of 
other sources of supply for Middle Eastern petroleum, in 
the wake of Oil Price Shocks, shows clearly in West Asia’s 
physical trade balance in the early 1980s as a recognizable 
inverse of the trend described for Europe.
In figure 2.13, grouping physical trade balance by wealth 
bands reveals the upper-middle income and high-income 
countries to be almost mirror images of each other, with 
steadily growing net exports from the former balancing 
steadily growing net imports by the latter for the first three 
and a half decades, followed by a very rapid rebalancing 
of both towards zero PTB over the final decade, with a 
minor reversal of roles in the final two years. The cause for 
these trends again lies mainly in the rapid industrialization 
of some countries in the upper-middle income group 
and the shift of much global production to this group, 
especially in the wake of the global financial crisis3, which 
disproportionately affected high-income countries. This 
resulted in the reallocation of much of the domestic 
extraction that from the upper-middle income group to 
local production and consumption, as well as ultimately 
drawing in primary materials exports from all other groups. 
FIGURE 2.11 Global trade in materials, four main material 
categories, 1970 – 2017, million tons
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FIGURE 2.13 Physical trade balance by four national income 
bands, 1970 – 2017, million tons
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FIGURE 2.12 Physical trade balance by seven world regions, 
1970 – 2017, million tons
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In driving commodity prices higher, this made exporting 
primary products a more economically attractive activity 
even among some members of the high-income group. For 
Australia alone, the increase in total exports of fossil fuels 
and metal ores combined, between 2005 and 2015, was 
over 730 million tons, which on its own could account for 
around half the decrease in PTB of the high-income group 
from its highest level of over 1.3 billion tons. 
The apparent near balance of the physical trade balance 
of low-income countries across the entire 1970-2017 
period largely reflects the fact that this group does not 
account for major volumes of international trade in terms 
of imports or exports.
Per capita levels of PTB are within a range of +/- 1.8 tons 
for five of the seven world regions (see figure 2.14). The 
two regions that have operated outside this relatively 
narrow band are again West Asia (for the entire period, 
and generally at over three times this level per capita) 
and EECCA post-2000. This reflects their importance as 
global suppliers of petroleum and natural gas. Despite the 
ongoing growth in West Asia’s net exports since the major 
reduction of the early 1980s (see figure 2.14), population 
growth there has been sufficiently rapid that net per 
capita exports have been slowly declining since the 1990s 
(-1.4 per cent per year from 1990 to 2017).
4 See www.resourcepanel.org/global-material-flows-database.
In contrast, broadly comparable growth in net exports in 
EECCA has flowed through to a very strong increase in per 
capita net exports (5.8 per cent per year over the same 
period). Given the reliance of key countries in these regions 
on petroleum and gas for export income, this illustrates 
that West Asia is under pressure to continuously increase 
extraction just to maintain current living standards, while 
the EECCA region (with much lower population growth) 
does not face this challenge.
The per capita physical trade balance for four country 
income groups accentuates the trend identified for total 
PTB for income groups (figure 2.15).
An assessment at the country level shows that, despite 
China’s dominance of net imports in total tonnage terms, 
and the fact that it drives the aforementioned trend for 
physical trade balance in the upper-middle income group 
of countries, its net import levels of 1.4 tons per capita 
remain relatively low. This is less than a third that of Asia’s 
second largest economy, Japan, and less than a fifth of 
South Korea’s level. 
The largest net exporter of materials in 2017 by far was 
Australia, followed by the Russian Federation, Brazil, 
Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. The detailed data available 
from the IRP website4 show that Australia’s extremely 
high levels of net exports are dominated by two categories 
FIGURE 2.14 Per-capita physical trade balance by seven 
world regions, 1970 – 2017, tons
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FIGURE 2.15 Per-capita Physical trade balance by four 
national income bands, 1970 – 2017, tons 
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- ferrous ores and coal - the bulk of which is destined for 
other countries in the Asia and Pacific region. Brazil’s 
exports are dominated by ferrous ores, while those of 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Norway and the UAE are all largely 
the result of petroleum and/or natural gas exports. On a 
per capita basis, Australia is again almost twice the level 
of the next major exporter, Norway. The presence of the 
two large international traders in ferrous ores in this figure 
(Australia and Brazil), while dominant exporters of other 
metals (notably Chile with regard to copper) are absent, 
simply reflects the fact that most non-ferrous metals are 
traded in highly concentrated or refined forms.
Where PTB gives the balances of direct physical tonnages 
traded, the raw material trade balance (RTB) metric, 
included in figure 2.18 and figure 2.19, considers the 
embodiment of materials that did not physically cross 
borders with traded goods, but that were nevertheless 
required for their production. This links material extraction, 
wherever it may physically take place, through global 
production chains to end consumers in a way that cannot 
be achieved using the direct physical trade metrics 
like PTB. The method by which extracted materials are 
attributed to final consumption is rather complex, and 
both data and computationally intensive (Lenzen et al. 
2017), but in general terms, monetary flows in the world’s 
economy are used as proxies to attribute parallel material 
flows to final demand. 
The total tonnages accounted for by the raw material 
trade balance are much larger than for the physical trade 
balance because of its much more inclusive scope. In 
many cases, materials are highly concentrated before 
they are first traded across borders. For non-ferrous 
ores, for example, the concentrate or crude metal that is 
traded internationally will usually be one or more times 
more concentrated than the ore originally extracted. While 
direct physical trade measures will usually exclude the 
vast bulk of this ore left behind in the country of extraction, 
as well as any other materials, for example fossil fuels, 
which had to be consumed to process it, the raw material 
trade balance seeks to include it. As shown in figure 2.18, 
whereas PTB for high-income countries in 2017 implies 
that this group of countries was in fact a minor net 
FIGURE 2.16 Top-ten net importers of materials measured 
by the Physical Trade Balance (PTB), 2017, million tons 
and tons per capita
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FIGURE 2.17 Top-ten net exporters of materials measured 
by the Physical Trade Balance (PTB), 2017, million tons 
and tons per capita
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exporter of 302 million tons of materials, the RTB measure 
indicates that, after re-attributing all extraction according 
to final consumption, the trade of this group in fact was 
equivalent to a net virtual transfer equivalent to 11.8 billion 
tons of primary extraction from elsewhere in the world into 
this group. Similarly, for the upper-middle income group, 
net imports of just under 124 million tons on a PTB basis 
are dwarfed by the net export of the equivalent of 7.3 
billion tons of primary extraction out of this group to the 
rest of the world. Comparing RTB among the groupings 
in figure 2.18 indicates that the economic activity in the 
high-income group of countries depends on very large and 
increasing levels of extraction of primary materials in other 
countries, which are effectively “imported” in virtual form 
and embodied in traded commodities. 
Figure 2.19 shows the same virtual transfers of extracted 
primary materials, on a per capita basis. From this 
perspective the average person in the high-income group 
was reliant on the mobilization of 9.8 tons of primary 
materials elsewhere in the world in 2017. This reliance 
on external materials has been increasing at a rate of 
1.6 per cent per year since the year 2000. 
2.2.3.   Domestic Material Consumption
Domestic material consumption (DMC) is another direct 
measure of the materials that are consumed in a national 
economy. It is calculated as domestic extraction (DE) plus 
physical trade balance and, as such, it directly measures 
the physical quantity of materials that are extracted from 
or imported into a nation’s territory (minus any physical 
exports). This is a direct indicator of the total materials 
that must be directly managed in a nation’s territory. These 
materials may be consumed over the short term (such as 
most fossil fuels) and so turned into waste and emissions, 
or remain for prolonged periods of time in national stocks 
(for example metals and building materials in vehicles and 
consumer durables, buildings, transportation and other 
network infrastructure). Ultimately, however, the materials 
accounted for in DMC will need to be disposed of back into 
the environment as some form of waste or emission. This 
is why DMC can also be thought of as an indicator of the 
long-term waste potential of a national economy. 
At the global level, domestic material consumption and 
domestic extraction are equivalent. In figure 2.20, the 
FIGURE 2.18 Distribution of physical trade balance (PTB) 
and raw material trade balance (RTB) across four national 
income bands, for 1990, 2000 and 2017, million tons
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FIGURE 2.19 Comparison of per-capita physical trade 
balance (PTB) and raw material trade balance (RTB) 
across four national income bands, for 1990, 2000 and 
2015, tons per capita
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FIGURE 2.22 Per-capita domestic material consumption 
capita by seven world regions, with world average, 1970 
– 2017
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FIGURE 2.23 Per-capita domestic material consumption by 
four national income bands, with world average, 1970 – 
2017, and ratio of high-Income group to world total
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rapidly increasing dominance of the Asia and Pacific region 
in global DMC is clear. In 1970, this region accounted for 
25 per cent of the global total of 27 billion tons, similar 
to Europe’s 24 per cent and North America’s 22 per cent 
shares. Between 1970 and 2017, however, while the DMC 
of Europe and North America grew at 0.6 per cent per 
year and 0.5 per cent per year respectively, in the Asia and 
Pacific region it grew at 4.5 per cent per year. By 2017, the 
Asia and Pacific region accounted for almost 60 per cent 
of the global total of 92.1 billion tons, while Europe’s and 
North America’s combined share decreased to less than 
18 per cent. 
The share of global domestic material consumption 
accounted for by high-income nations is rapidly 
decreasing, as illustrated by the high-income countries/
world ratio in figure 2.21. This is due to the rapidly rising 
DMC of the upper-middle income group of nations, which 
increased its share of the global total from 33 per cent 
FIGURE 2.21 Domestic material consumption by four 
national income bands and World total, 1970 – 2017, 
billion tons, with ratio of High-Income group to world 
total
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FIGURE 2.20 Domestic material consumption by seven 
world regions, 1970 – 2017, billion tons 
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in 1970 to 56 per cent in 2017, while the share of 
high-income countries dropped from 52 per cent to 
22 per cent. The share of DMC accounted for by lower-
middle income countries also grew from 12 per cent to 
19 per cent, however the share of the low-income group 
remained unchanged at under 3 per cent, despite having 
by far the fastest growth in population. This shows that, 
while virtually none of the massive growth in materials 
consumption in the new millennium has gone to the 
wealthiest countries, neither has much of it gone to the 
poorest countries despite the latter being the group in 
most urgent need of improved material living standards. 
In figure 2.22, the trajectory of domestic material 
consumption per capita for the seven world regions reflects, 
and in some cases magnifies, the aforementioned features 
and events. Rapidly increasing per capita consumption 
in the Asia and Pacific region is a major factor, as is the 
impact of the global financial crisis on North American 
consumption (although this impact is much less obvious 
in Europe’s DMC per capita). The dramatic fall in DMC 
per capita in the EECCA region following the dissolution 
of the USSR is particularly marked in figure 2.22, as the 
fall in DMC there was driven by two dynamics operating in 
tandem. The first was the overall depression of economic 
activity, which suppressed domestic demand for domestic 
extraction and for imports. The second dynamic, which 
operates over the longer term, was the re-orientation of 
major EECCA economies to global rather than internal/
eastern bloc markets. Much of the DE that had previously 
been used internally (thus contributing to the EECCA’s 
DMC account) was made available for external sale and 
export (decreasing the DMC account). Figure 2.22 shows 
that the EECCA region has still not returned to the levels of 
DMC per capita seen at the end of the Soviet era, despite 
the region’s GDP per capita levels having recovered and 
exceeded Soviet-era levels.
The decreasing significance of high-income countries in 
determining global DMC is further reflected in a DMC per 
capita basis, in terms of the high-income to world ratio. 
More significantly, per capita levels of DMC in the upper-
middle income group surpassed those of the high-income 
group by 2012. While the time series since 2012 is too short 
to infer any robust trend, any evidence for a convergence 
and stabilization of DMC levels below 20 tons per capita 
is lacking. Given that we know there has been a large and 
ongoing transfer of global production shares from high-
income countries to the upper-middle income countries, 
this observation calls into question how much the mooted 
stabilization of DMC at higher income levels (Steinberger 
et al., 2013) is real, and how much of it is actually just a 
result of the transfer of material- and energy-intensive 
production stages to transitioning countries. This is a 
question of great importance in determining likely future 
trends in material resource demand.
Domestic material consumption has been selected by the 
Inter Agency Expert Group (IEAG) as the basis for indicators 
to monitor progress towards SDG 12.2, which calls for the 
sustainable management of natural resources. In this 
role it has both strengths and weaknesses. Its role as an 
indicator of the total waste potential that must ultimately 
be sunk back into the environment within a nation’s 
territory is valuable, and it cannot be replaced in this role 
by the consumption-based measures such as material 
footprint (see below). On the other hand, it is currently 
used for the SDGs in a highly aggregated form (typically 
one, or at the most four, individual material categories), 
lumping together materials that have radically different 
environmental impacts per ton. Finally, it is critical that the 
DMC be used in combination with a consumption-based 
measure. DMC’s strength in attributing environmental 
loads to a specific territory can be a major weakness in 
attributing responsibility for the mobilization of resources 
and emissions. An individual nation that simply outsources 
the most material- and energy-intensive processes in its 
production chains will score well on DMC based SDG 
measures, regardless of the environmental load its 
consumption may represent on the global level.
2.2.4.   Material Footprint of Consumption
Material footprint (MF) is the other material flow indicator 
that has been selected to monitor progress in the context 
of the SDGs, and more specifically SDG 8.4 on resource 
efficiency. The material footprint is a demand-based - 
rather than a territorially based - indicator, bearing the 
same relationship to DMC as the previously discussed RTB 
and PTB. In short, it attributes all of the material resources 
mobilized globally to the final consumer, and so it traces 
embodied or virtual flows of materials associated with 
value, rather than simply territorially delineated physical 
flows (Wiedmann et al., 2015). In the context of the SDGs, 
material footprint complements DMC by ensuring that 
material flows underpinning a country’s consumption, but 
that largely take place in other countries’ territories and 
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impose their environmental costs there, are attributed to 
an end consumer’s account. 
The time series available for material footprints and MF 
per capita only run from 1990 to 2017 (see figures 2.24 
and 2.25). As a general trend, the share of MF attributed 
to wealthier regions and country groups is much higher 
compared to domestic material consumption. Note that 
in global totals, DE = DMC = MF, so it is just the relative 
shares of responsibility for global domestic extraction 
that are being redistributed by the material footprinting 
calculations. 
The material footprint of the upper-middle income group 
did not exceed that of the high-income group until the 
global financial crisis, and by 2017 the high-income group 
still accounted for over 35 per cent of global MF, compared 
to only 22 per cent seen previously for DMC. The combined 
share of the lower-middle and low-income groups dropped 
from 22 per cent of DMC to 18 per cent of MF.
There has not been a level of global wealth at which 
material demand has stabilized or declined. 
On a per capita basis, the high-income group has not been 
overtaken but rather maintains levels of MF consumption 
of around 27 tons (which is 60 per cent higher than the 
upper-middle income group) through to the end of the 
time series. This is also more than 13 times the level of 
the low-income group (at 2 tons per capita). After a rapid 
reduction of MF in high-income countries during the GFC, 
MF per capita resumed a modest and ongoing upward 
growth trajectory. This contrasts with the stagnant to 
slow decrease seen for DMC per capita, and suggests that 
improvements for the high-income group on that metric do 
indeed come from outsourcing production rather than any 
decrease in underlying material consumption.
2.2.5.   Material Productivity
Material productivity, the efficiency of material use, is of 
economic importance and helps reduce environmental 
pressure and impacts. Material productivity, however, 
needs to be reviewed in the context of other key productivity 
measures. It is therefore illustrated in Figure 2.26 alongside 
three additional aspects of productivity (labour, energy and 
GHG emissions). Each of these additional measures is 
defined and discussed briefly, followed by a more detailed 
discussion of material productivity – the economic gains 
achieved through resource efficiency (stated as the value 
obtained from a certain amount of natural resources).
The global economic settings have focused on 
improvements in labour productivity at the cost of material 
and energy productivity. This was justifiable in a world 
where labour was the limiting factor of production. We are 
now in a world where natural resources and environmental 
FIGURE 2.24 Material footprint by four national income 
bands, with world average, 1970 – 2017, and ratio of high-
income group to World total
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FIGURE 2.25 Material footprint per capita by four national 
income bands, with World average, 1970 – 2017, and ratio 
of high-income group to world total 
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sinks have become the limiting factor of production, and 
shifts are required to focus on resource productivity.
Labour productivity – US$ of GDP per hour of work – has 
improved substantially since the 1970s and has doubled 
over the last five decades. An important aspect of labour 
productivity is that, historically, one of the main ways of 
increasing it has been to substitute increased inputs 
of materials and (especially) energy for labour. It is also 
improved by increasing the knowledge and/or skills of 
workers.
Energy productivity – US$ of GDP per megajoule (MJ) 
of primary energy use – has increased more or less 
continually throughout the period from 1970 to 2016, but 
may be divided into two fairly distinct phases. It increased 
relatively strongly from 1970 through to the early 2000s, 
although at a lower rate than labour productivity. From 
then on, there was a distinct slowdown in the rate of 
improvement through to the current time, with short 
multi-year periods where productivity declined. Energy 
productivity has, however, not displayed the longer-term 
deterioration seen for material productivity. The main 
driver of this slowing rate of improvement is probably 
the same as that for the decline in material productivity, 
which is the increasing share of global production taking 
place in low energy productivity countries. There is also 
an element of the substitution of energy for labour, as the 
energy systems in transitioning countries have developed 
(with increasing electrification and more widespread use 
of fossil fuels for transportation). 
GHG Emission Productivity – US$ of GDP per kg of CO2 
equivalent emissions – GHG emissions to a large degree 
mirror the trajectory of energy productivity, as most are 
produced from the burning of fossil fuels, although there 
are significant contributions from land use and agriculture. 
Where GHG productivity was increasing faster than energy 
intensity from 1970 to 2000, this likely reflected simple 
ongoing improvements in energy efficiency among major 
users of fossil fuels (better internal combustion engines 
and more efficient generators), and perhaps some shift 
from more carbon intensive fuels, particularly coal, to either 
less carbon intensive fossil fuels (notably natural gas), or 
non-fossil fuel energy sources such as hydroelectricity 
and nuclear. From around the year 2000, GHG productivity 
begins to parallel or even under-perform against energy 
productivity. This coincides with a rapid increase in China’s 
share of the world economy, and in large part reflects the 
very high reliance of that country’s energy systems on 
coal. Since 2010, GHG productivity has again started to 
grow at a faster rate than energy productivity. Factors 
that might explain this include the improved efficiency of 
much of the Chinese coal generator fleet, a major shift to 
natural gas rather than coal-fired electricity generation in 
the United States of America (due to the deployment of 
hydraulic fracking technology) and the increased use of 
lower carbon technologies, including renewable energy 
sources, more generally. 
Material Productivity – US$ of GDP per kg of material use 
– posted the slowest growth of all four productivity factors 
and started to decline around the year 2000, stagnating in 
recent years. This means that the average environmental 
pressure and impact per dollar of products and services 
have been increasing in the global economy since the start 
of the new millennium. This is particularly discouraging 
from an environmental point of view, as increasing material 
productivity is one necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
to enable the continuation of economic growth while 
reducing environmental impacts.
The general lack of improvement in material productivity 
at a global level seems somewhat counterintuitive, given 
the ongoing improvement of technical process efficiencies 
in most industries. It seems even more counterintuitive 
given the fact that the majority of individual countries 
show ongoing improvements in resource productivity 
FIGURE 2.26 Global resource productivity (material, energy 
and CO2 emissions) and labour productivity, index, 1970 
– 2017
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over the time period, including the top countries in 
terms of GDP and material flows. For example, material 
intensity for the People’s Republic of China (the inverse 
of material productivity) improved rapidly over the entire 
1970-2017 period, and continued improving at a rate over 
2.4 per cent per year from 2000 to 2015. The reason why 
global material productivity has not improved, even given 
the above, is that there has been a simultaneous shift in 
the share of global production from economies with high 
material productivity to economies that have much lower 
material productivity. This is reflected in the relatively high 
materials use per capita for the upper-middle income 
group seen in figure 2.23, and is partly a result of the 
outsourcing of material and energy intensive processes 
by many of the wealthiest countries. Material productivity 
in transitioning countries is inherently lower, because the 
infrastructure and plants for industrialization need to be 
built, and because these economies lack much of the high 
value adding/low material requirement service sectors (for 
example finance, education and research) that have built 
up over time in the highest income countries. 
Improving material productivity (and energy productivity) 
in the future requires a new economic paradigm. Economic 
and environmental policy needs to be more integrated to 
facilitate improvements in resource productivity, and to 
promote production and consumption systems that provide 
essential services such as housing, transport, food and 
energy with much lower material and energy throughputs. 
This will probably requires a fundamental rebalancing of 
the trade-off between increasing resource and labour 
productivity towards greater resource productivity. 
2.2.6.   Material Intensity of Production and 
Consumption
One important measure of the sustainability of current 
resource management practices is how efficiently natural 
resources are being used by the economy to generate 
each unit of goods and services, as reflected by GDP. A 
standard metric used is material intensity (MI), defined as 
domestic material consumption/gross domestic product 
(this is simply the inverse of material productivity, seen in 
section 2.2.5). 
For a number of years, global material intensity has 
stagnated despite improvements in material efficiency 
in most individual countries, world regions and income 
groups. This is clearly shown in figure 2.27. The underlying 
explanation for this counter-intuitive phenomenon, as also 
reflected in material productivity, was discussed in detail 
in section 2.2.5.
Global material efficiency has stalled because the shift in 
economic activity from highly resource-efficient countries 
to less resource-efficient countries has been faster than 
the improvements in resource efficiency in individual 
countries.
Resource efficiency has been improving (such that 
material intensity has been decreasing) for all income 
groups throughout the 1970-2016 period, and the ratio 
of high-income countries to the world indicates that the 
rate of improvement was highest for the high-income 
group, which decreased at a rate of -1.7 per cent per year. 
All individual income groups improved faster than the 
aggregated world rate of -0.4 per cent per year. In the more 
recent 1990 to 2016 period, while all individual income 
groups decreased their material intensity by rates (-0.3 to 
-1.6 per cent per year), global aggregated material intensity 
deteriorated (increased) at slightly more than 0.1 per cent 
per year. An important observation here is that the MI of 
the high-income group and the upper-middle income group 
in 2016 are 0.4 kg/US$ and 2.5 kg/US$. For every US$ in 
economic activity that shifts from the former to the latter, 
the amount of materials required to produce that dollar will 
increase by more than six-fold given current supply chain 
and production characteristics.
Using material flow indicators of domestic material 
consumption and material footprints (territorial and 
consumption-based) in addition to the standard territorial 
definition of material intensity (DMC/GDP) provided in 
figure 2.27, we provide a consumption-based version using 
MF/GDP in figure 2.28 and refer to it as Adjusted MI.
The changes in trajectories for different income groupings 
when Adjusted Material Intensity is used are given in figure 
2.28. Interpreting these differences in detail is difficult, 
as much variation is probably due to fluctuations in the 
exchange rate over time, which affects both the aggregated 
measure of GDP used directly in the indicator, and the 
mechanism for redistributing DE used to generate the 
material footprint indicator. General features that should 
be robust, however, include Adjusted MI being notably lower 
than MI for low-income countries and higher for wealthier 
countries. Aggregated global adjusted MI and its trend over 
time are identical for both Adjusted MI and MI. 
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2.2.7.   Drivers of Material Use
We use the notion that environmental pressure and 
impact can be expressed as a combination of population 
size, affluence and resource use or environmental impact 
intensity to discuss the extent to which population growth 
and consumption have determined resource demand in 
the past. This relationship was expressed by the well-
known IPAT formula (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971), which we 
modify and use as a framework for analysing the relative 
importance of three different, economy-wide scale drivers 
of materials demand. The original formulation is: 
I = P * A * T
Where I is environmental impact, P is population, A is 
Affluence and T is a technological coefficient, which usually 
just translates as the intensity of I per unit of money used 
in the Affluence term. The original form of the equation 
also needs to be transformed to a logarithmic form to 
facilitate attribution of discrete shares of impact growth 
among the three drivers, in keeping with the formulation 
provided in Herendeen (1998).
For use here, the impact of concern substituted for I is 
domestic extraction, then material footprint. A is GDP/
population in all analyses, while T is domestic extraction/
GDP, then Adjusted Material Intensity. 
A key agenda behind this analysis is to assess the degree 
to which societies would need to improve the efficiency 
of materials use to offset the largely monotonic growth in 
both population and GDP. 
Therefore, taking the formula domestic extraction = 
population * GDP/population * domestic extraction/GDP, we 
find that from 1970 – 2000, the rate of improvement in 
technology (DE/GDP) was sufficient to offset the combined 
effects of the growth in population and affluence in only one 
of the seven world regions, which was the EECCA region. 
Despite a relatively rapid improvement in T, and the very 
low growth rates for both population and affluence that 
characterized the region over the period, the extractive 
burden for the EECCA region decreased by just 14 per cent. 
Elsewhere, improvements in T were often not sufficient to 
offset even one of the other drivers. This is most clearly 
the case in the Asia and Pacific region, where the increases 
in domestic extraction driven by population and affluence 
were an order of magnitude larger than the nominal 
10 per cent decrease that would have been driven by 
improved efficiency alone. The highest offsetting efficiency 
technology improvements were achieved in North America, 
although this was not enough to cancel out the increases 
driven by affluence alone. Population growth was the 
strongest driver of increased domestic extraction in three 
of the seven regions, and for the world in aggregate. 
FIGURE 2.28 Material intensity of consumption (Material 
Footprint / GDP) intensity by four national income bands, 
with world average, 1990 – 2017, and ratio of high-income 
group to world total 
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FIGURE 2.27 Material intensity (DMC / GDP) by four 
national income bands, with world average, 1970 – 2017, 
and ratio of high-income group to World total  
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From 2000 onwards, increasing affluence replaced 
population as the largest driver of growth in material 
extraction globally, although at a regional level population 
was the most significant factor in both Africa and West 
Asia. The only region where technological improvement 
was sufficient to offset growth in population and affluence 
combined was North America. DE/GDP decreased by 
39 per cent over the period. In the Asia and Pacific region, 
which is by far the most significant region in terms 
of domestic extraction, technological change did not 
offset growth in population and affluence, and it actually 
served to drive it higher. This deterioration in T is another 
manifestation of an intra-regional shift of production 
share from lower material intensity nations to higher 
intensity ones. 
Although the general pattern of material footprint drivers 
in the earliest period differs considerably from that seen 
for domestic extraction, much of this is likely due to the 
different and shorter time used in the analysis for material 
footprints. The greatest departure is seen for the EECCA 
region, and this is largely explained by the 1990 to 2000 
FIGURE 2.29 Drivers of domestic extraction, 1970 – 2000, percentage
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FIGURE 2.30 Drivers of domestic extraction, 2000 - 2016, percentage
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time period coinciding with the dissolution of the USSR 
and the long period of economic dislocation that followed 
for that region. This region provides a rare example of 
the fall in affluence being sufficient to drive a large and 
protracted decrease in material footprint at a regional 
scale. Increasing population was still the strongest driver 
of materials demand over the period globally, and for three 
of the seven individual regions. Change in the technological 
coefficient actually exacerbated rather than offset growth 
in MF in five of the regions and (marginally) for the world 
in aggregate.
For the later period from 2000 to 2016, which matches 
the latter period used for domestic extraction, we see a 
much greater similarity between the result for domestic 
extraction and material footprint. At the global level, 
the contribution of drivers is identical for both, which is 
how it should be as, globally, MF = DE. The proportional 
relationship between population and affluence remains 
similar, but the absolute percentages generally change. 
The change in impact and the change in technological 
coefficient is a result of the changed reallocation of global 
DE by country that takes place in the footprinting process. 
FIGURE 2.31 Drivers of material footprint, 1990 - 2000, percentage  
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FIGURE 2.32 Drivers of material footprint, 2000 - 2016, percentage
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2.3 Historical Analysis of Water
Continents are supplied with freshwater by precipitation 
of almost 110,000 km3 per year (FAO, 2016). About 
56 per cent of this amount is evapotranspired by forests 
and natural landscapes and 5 per cent by rainfed 
agriculture. The remaining 39 per cent or 43,000 km3 per 
year is converted to surface runoff (feeding rivers and 
lakes) and groundwater recharge (feeding aquifers). Part 
of these renewable freshwater resources is being removed 
from these rivers or aquifers by water management 
infrastructure. This removal of water is called water 
withdrawal. Most of the withdrawn water is returned to 
the environment some time later, after it has been used. 
When it was evaporated, incorporated into products, or 
consumed by humans and livestock or transpired (for 
example by irrigated plants) this accounts for water 
consumption. Even after non-consumptive use, when the 
used water returned to the same river or aquifer, its quality 
is often changed (with regard to temperature or chemical 
composition).
2.3.1. Global Trends
Global water withdrawal for agriculture, industries, and 
municipalities increased sharply in the second half of 
the 20th century (Figure 2.33). During that period, water 
withdrawal grew at a faster rate than human population. 
From 1970 to 2010, the growth rate of withdrawal slowed, 
while, nevertheless, growing from 2,500 km3 per year 
to 3,900 km3 per year (FAO, 2016a). Since the 1990s, 
global water withdrawal by agriculture, industries, and 
municipalities has decoupled in relative terms (figure 2.33).
In addition to the water withdrawal by those three sectors, 
water was lost by evaporation from artificial lakes or 
reservoirs with dams. This category can also be counted 
as anthropogenic water consumption. 
2.3.2. Sectors and World Regions
Based on country measurements between 2000 and 
2012, the global sum of water withdrawals is dominated 
by agriculture at 70 per cent, mainly for irrigation (including 
livestock and aquaculture). Industry withdrawal accounts 
for 19 per cent, with municipalities responsible for 
11 per cent (FAO, 2016a). 
Depending on the geographical conditions and the state of 
infrastructure development, these proportions vary across 
continents (figure 2.34).
FIGURE 2.33 Global water Withdrawal and losses from 
artificial lakes from 1900 to 2010
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FIGURE 2.34 Water withdrawal ratios by continent
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2.3.3. Water Scarcity: High Withdrawal in 
Relation to Availability
The larger the volume of water withdrawn, used and 
discharged back into a river, the more the river flow is 
depleted and/or degraded for users downstream (including 
the environment), , and thus the higher the water stress. The 
withdrawals-to-availability ratio is used to indicate water 
stress. This indicator has the advantage of being transparent 
and computable for all river basins and has been used in 
several studies (see, for example, Alcamo et al., 2007).
There are 844 million people who lack access to water 
(WHO & UNICEF, 2017). High water stress occurs when 
more than 40 per cent of the water input of a river basin 
is used. This can be observed in most of India, Northern 
China, Central Asia, the Middle East, the Mediterranean 
rim countries, Eastern Australia (the Murray Darling basin), 
Western Latin America, large parts of the Western United 
States and Northern Mexico (figure 2.35). Overall, river 
basins in these regions are at greater risk of seasonal or 
inter-annual variations in water flow. 
2.4 Historical Analysis of Land Use
2.4.1. Land-Use Change Between 2000 and 2010
The continents cover 134 million km2 (not including 
Antarctica and Greenland). In 2010, these were mainly 
covered by forest (31.7 per cent); grassland, shrubland and 
savannah (19.1 per cent); intensively managed pastures 
(12.2 per cent), cropland (11.4 per cent); and barren land 
(14 per cent) (figure 2.36). In the light of varying definitions 
and methods of measurement, it seems reasonable to 
assume that built-up areas covered by settlements and 
infrastructure account for 1 to 3 per cent of the total area 
(based on Potere et al., 2009; UNEP, 2014).
FIGURE 2.35 Water stress in river basins of the world 2010
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2.4.2. Cropland and Pasture
Between 2000 and 2010, total global cropland area 
increased by 1.34 per cent from 15.2 million to 15.4 million 
km². While cropland area declined in Europe and North 
America, there were increases in Africa, Latin America and, 
more moderately, in Asia (figure 2.37). 
Global pasture area has decreased slightly from 31.3 
million to 30.9 million km². While slight increases can 
be observed in North America, Latin America and Africa, 
there was a decrease in Europe and more significantly 
in Asia (figure 2.38). Globally in 2000, 53 per cent of this 
area was intensively managed pasture, 47 per cent were 
grassland, savannahs, shrubland and barren land that were 
extensively grazed. Up to 2010, these proportions hardly 
changed. 
FIGURE 2.36 Global land cover in 2010
Source: UniKassel/CESR
FIGURE 2.37 Development of cropland area in world 
regions between 2000 and 2010
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FIGURE 2.38 Development of pasture area in world regions 
between 2000 and 2010. Pasture is subdivided according 
to intensive management practices and extensive 
management practices with only minor effects on natural 
ecosystems
10
6  K
m
2
20
00
20
05
20
10
Europe
(incl. former
USSR)
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
00
20
05
20
10
Africa and 
West Asia
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean
North 
America
Asia
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Extensive PastureIntensive Pasture
Source: UniKassel/CESR
Back to the content
| 02 DRIVERS, PRESSURES,  AND NATURAL RESOURCE  USE TRENDS
61 
1
2
3
4
5
6
2.4.3. Forest and Other Natural Ecosystems
Net forest losses can be observed in Africa (-1.3 per cent) 
and Latin America (-1.6 per cent) (figure 2.39). The other 
world regions show slight net increases in forest areas. 
The overall forest area in Asia appears fairly stable, while a 
more detailed spatial analysis shows that South Asia is a 
deforestation hotspot. Shrinking forests in that region are 
compensated by forest expansion in East Asia in terms 
of land cover, although impacts on biodiversity may be 
severe (see chapter 3). About two-thirds of world forests 
are extensively used, 6 per cent are intensively managed 
(for example, fast-growing plantations), while 28 per cent 
remain largely intact. These shares are more or less 
constant in the three time steps. 
Figure 2.40 shows the development of grassland, 
shrubland and savannahs. In total, there has been almost 
no change. Decreases in Africa and Latin America are 
compensated by increases in the other parts of the world. 
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that, since the 1970s, global 
population has doubled and global GDP has grown 
fourfold. These trends have required large amounts of 
natural resources to fuel economic development and 
human well-being. The data presented in this chapter 
demonstrate that there has never been a prolonged period 
of stabilization or decline in global material demand in the 
last 50 years. 
Global material extraction has also become slightly 
more concentrated over the last five decades, with ten 
economies responsible for over 68 per cent of global 
extraction in 2017 (compared with around 64 per cent 
in 1970). Upper-middle income economies dominate 
extraction of resources, accounting for 56 per cent of the 
global total. Two dynamics are at play here: an increasing 
demand to build up new infrastructure and the outsourcing 
of the more material- and energy-intensive stages of 
production chains by higher income countries to lower 
income but transitioning countries. 
The share of global domestic material consumption 
accounted for by high-income countries is decreasing, 
while the share of domestic material consumption of the 
upper-middle income countries is increasing. The global 
share of low-income countries remains unchanged at 
FIGURE 2.39 Development of forest area in world regions 
between 2000 and 2010 
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FIGURE 2.40 Development of grassland, shrubland and 
savannahs in world regions between 2000 and 2010. 
Some of these natural ecosystems are used as extensively 
managed pasture
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below 3 per cent, despite this group posting the highest 
population growth rate among the different income 
categories. In terms of material footprint per capita, high-
income countries maintain the highest consumption of 
approximately 27 tons. This is 60 per cent higher than the 
upper-middle income group.
For water, a slight relative decoupling of water use from 
population growth began in the 1990s, but global water 
use is increasing and 30 per cent of the global river basin 
area has been under mid to severe water stress since 
2010.
Overall, this chapter has presented the global trends of 
drivers (such as population and GDP) on pressures such as 
material extraction, trade of materials, domestic material 
consumption, material footprints and material productivity, 
along with a historical analysis of water and land use 
change. Based on the information on resource extraction 
provided in this chapter, chapter 3 addresses the impacts 
of these trends.
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6Main findings
  Resource extraction and processing make up about half of the total global greenhouse gas emissions and 
more than 90 per cent of land- and water-related impacts (biodiversity loss and water stress). If the rising 
trend in resource-related impacts persists, it will be difficult to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and 
the Sustainable Development Goals (including SDG 15.5 to halt biodiversity loss). 
  Impacts and value creation are not equally distributed around the globe. Per capita impacts of consumption 
in high-income regions are between three and six times larger than those of low-income regions. This is 
reinforced by trade: some high-income regions outsource environmental impacts to other regions, such that 
a part of the total environmental impacts of their consumption occurs abroad. At the same time, the value 
created through these traded materials in the countries of origin is relatively low. 
  Between 2000 and 2015, there was a relative decoupling of resource-related environmental impacts from 
GDP and a moderate relative decoupling of impacts from extracted mass of resources. However, impacts still 
increased on an absolute scale. Agriculture is the main driver of global biodiversity loss and water stress, while 
build-up of infrastructure was the main driver for the increase of climate change impacts. Policy actions are 
required to maintain the impacts of resource use within planetary boundaries while allowing for development 
and build-up of infrastructure in developing and emerging economies.
  Potential measures for the simultaneous reduction of agricultural impacts include food waste reduction and 
shifts in diets towards less meat and animal products from intensive livestock systems. Focusing on long-
term material use of sustainably grown wood in the construction sector can lead to co-benefits in terms of 
climate change and biodiversity. Similarly, conserving valuable forest ecosystems and avoiding deforestation 
contribute to reducing both climate change and biodiversity impacts.
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3.1 Introduction
Decoupling economic growth and environmental 
degradation requires sustainable sourcing and 
management of resources over the whole life cycle. While 
the mass-flow indicators of chapter 2 are very useful for 
understanding the environmental pressures from material 
consumption, information about the environmental 
impacts of resource use and resource management 
practices is also needed to support policymaking for the 
sustainable use of natural resources (Voet et al., 2005). 
This chapter focuses on the environmental consequences 
of resource extraction and processing. It illustrates the 
legitimate need for appropriate policy to manage natural 
resources, which is required if we are to remain within the 
safe operating space (Steffen et al., 2015) and achieve 
the SDGs. 
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Relevant environmental impacts are assessed on the 
basis of the information on resource extraction provided 
in chapter 2. The focus is on the resource extraction and 
processing phase of production, and stops at the “ready-
to-use” materials and fuels phase (which includes the 
waste disposal processes in the extraction and processing 
phase, such as emissions and impacts of mine tailings). As 
all human activity involves the use of resources, assessing 
the use phase of all of them would involve assessing 
the entire global economy. Therefore, while resource 
extraction and processing are assessed for all resources 
(denoted as “resource related” and “cradle-to-gate”), the 
impacts including the use and disposal phase (denoted as 
“economy wide” and “cradle-to-grave”) are discussed only 
in exemplary cases to highlight the importance of resource 
quality in the complete life cycle of materials. The cases 
where the use and disposal phases are considered are 
presented within a box.
This chapter addresses the “pressure” as well as the 
“state” and “impact” components of the DPSIR framework. 
The amounts of resources from the IRP Material Flow 
Accounting database (part of the “pressure” component) 
were used as a starting point (chapter 2). For waste 
and recycling, additional data on recycling amounts 
were added to complete resource coverage. For each 
resource, an inventory of emissions and indirect resource 
consumptions (including land and water resources) 
was set up, corresponding to the “pressure” component 
of DPSIR. The data were mainly derived from inventory 
and input-output databases: Exiobase 3.4 was used to 
assess the cumulated upstream impacts of all resource 
types of the whole economy (macroanalysis, Section 3.2) 
(Exiobase, n.d.; Stadler et al., 2018). Double counting was 
avoided using an adapted version of the approach by Dente 
et al. (Dente et al., 2018) (see methodological appendix), 
assigning the impacts of resources to the final material or 
fuel (such that the impacts of coal and coke going into steel 
production would be part of “metal processing” and not 
“fossil extraction” or “fossil processing”). In addition to the 
Exiobase “macroanalysis”, data were used from ecoinvent 
3.4 (Wernet et al., 2016) to study single resources and 
materials in depth (section 3.3). In these detailed studies, 
there was no need to aggregate the impacts of various 
resource types, and therefore no need to correct for double 
counting. Regional conditions, such as country-specific 
electricity mixes, were considered where relevant. Finally, 
the inventory was assessed in terms of environmental and 
health impacts.
FIGURE 3.1 Overview of methodological procedure to assess the health and environmental impacts of resource extraction 
and processing. For some resources a complete life cycle perspective was additionally adopted (cradle to grave; these 
cases are marked by a box)
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In the impact assessment step, emissions and resource 
use (for example land and water use) were grouped 
according to the type of impact they produce and 
converted to common impact units to make them 
comparable (Hellweg & Mila i Canals, 2014). The best-
practice guidelines of the UNEP-SETAC Life Cycle Initiative 
for use in Life Cycle Assessment were followed (UNEP 
SETAC, 2016). Recommended methods exist for impacts 
of climate change (IPCC, 2007), eco-toxicity (Rosenbaum 
et al., 2008), water stress (Boulay et al., 2018), biodiversity 
loss from land use (Chaudhary et al., 2016a), human toxicity 
(Rosenbaum et al., 2008) and human health impacts 
from particulate matter (PM) exposure (documented 
in UNEP SETAC, 2016). This impact assessment phase 
corresponds to the “state” and “impact” components 
of the DPSIR framework. For example, greenhouse gas 
emissions were weighted according to the concentration 
change they produce in the atmosphere (considering 
persistence and chemical transformations) multiplied by 
the radiative forcing of the respective gas, a substance 
property describing how much energy the substance can 
absorb. This effect of altering the energy balance of the 
earth is accumulated over a defined time horizon (typically 
100 years) and published by IPCC as “Global Warming 
Potentials, GWPs” (IPCC, 2013). The impacts herein are 
called climate change impacts, but are also known as 
the carbon footprint. Note that climate change impacts 
in this chapter do not include emissions from land use 
change. For toxicity impacts, the fate of the emissions in 
the environment is modelled (degradation and partition 
between environmental media such as water, air and soil) 
and combined with the substance-specific toxic effects 
on humans and ecosystems (Rosenbaum et al., 2008). 
Similarly, for health impacts from emissions of particulates 
and precursor gases transformed to particulate matter 
in the atmosphere (SOx, NOx, ammonia), the fate of 
emissions is modelled in the atmosphere, leading to 
atmospheric concentration increases of particulate matter. 
Inhalation exposure leads to elevated risk of cardiovascular 
and respiratory diseases (ranging in health outcomes from 
diseases like asthma to increased mortality) (WHO, 2013). 
Health impacts due to particulate matter exposure and 
human toxicity are both expressed in terms of Disability 
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), meaning the amount of life 
years lost or lived with health impairment. Impacts relating 
to ecosystem damage from land use (causing habitat loss) 
are expressed in terms of global species loss, such as the 
fraction of globally existing species that are committed 
to extinction due to habitat loss (Chaudhary et al., 2015). 
While this unit does not cover all aspects of biodiversity 
loss (for example, genetic diversity) or ecosystem services, 
it remains a highly relevant indicator. Regionalized impact 
assessment methods were used whenever relevant and 
possible in order to decrease uncertainties. This was 
particularly true for the assessment of land and water use, 
because the magnitude of impacts is not only a function of 
land area or water amount consumed, but also depends on 
the location where land and water are used and how they 
are managed. For example, land use in tropical regions 
often leads to the extinction of more unique species 
than land use in less valuable ecosystems. However, a 
regionalized assessment was not possible for toxicity 
impacts and only partially for PM health impacts, due to a 
lack of appropriate regionalized methods (which leads to 
major uncertainties in terms of such impacts). Interactions 
between impact categories also exist. For example, the 
relation between health and biodiversity is extensively 
discussed in Romanelli et al., 2015. 
The selection of impact categories fits well with the “core 
planetary boundaries” of climate change and biodiversity 
loss (Steffen et al., 2015), and additionally includes the 
most relevant pathways for human health impacts from 
outdoor air pollution (Lim et al., 2012). Furthermore, all 
these impacts are relevant for resource use, and some of 
them have been shown to correlate with (and therefore 
represent) other impacts too. In particular, climate 
change impacts have been demonstrated to correlate 
with ozone depletion, acidification and eutrophication 
for resource extraction and processing (Steinmann et al., 
2018). Therefore, these impact categories are not shown 
separately, unless they diverge from the development of 
climate change impacts and are predominant with regard 
to resources (as with phosphorus use as fertilizer and its 
relation to eutrophication, which is extensively discussed 
in section 3.3.2).
In order to relate the environmental impacts to economic 
benefits and social impacts, we also accounted for the 
value added by the extraction and processing of resources 
as well as the number of full-time equivalent positions 
required for this purpose (denoted as “employment” 
below). Different types of value-added categories as well 
as the workforce numbers per skill-level are listed for each 
region and industrial sector in Exiobase 3.4 (Exiobase, n.d.; 
Stadler et al., 2018). In an additional analysis, “work risks” 
were quantified using region-sector specific weighting 
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factors derived from the social hotspot database (Benoit-
Norris et al., 2012) to account for social risks (Zimdars et 
al., 2018). The weighting factors consider human safety, 
human health, human rights and labour rights, with a view 
to quantifying the exposure to work risk factors of people 
working in the resource sectors.
One focus was the assessment of trade impacts. 
Opportunities include the fact that, ideally, trade and 
international cooperation could lead to goods being 
produced where they cause the least environmental 
impacts and create most social benefits. In many cases, 
however, profit concerns govern the flow of traded 
resources and materials, while social and environmental 
5 Available at www.resourcepanel.org/reports/global-resources-outlook-2019.
impacts tend to play a secondary role. There is therefore 
a risk of displacing environmental pressures through 
trade, with regions consuming resources that were 
originally extracted and processed in another region. 
This is considered by presenting results from both a 
production-based and a consumption-based perspective, 
as defined in chapter 1.4. We derived “net trade benefits 
and impacts” from the difference of the production-based 
and consumption-based perspectives of each respective 
region (Wood et al., 2018).
More details about the methodological procedure are 
provided in the method annex.5
3.2 Overview of Impacts of Resource Extraction and Processing
3.2.1   Decoupling Resource Impacts from Human 
Well-being and Economic Growth
Resource extraction and processing account for more than 
90 per cent of global biodiversity and water stress impacts 
(figure 3.2), and approximately half of global climate 
change emissions (not including climate impacts related 
to land use). These results illustrate that resources need 
to be put at the centre of climate and biodiversity policies, 
so as to stay within the safe operating space (Steffen et al., 
2015) and facilitate the achievement of commonly agreed 
international targets, such as the Paris Agreement, the 
Aichi targets of the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
the Sustainable Development Goals (including SDG 15.3 
on land-degradation neutrality and SDG 15.5 on halting 
biodiversity loss). 
In contrast to climate impacts, water-stress and land-
related biodiversity impacts, resource extraction and 
processing make a limited contribution to the global 
health impacts of particulate matter exposure (figure 3.2) 
- although these may be relevant on a local scale. Health 
effects are dominated by combustion-related emissions in 
the use phase of biomass and fossil resources (figure 3.2). 
Note that health effects from particulate matter in figure 
3.2 exclude indoor emissions, which would increase the 
share of impacts from “households” even more. In fact, 
indoor exposure to particulate matter from cooking with 
solid fuels, particularly biomass, represents one of the 
most important health risks globally.
Water stress and land use-related biodiversity impacts are 
mainly caused by biomass resources. This is in contrast 
to climate change and health impacts from particulate 
matter, for which all types of resources carry a significant 
share of the overall impacts (figure 3.2). 
Environmental impacts of material provision showed 
a relative decoupling from economic growth, but per 
FIGURE 3.2 Split of the total global environmental impacts 
and socio-economic benefits between resource types 
(extraction and processing), the remaining economy (i.e. 
without the resource extraction and resource processing 
sectors) and households
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capita impacts increased between 2000 and 2015. In 
spite of the relative decoupling from economic growth, all 
impacts increased in absolute terms in comparison to the 
year 2000 (figure 3.3). The temporal trend of biodiversity 
impacts from land use has already been discussed in a 
previous IRP report (IRP, 2017a) and was found to increase 
on an absolute scale, while the geographical impacts and 
changes are discussed in section 3.3.6, based on new land 
use data (chapter 2). The new data did not make it possible 
to assess the temporal trend, as the land use maps only 
showed the predominant (not total) land use per grid cell 
(the uncertainty is larger than the changes in impact).
Resource-related value added per GDP showed an increasing 
trend between 2009 and 2011 (end of reported data), while 
all environmental impacts per GDP decreased in this time 
period (figure 3.3). This is a positive development, as sector 
specific value-added increased by a greater extent than GDP, 
and environmental impacts were decoupled (relatively). 
Nonetheless, resource extraction and processing generate 
a low share of economy-wide added value (<23 per cent), 
while providing work to approximately 50 per cent of the 
global workforce (mainly through agriculture) (figure 3.2). 
The number of workplaces remained rather constant over 
time (Figure 3.3), in spite of the increase in resource use, due 
to increasing labour productivity.
3.2.1   Impacts by Region and the Role of 
International Trade
Per capita impacts caused by consumption of high-
income countries are between three and six times larger 
than those of low-income countries (figure 3.4, left). This 
FIGURE 3.3 Temporal development of environmental 
impacts from resource extraction and processing (up 
to “ready-to-be-used” materials or fuels) and socio-
economic indicators from 2000 to 2015
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FIGURE 3.4 Left: Per capita impacts (climate change impacts, PM health impacts, water stress, land-use related biodiversity 
loss) and socio-economic benefits (value added, employment) by income group (consumption perspective). Right: Global 
net trade impacts per capita ordered by income group countries, represented as a share of global per capita impact. 
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illustrates the unequal contribution that the consumption 
of richer and poorer regions make to global environmental 
impacts. Water and land impacts show a smaller variation 
between income groups than climate change and PM 
health impacts. This is because they are mainly related to 
food consumption, and food intake is less variable than 
fuel or material use between income groups. Furthermore, 
high-income regions import resources and materials and 
outsource environmental impacts from production to 
middle- and low-income regions (figure 3.4, right).
The total footprints of the world regions vary by more than 
one order of magnitude, mainly due to the different sizes of 
regions (figure 3.5 left).6 Asia and the Pacific has the largest 
footprints (more than half of the global climate, PM health 
and water-stress impacts). Climate change and PM health 
impacts show a similar pattern in regional footprints, while 
water stress and land use related biodiversity loss diverge 
from this pattern (figure 3.5). This is mainly caused by 
the spatial variability of the water and land use impacts 
of biomass production, which depend on the climate and 
ecoregion conditions, in addition to production efficiency 
and consumption.
The per capita footprints show that some regions 
consistently cause above-average impacts through 
6 In Chapter 3, Iran is included in West Asia and Mexico is included in North America.
consumption (Europe and North America), while other 
regions only have minor per capita consumption-related 
environmental impacts (particularly Africa) (figure 3.5, 
right). However, impacts do not always show the same 
trend. For example, West Asia generally displays below-
average consumption impacts, but shows above-average 
impacts in terms of water stress due to the large-scale 
domestic irrigation required by the climate and the 
intensive agricultural activities. A similar, above-average 
deviation in the impacts applies to land use-related 
biodiversity loss in Latin America, which is due to the 
impact of domestic agriculture on valuable ecosystems.
The climate change impacts of most world regions are 
mainly caused by private consumption (figure 3.6, and 
annex for PM health impacts), while capital formation plays 
a small role, either because the infrastructure has already 
been built up in the past (for example North America and 
Europe) or because infrastructure has not been fully built 
up yet (for example Africa). This is different in Asia and the 
Pacific, where build-up of infrastructure is the main driver of 
impact (figure 3.6). The latter is caused primarily by recent 
development in the People’s Republic of China. China is the 
country with the highest resource-related climate change 
and PM health footprints in the world, although per capita 
FIGURE 3.5 Impacts (climate change impacts, PM health impacts, water stress, land use-related biodiversity loss) and socio-
economic footprints (value added, employment) attributed to the region of consumption
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impacts are in line with or even below the global average. 
As of 2011, over 65 per cent of all impacts and 80 per cent 
of all infrastructure development impacts in the Asia and 
the Pacific region were contributed by China. The overall 
footprint for climate and PM health impacts has increased 
substantially in the past 15 years and can be explained by 
the buildup of infrastructure, especially as regards climate 
impacts. This infrastructure build-up represents a long-term 
investment, and many developing countries are likely to 
follow this pattern of increased infrastructure investment 
in the future. Therefore, policy actions are required to 
maintain the impacts of resource use within planetary 
boundaries while still allowing for development and build-up 
of infrastructure in developing and emerging economies.
Water stress and land-related biodiversity loss are mainly 
caused by household food consumption in all regions (see 
annex), although capital formation can play a significant 
role in some sub-regions (for example due to wood used to 
build up infrastructure in the south-east of Asia).
Globally, resource-related climate change footprints 
associated with consumption converged, with per capita 
high-footprint regions lowering their impacts at the same 
time that low-footprint regions increased their impacts. 
Lower impacts in high-footprint countries suggest 
efficiency gains in production, but were also affected by the 
financial crisis and the associated reduced consumption 
(figure 3.7).
Figure 3.8 provides an overview of the regions that 
are net exporters or net importers of resource-related 
environmental pressures and socioeconomic benefits 
(following the method of Wood et al., 2018). Europe 
and North America show higher footprints for all 
impact categories than domestic impacts due to their 
comparatively higher consumption than production of 
biomass, metals and particularly fossils (figures 3.8 
and 3.9). These regions therefore “outsource” impacts 
to other regions, while creating only minor economic 
benefit (in terms of value added) in the countries of origin 
(figure 3.10). 
West Asia and Asia and the Pacific have the largest 
water-stress impacts, while Latin America and Asia and 
the Pacific have the largest land use-related impacts, 
due to their unique ecosystems. For all these regions, 
FIGURE 3.6 Climate change impacts split according to final 
demand categories.  
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FIGURE 3.7 Time series of resource-related per capita 
climate change impacts by region (consumption 
perspective) 
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the production-related impacts inside the region are 
higher than the consumption impacts (figure 3.8), due to 
the export of agricultural products. Europe is the largest 
beneficiary, as it imports agricultural products from water-
scarce regions.
Total resource-related greenhouse gas emissions and 
PM health impacts are largest in Asia and the Pacific 
(figure 3.9). Asia and the Pacific, EECCA and West Asia 
have higher domestic climate impacts than consumption 
footprints due to their importance in the extraction and 
processing of fossils (figures 3.8 and 3.9). For PM health 
impacts, metal processing additionally contributes to this 
effect in the case of EECCA. 
Making the electricity system more renewable (as 
outlined in SDG 7.2) will lower the climate impact of 
resource extraction and processing, since greenhouse 
gas intensity per kWh electricity decreases. However, 
such a decrease in climate impact will be limited as the 
BOX 3.1 Life Cycle impacts of household consumption (including the use phase of resources)
On an individual country level as well as on a global level, numerous studies have consistently identified three major con-
sumption hotspots that are crucial from an environmental point of view: mobility/transport, food and housing/shelter (for 
example, see Hertwich & Peters, 2009; Tukker & Jansen, 2006). However, there is considerable variability in behaviours 
among households from different countries but also within each country. Consequently, the relative scale and absolute 
amounts of emissions in different consumption areas differ from country to country, as well as among socioeconomic 
groups. For instance, basic needs such as food or shelter have a relatively higher share of total impacts in lower income 
countries, while mobility is especially relevant in high-income economies (Hertwich & Peters, 2009). In cross-country com-
parisons, GDP is considered the most informative explanatory factor for national per capita carbon footprints (Hertwich & 
Peters, 2009) and material or land use footprints (Ivanova et al., 2016). Similarly, income distribution can explain much of the 
variability in household environmental footprints within countries (Baiocchi et al., 2010). Many studies show a macrotrend 
of a positive relationship between income and environmental impacts (Baiocchi et al., 2010; Jones & Kammen, 2014; and 
Weber & Matthews, 2008). This is also shown by Froemelt et al., 2018, for the case of Switzerland, but they additionally 
reveal that some household groups diverge from these general tendencies indicating a certain decoupling. Low-impact 
households in industrialized countries were found to opt for higher priced goods, less mobility and green heating (for exam-
ple heat pumps or wood-based technologies) (Girod & De Haan, 2009). A relative decoupling effect was also found for 
the top income quintile in the European Union (Sommer & Kratena, 2017). However, this does not offset the much higher 
impacts caused by these high-income households.
Apart from income, household size and location (rural versus urban) are often analysed as factors influencing household 
behaviours and associated environmental impacts (Baiocchi et al., 2010; Hertwich, 2011; Tukker et al., 2010). The economy 
of scale originating from household size appears in many studies: the larger the household, the lower its per capita footprint. 
However, at a certain income level, this trend is less pronounced (Froemelt et al., 2018; Underwood & Zahran, 2015; Weber 
& Matthews, 2008). The influence of household size is especially significant in view of the decreasing number of persons 
per household in industrialized countries (Underwood & Zahran, 2015). In contrast to household size, the impact of location 
is less distinct. In general, households in dense urban areas tend to have lower impacts, especially in the domains of 
mobility (shorter distances) and housing (smaller apartments) (Baiocchi et al., 2010; Tukker et al., 2010; Wiedenhofer et al., 
2018). This, however, is partially offset by smaller household sizes and higher incomes in cities (Jones & Kammen, 2014; 
Wiedenhofer et al., 2018), although the latter greatly depends on the national context (Baiocchi et al., 2010) . Furthermore, 
Jones & Kammen, 2014 reveal that high-density areas in the United States of America do indeed show lower environmental 
footprints for households. However, the suburbs around these central metropolitan areas can erode this effect and even 
lead to increased impacts in the area as a whole. Note that studies seeking to understand these drivers of household envi-
ronmental footprints focus mostly on high-income countries and may therefore not be applicable to developing economies.
In conclusion, the environmental impacts of different lifestyles are affected by a multitude of factors and therefore show 
high variability in terms of total amounts and composition, not only among different countries (Hertwich & Peters, 2009; 
Ivanova et al., 2016) but also among different household types (Baiocchi et al., 2010; Jones & Kammen, 2014) and even 
within socioeconomic household segments (Froemelt et al., 2018; Saner et al., 2013; Weber & Matthews, 2008). Even though 
some general trends, such as increased impacts with increased income, or consumption hotspots (like food, mobility and 
housing) can be identified, this highly complex situation reveals that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to support a path-
way towards low-impact consumption patterns (Froemelt et al., 2018; Jones & Kammen, 2014). For a successful change 
towards more sustainable lifestyles, measures, policies and programmes aiming at reducing the impacts of households 
should be tailored as much as possible to the target region or even to the target household groups (Froemelt et al., 2018). 
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contribution of electricity inputs to the impacts of resource 
extraction and processing is already just 10 per cent (data 
not shown; calculated from Exiobase 3.4). Furthermore, 
renewable electricity demands more metal and non-metal 
mineral resources, which will increase the climate impact 
of resources (IRP, 2017c). The combined impacts of an 
increased renewable future energy system are discussed 
in a separate IRP report (UNEP, 2017).
Per-capita added value is largest in Europe and North 
America (figure 3.10). Europe generates 20 per cent of 
the global resource-related value added, but only 5 to 
10 per cent of the environmental impacts occur there. In 
contrast, as an example, 24 per cent of the global water 
stress impacts, 8 per cent of climate change impacts, 
7 per cent of PM health impacts and 7 per cent of land 
use biodiversity impacts arise in India, but only 4 per cent 
of the resource-related value added is generated there. 
This inverse pattern of domestic resource-related value 
added and environmental impacts may be a sign of 
varying environmental standards, but may also indicate 
the unequal distribution of resource-related benefits 
and impacts. This is reinforced by international trade, as 
discussed above.
There is considerable variation in the dependence of world 
regions on the resource sector. Employment in the resource 
sector is especially high in Asia and the Pacific, where more 
than 40 per cent of all people work in resource extraction 
and production sectors - mainly in biomass production 
(figure 3.10). In North America, less than 10 per cent of the 
population works in this sector. The comparison between 
the consumption and production perspective shows that 
many people in Asia and the Pacific or Africa work for 
the production of resources (mainly biomass) that are 
consumed in regions such as Europe, North America and 
West Asia (figure 3.10).
Full, productive employment and decent work is a 
requirement under SDG 8.5. Figure 3.11 shows the 
distribution of workplaces, the value added, as well as the 
salaries (compensation of employment) in the material 
production sector. There is considerable variability among 
the world regions in terms of these indicators. While high 
levels of employment are indeed positive for achieving the 
SDGs, the work risks (adverse work conditions based on 
the social hotspot database; see section 3.1 and annex) 
also need to be considered. For regions with high relative 
shares of employment compared to value added (such as 
FIGURE 3.8 Net trade impacts by region, calculated as the difference between production-based and consumption-based 
footprints
Climate change impacts PM health impacts Water stress Land-use related biodiversity loss Value added Employment
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Sh
ar
e 
of
 t
ot
al
 g
lo
ba
l i
m
pa
ct
s
Total net trade impacts
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
Re
la
tiv
e 
to
 t
he
 g
lo
ba
l 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 a
ve
ra
ge
Per capita net trade impacts
% %
Af
ric
a
As
ia
 +
 P
ac
iﬁ
c
EE
CC
A
Eu
ro
pe
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a 
+
 C
ar
ib
be
an
N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a
W
es
t A
si
a
Af
ric
a
As
ia
 +
 P
ac
iﬁ
c
EE
CC
A
Eu
ro
pe
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a 
+
 C
ar
ib
be
an
N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a
W
es
t A
si
a
Notes: Left: Total net trade impacts represented as a share of total global impacts; Right: Per capita net trade impacts relative to the global per capita average impact. Negative 
values refer to an outsourcing of environmental impacts and socio-economic benefits to other regions, positive values refer to environmental impacts and socio-economic 
benefits occurring in the region of the production of export materials. Reference year: 2011
Data source: Exiobase 3.4 (Exiobase, n.d.; Stadler et al., 2018)
GLOBAL RESOURCES OUTLOOK 2019: NATURAL RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE WE WANT |
74 Back to the content
low- to middle-income regions), these risks are higher than 
in the regions with a high share of value added compared 
to occupation. Improved working conditions and increased 
salaries in the resource sectors of low- and middle-income 
countries are therefore important steps in achieving the 
aim of decent work enshrined in SDG 8.5. 
Human well-being is often measured by the human 
development index (HDI), which includes aspects 
relating to GDP, health and education. Patterns of 
production-related water and land impacts on subnational 
administrative units were analysed for various classes 
of HDI (figure  3.12). Regions with very high human 
development indices (HDI >0.8) combine just 6 per cent of 
global population with 50 per cent of GDP, 11 per cent of 
biodiversity loss due to land use and 8 per cent of global 
water scarcity. The majority of the impacts occur in regions 
of HDI 0.6-0.8 (middle to high human development), with 
27 per cent of global population, 42 per cent GDP but 
63 per cent biodiversity loss and 65 per cent water scarcity 
(mainly due to biomass cultivation). Many areas with an 
HDI<0.4 are situated in central Africa, where irrigation is 
all but absent and biodiversity loss is relatively low. This 
reflects low economic development in this region. 
FIGURE 3.9 Regional distribution of climate change impacts (left) and particulate matter (PM) health impacts (right) from 
resource extraction and processing from the production (P) and consumption (C) perspective in 2011 
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FIGURE 3.10 Regional distribution of socio-economic indicators from resource extraction and processing 
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FIGURE 3.11 Global share of total value added, value added 
for compensation of employment (salaries), and number 
of employed people related to material production
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FIGURE 3.12 Global share of GDP, population and impacts of 
water stress and land use-related biodiversity loss in the 
production perspective (Biodiversity Loss Land use) 
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Classified by human development (HDI class, x-axis). The impacts were calculated on 
subnational administrative units based on data from (Kummu et al., 2018) with the 
same geographies for local HDI, GDP and population data.
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3.3 Environmental and Health Impacts by Resource Group
This section opens with a discussion of the contribution 
of four material resource groups (metals, non-metallic 
minerals, fossils and biomass) to the environmental 
impacts of climate change, ecotoxicity, human toxicity 
and human health impacts from primary and secondary 
particulate matter emissions (sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.4). The 
extraction, processing and use of these resources leads to 
another indirect resource use, namely water consumption 
and land use. The resulting impacts of water stress and 
biodiversity loss from land use are extensively discussed 
at the end of the section (sections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6). Each 
section contains an in-depth discussion of those resources 
that contribute most to impacts and have the highest 
leverage in impact mitigation.
3.3.1 Impacts of Metal Resources
Metals are essential for the kind of technology that 
underpins modern society. From structures and industrial 
equipment to information technology, virtually all activities 
and products rely on metals, at least indirectly. However, 
the extraction and processing of metals from mined ores 
have an associated environmental cost. In 2011, metals 
were responsible for 18 per cent of resource-related 
climate change and 39 per cent of PM health impacts 
(figure 3.2). Considering the period 2000-2015, the climate 
change and PM health impacts of metals more or less 
doubled. Toxicity impacts also increased in the same time 
period, but at a slower pace (figure 3.13).
Steel is the most widely used metal, mainly as a 
construction and engineering material, because of its 
good mechanical properties and affordability. Among 
metals, the global iron-steel production chain causes 
the largest climate change impacts (figure 3.13). This 
is due to the large volumes of steel produced yearly and 
the energy-intensive processing of the ore into iron and 
steel, with the sector representing around one quarter 
of global industrial energy demand. Further significant 
contributions to the total climate change impacts of 
metals arise from aluminium production (figure 3.13), 
again due to considerable production amounts and high 
energy requirements for the smelting of aluminium via 
electrolysis.
The mining and processing of copper and precious metals 
cause high toxicity impacts compared to their production 
amounts (figure 3.13). Sulfidic mining tailings are the main 
source of toxicity impacts for both metals. Processed 
materials are stored in tailing impoundment dams, but can 
nevertheless involve continuous leaching of pollutants into 
the soil and groundwater and might additionally present 
risks of contamination from spills in case of failure 
(Beylot & Villeneuve, 2017). The predominant contribution 
of tailings to toxicity impacts can also be related to the 
large amounts of rock processed per mass of refined 
metal. Gold and precious metals are mined at much lower 
concentrations than bulk metals such as iron or aluminium. 
As physical separation methods typically require higher ore 
grades, sodium cyanide compounds have been used for 
more than a century in the industrial extraction of gold, 
with an estimated 18 per cent of world cyanide production 
dedicated to the formal gold mining sector (Hilson & 
Monhemius, 2006). Since cyanide degrades spontaneously 
in the environment, the risks associated to its use consist 
mainly in the sudden release of this pollutant, which can 
be averted with careful management of waste streams.
Recycling represents one possible pathway towards 
decreased environmental impacts deriving from metal 
use. Metals are ideal candidates for closing material 
FIGURE 3.13 Metal production amounts and environmental 
impacts of metal mining and processing from 2000 to 
2015 (selection of 10 metals covering > 95 per cent of 
global domestic extraction of metal ores in 2015, MFA 
database).
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loops in a circular economy approach, because they can 
be melted and reused indefinitely (as long as alloys are 
not contaminated by weakening or toxic elements). In 
general, secondary production considerably reduces the 
environmental impacts of metal use, because it avoids the 
impacts from the extraction and processing of ores. For 
example, the climate change impacts of steel recycling are 
between 10 and 38 per cent of that of primary production 
and for aluminium recycling between 3.5 and 20 per cent 
(figure 3.14). This variability is mainly explained by the 
difference in the electricity mixes among countries: 
the lowest impacts occur in countries with renewable 
electricity mixes - such as Norway, Iceland and Canada - 
while India and China display the largest per-kg impacts 
(see annex). However, metals such as steel are used in 
many products with long lifetimes (for example in the 
construction sector), so that the scrap amounts available 
today for recycling correspond to a share of the production 
amounts that entered the market many years ago. Taking 
steel as an example, this characteristic coupled with 
increasing demand means that the amounts of scrap steel 
available are unable to match the large global increase in 
steel demand (figure 3.15). As a result, increase in demand 
is covered mainly by primary steel, thereby decreasing 
the overall share of secondary steel. In 2000, electric-
arc furnaces (EAF) suitable for secondary steel covered 
34 per cent of global crude steel production, while in 2015 
this share fell to 25 per cent (World Steel Association, 
2017). This trend was most visible in China, which has 
become the world’s top steel producer, and contributed 
more than half of the sector’s greenhouse gas emissions 
in 2015. Its primary steel production increased more than 
six times between 2000 and 2015, while the share of EAF 
decreased from 16 per cent in 2000 to 6 per cent in 2015. 
This is in contrast to “old economies”, such as Europe, 
where the bulk of the infrastructure was built up a long 
time ago and both demand and recycling rates are on a 
steadier trajectory. However, approximately 20 per cent of 
the Chinese climate change impacts from the iron-steel 
industry are due to exports to other regions (Exiobase, 
n.d.; Stadler et al., 2018). Globally, while steel recycling is a 
good way of lowering the impacts of steel production and 
recycling should be increased, its overall potential is limited 
by the availability of scrap. In the context of expanding 
demand over the medium term, this limitation will remain 
an important constraint in the coming decades (Van der 
Voet et al., 2018).
In the primary production route of steel, the first 
processing steps account for more impacts than the iron 
ore extraction phase for all indicators. The overall energy 
efficiency of iron- and steel-making rose considerably in the 
last few decades of the 20th century, but plateaued in the 
course of this century (IEA, 2014; World Steel Association, 
2018). Today, blast furnaces are the most widely used 
technology, but some outdated open-hearth furnace 
plants still exist. The latter have much larger climate 
change impacts compared to all other technologies. In a 
blast furnace, the heat and elemental carbon required to 
smelt iron from raw materials is primarily provided by the 
combustion of carbon coke (Hasanbeigi et al., 2014). This 
process step accounts for most of the climate impacts 
of the primary steel value chain. Alternatives to the blast 
furnace production route offering lower carbon intensity 
exist or are at varying stages of development. Some of 
these technologies were developed to avoid sinter iron 
and coke production, for instance relying on the direct 
reduction of solid iron (DRI) and using non-coking coal or 
gas as a reducing agent. The potential for using plastic 
waste as a reducing agent has been tested in some 
plants that have included this secondary feedstock to 
partially replace coke or coal in their operations (Vadenbo 
et al., 2013). While these innovative solutions promise 
reductions in the climate change impacts of primary steel 
production, commercial adoption is low (Hasanbeigi et al., 
2014). The International Energy Agency estimates that 
the energy intensity of iron and steel production can still 
FIGURE 3.14 Climate change impacts of metal recycling 
versus primary production
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The uncertainty bar captures the variation in CO2-emissions of electricity mixes of 
the producing countries (see annex). Country-adapted cradle-to-gate impacts from 
ecoinvent 3.4.
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be lowered by 20 per cent compared to the current status 
if best available technology (BAT) is applied (IEA, 2014). 
Based on the Energy Technology Perspectives 2014 of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014), the Science Based 
Targets Initiative (Pineda et al., 2015) quantified the total 
CO2 emission budget between 2011 and 2050 for the iron 
and steel sector to be 112 Gt CO2, in order to stay within the 
safe operating space for climate change. Considering that 
global steel demand is projected to increase (IEA, 2014), 
such an absolute reduction in climate change impacts is 
a challenge.
Following steel, aluminium production is the metal industry 
with highest climate change impacts on the global scale. 
Most of the impacts come from the energy consumption 
of fuel and electricity, which are the respective drivers of 
the refining bauxite ore into alumina and of the subsequent 
smelting of aluminium via electrolysis. In 2017, average 
energy intensity for alumina refining and aluminium 
smelting were 23 per cent and 8 per cent lower than in 
2000, respectively (International Aluminium Institute, 
2018). Further energy savings of around 10 per cent are 
still possible on a global scale by phasing out outdated 
production facilities and adopting the best available 
technology. This point has been demonstrated by China 
in the last couple of decades, where production capacity 
has rapidly increased, providing the opportunity to install 
the newest technology and enabling the country to be 
at the forefront of aluminium smelting energy efficiency, 
with around 4 per cent lower electricity intensity compared 
to the global average (International Aluminium Institute, 
2018). On the other hand, climate change and PM health 
impacts of aluminium production are highest in China 
because of the large amounts produced (54 per cent of 
global primary production in 2015 (International Aluminium 
Institute, 2018), but also due to the large carbon intensity 
of the electricity mix, which relies heavily on coal power.
For metals where the key input is electricity, such as 
primary aluminium and secondary steel, a shift towards 
an electricity mix with a higher share of renewables and 
a lower share of fossil fuels (in accordance with the Paris 
Agreement) will also favourably influence the impact. 
Moreover, if future growth in aluminium demand slows 
down, recycling can cover increasing shares of production 
(Van der Voet et al., 2018) , which may substantially 
reduce the impact of metal production. Since recycled 
aluminium is currently the main form used in certain 
applications (mainly motor engines) and does not meet 
the quality standards of many other applications due to 
alloying elements, concerns have been raised that there 
may even be a scrap surplus in the coming decade if 
aluminium scrap continues to be processed as a mixed 
fraction (Modaresi & Müller, 2012). This scenario of a 
scrap surplus may be unlikely as other uses for low-grade 
aluminium may be found (replacement of other materials), 
FIGURE 3.15 Impacts of the iron- and steelmaking sector (primary and recycled steel)  
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but these substitutions may result in fewer benefits than 
the substitution of primary aluminium. Therefore, attention 
should be paid to better sorting of scrap materials 
(Modaresi & Müller, 2012), with a view to producing high-
quality secondary metals that can substitute the same 
primary metals.
While the above discussion refers to the industrial 
production of metals, there are also informal small-scale 
activities, especially in the mining sector in developing 
countries, which do not necessarily meet the technology 
standards assumed in the above figures. One of the most 
prominent examples is gold mining. To date, elemental 
mercury is still frequently used in (informal) artisanal and 
small-scale gold mining (ASGM) to extract gold (WHO, 
2016). Artisanal and small-scale gold mining is estimated 
to be the largest anthropogenic source of mercury 
emissions, contributing approximately 37 per cent of the 
annual emissions in 2010 (AMAP/UNEP, 2013), and with 
an upward trend displayed in recent years (1,000 tons 
of mercury in 2008 versus 1320 tons or more in 2011 
(Seccatore et al., 2014)). Recent estimates show that 
about 16 million miners (including around 4 to 5 million 
women and children) in over 70 countries, (mainly South 
America, Africa and Asia) may be directly affected by 
mercury exposure in ASGM (Pirrone & Mason, 2009; WHO, 
2016). Such exposure may cause various health issues 
including kidney dysfunction, neurological disorders/
symptoms and immunotoxicity/autoimmune dysfunction 
(Gibb & Leary, 2014; WHO, 2016), with the global burden 
of disease associated with ASGM miners estimated to 
be 1.22 to 2.39 million DALYs (Steckling et al., 2017). In 
addition to miners, their families as well as nearby and 
downstream communities may also be severely exposed 
to mercury via inhalation and/or ingestion of contaminated 
food items. As a response to the global concern over 
mercury, governments adopted the Minamata Convention 
in 2013, including objectives to reduce, and where feasible 
eliminate, the use of mercury in ASGM (Minamata 
Convention on Mercury, 2009).
Many alternative methods have been developed and are 
available on the market. For example, using “concentrate” 
amalgamation instead of “whole ore” amalgamation 
may reduce the use of mercury by a factor of up to 50 
per unit of gold recovered (Ban Toxics!, 2010; Sousa et 
al., 2010; WHO, 2016). In addition, mercury in ASGM only 
yields about 20 to 30 per cent efficiency in recovering 
gold compared to 60 to 90 per cent from other methods 
(GEF, 2017). Therefore, miners have a financial incentive 
to switch, besides protecting their health. However, the 
sector’s general informality is one of the root causes of 
mercury use, and results in difficulties for the miners to 
apply alternative methods (GEF, 2017): (1) miners often do 
not know about the alternatives; and (2) they have difficulty 
in accessing capital to finance the initial investments for 
switching to alternative methods. Formalizing the sector 
and supporting miners with knowledge, training and 
capital (for instance through micro-loans or income from 
higher prices of certified gold) may be promising actions 
in the combat against mercury emissions.
3.3.1 Impacts of Non-Metallic Minerals
Although non-metallic mineral resource extraction makes 
up more than 45 per cent of the total mass of extracted 
resources and displays one of the highest growth rates of 
all resource groups (figure 2.7 in chapter 2), its contribution 
in terms of impacts to climate change and other impact 
categories remains limited (<2 per cent of the total resource 
impacts, figure 3.2, bottom). The majority of impacts of 
non-metallic minerals come from the processing stage, 
particularly from the production of cement and fertilizers 
(figure 3.17) (which are discussed in detail below). 
Extraction impacts are distributed among many different 
mineral resources. The main non-metallic minerals in 
terms of mass, namely sand/gravel and limestone, are 
of minor importance in terms of environmental impacts. 
FIGURE 3.16 Share of global production amounts and 
environmental impacts of the aluminium production 
chain  
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Nevertheless, mining activities may have local impacts on 
ecosystems. In particular, sand is mined in large amounts 
from rivers and marine sources, causing damages to 
local ecosystems. This is mainly a consequence of bad 
management practice, which calls for the attention of 
policymakers. Using land-based sand mines (as long as 
not from living riverbeds) or mining rock and crushing it to 
gravel and sand are viable options for many countries (the 
additional energy demand for crushing stone is small in 
comparison to the total impact of non-metallic minerals).
Climate change impacts and PM health impacts increased 
with the mass of minerals extracted over time and were 
mainly spearheaded by cement production (figure 3.17). 
By contrast, the increase in toxicity impacts is smaller than 
the mass increase. In addition to cement, emissions from 
the application of phosphorus fertilizer are also relevant 
for toxicity (discussed in the box later in this section). 
Nitrogen fertilizers were not included in figure 3.17 (only 
phosphorus and potassium nutrients used as fertilizer 
or as feedstock), because nitrogen fertilizers are not 
produced from mineral resources but from nitrogen in air. 
However, note that the production of nitrogen fertilizers is 
energy intensive, consuming fossil resources, and would 
contribute more than 15 per cent to the total of each 
impact category shown in figure 3.17. Other neglected 
processes include the production of glass and ceramics 
(adding approximately 10 per cent to the total climate 
change impacts in Figure 3.17) and the processing of 
building stone.
The production of clinker, the main ingredient of cement, 
is responsible for the greatest share of climate change 
impact and a substantial (> 40 per cent) share of the other 
impacts (figure 3.17). Greenhouse gas emissions are 
primarily due to the direct release of CO2 in the process 
of decarbonation of the raw material during calcination 
in the clinker kiln, and secondly due to the use of fuels to 
cover the high heat demand necessary for the calcination 
process.
Similar to the impacts of steel and aluminium, the biggest 
shares of cement impacts occur in China and India 
(> 50 per cent and 13 per cent of global production in 2015, 
respectively; see annex for data), due to the large build-up 
of infrastructure in the past several decades.
Since energy inputs represent roughly one third of the total 
production costs of cement, economic incentives have 
fostered early innovation in clinker kiln technology. Thermal 
efficiency has greatly improved in the last decades, thereby 
reducing the greenhouse gas emissions per kg of clinker. 
For instance, the heat demand of a modern precalciner kiln 
is only half of the heat demand of the now outdated, long-
wet kiln technology. As the technology reaches a state of 
maturity, the thermal requirements of modern kilns have 
plateaued in recent years and the adoption of efficient kiln 
technology stands at over 85 per cent of current installed 
capacity. While this is good news, it also means that the 
potential for further thermal efficiency gains is limited.
Another area for improvement of clinker production lies 
in the substitution of primary fuels and raw materials 
for waste materials. As part of the “Getting the Numbers 
Right” Project, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (20 per cent coverage of global cement 
production) found that alternative fuels, biomass 
and mixed waste increased from a global share of 
4 per cent of the heat demand of clinker kilns in 2000 to 
15 per cent in 2015 (WBCSD, n.d.). Further increases can 
realistically be expected (IEA, 2018). Clinker production 
can accommodate alternative fuels and raw materials 
substituting primary fuels (such as coal or other fossil 
fuels) and raw materials (such as limestone), as long as 
requirements concerning chemical composition and heat 
FIGURE 3.17 Development of impacts from non-metallic 
minerals extraction and processing (values from 2000 
indexed to 1)
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demand are met. In most cases, the co-processing of 
waste materials (old tires, solvents and so forth) lowers 
the climate change impacts and, depending on the 
waste material and its introduction in the combustion 
process, may further decrease or increase other impacts, 
such as toxicity effects from airborne emissions. For 
example, clinker kilns can represent a viable way to treat 
organically polluted waste fuels because organics are 
destroyed due to the high kiln temperature. This is highly 
valuable, particularly in countries without proper dedicated 
infrastructure to treat hazardous waste. By contrast, waste 
raw materials such as organically contaminated soil are 
otherwise introduced at the “cold end” of the kiln and may 
be volatilized before they reach the hot zones, forming 
dioxin emissions. A careful evaluation of the types of waste 
materials to be co-processed is therefore necessary in the 
light of the kiln technology, the entrance point in the kiln 
and the gas purification system.
The increased demand for cement has overcompensated 
the reductions of greenhouse gas emissions per kg of 
clinker, leading to an absolute increase in overall impact 
(figure 3.17). Therefore, additional changes are necessary 
to decouple environmental impacts from economic growth. 
While improvements in the clinker production process are 
constrained by the fact that over half of the CO2-emissions 
come from the unavoidable calcination emissions of the 
raw material, the use of sustainable construction materials 
and an improved design could also represent important 
technology innovation pathways in the near and medium 
term. Often, a portion of clinker is substituted with other 
materials that have lower environmental impacts, like 
industrial by-products or waste materials (such as ash 
from coal power plants and blast furnace slag). Another 
option is to reduce the volume of concrete needed for a 
given construction process by using high-performance 
concretes (see, for example, Habert & Roussel, 2009).
Although these strategies can help the cement industry 
meet the near- and medium-term CO2 emission reduction 
objectives, worldwide demand for concrete is expected 
to continue rising and at least partially offset the gains 
in CO2 intensity (WBCSD, 2018). Moreover, despite best 
efforts and technology, the fact that a large share of the 
CO2 emissions is related to calcination means that these 
associated emissions cannot be avoided. This is why 
the greatest share of future greenhouse gas savings is 
expected to come from installing carbon capture and 
storage, followed by a reduction of the clinker content in 
materials (IEA, 2018). Initial results have shown that a 
CO2 capture rate of 90 per cent is technically feasible with 
currently available technology, but it is also estimated to 
increase electricity demand (Cembureau, 2018).
Advances in materials can be combined with innovative 
production methods and technologies such as digital 
fabrication and construction. Concrete and steel can 
also be substituted with cross-laminated timber in the 
construction of mid-rise buildings. Furthermore, while the 
recycling of construction materials usually constitutes 
downcycling with little environmental benefit, this could 
change in the future if direct reuse of building components 
is introduced. Finally, urbanization design plays a key 
role in material demand for infrastructure. “Strategic 
intensification”, as recommended in the IRP report (IRP, 
2018c) can reduce material demand by establishing a 
“well-articulated networked hierarchy of high-density 
nodes that are interconnected”, densifying cities and 
providing services to citizens at short distances, reducing 
mobility demand.
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BOX 3.2 Cradle-to-grave assessment of phosphorus fertilizer 
Fertilizer minerals play an important role in the context of 
global food security (IFA, 2002). In the case of phosphorus, 
a large proportion of globally applied fertilizer originates 
from phosphate rock resources. The main producing 
countries are the People’s Republic of China, Morocco 
and Western Sahara, the United States of America and 
the Russian Federation (80 per cent of the total globally 
produced phosphate rock in 2015) (USGS, 2017). Initially 
alarming studies suggesting an upcoming phosphorus 
shortage and a threat to the global food supply have been 
put into perspective by a reclassification of phosphate 
reserves (USGS, 2012). Nonetheless, from an environmen-
tal viewpoint, it is vital to consider resource quality and the 
management of phosphorus resources. 
Figure 3.18 shows a cradle-to-grave analysis of the 
global production and application of phosphate fertilizers 
involving phosphate rock mining, phosphoric acid pro-
duction, fertilizer production and fertilizer application on 
agricultural fields. Climate change and particulate matter 
impacts result mainly from the production phase of fertil-
izer. Eco- and human toxicity effects are primarily caused 
by the contaminants in the fertilizer such as cadmium, 
uranium, chromium and other heavy metals. Application of 
contaminated phosphate fertilizers can lead to long-term 
accumulation of these metals in soil systems, where they 
may impact soil health and fertility, be taken up by crops or 
leach into water bodies (Kratz et al., 2016). Contaminants 
in the phosphate rock, such as heavy metals and radioac-
tive substances, often end up in manufactured mineral fertilizers, while cleaner resources are mostly used as feedstock in 
the chemical industry. Improving the quality of applied fertilizer and reducing the application rate in countries with current 
over-fertilization are key to lowering the environmental impact. Pollutant thresholds for mineral fertilizers could be a suit-
able way of improving fertilizer quality. Resource-quality considerations (especially for cadmium and uranium) should also 
play a key role in future phosphorus mining activities. Contaminated production residues, such as phosphogypsum, are an 
additional source of environmental impacts (Tayibi et al., 2009). They are mainly disposed of in large stacks, where wind 
erosion and groundwater leaching may spread contaminants, or they are directly discarded in rivers or the sea. Moreover, 
fertilizer production requires numerous chemicals and has high material and energy needs. 
Over-fertilization in agriculture causes eutrophication of rivers and lakes through runoff and leaching. Erosion is affected 
by land use change and agricultural management practices, but its eutrophying effects depend largely on the phosphorus 
content in the soil, which is increased through fertilizer applications. These human causes are often combined, and it is 
therefore difficult to separate the two effects. Phosphorus concentrations build up especially in agricultural areas that have 
been intensively managed for long periods. As a result, past fertilization leads to eutrophication through current erosion, 
which depends on current management practices (Scherer & Pfister, 2015).
Table 3.1 summarizes the indices of phosphorus fertilizer use and related eutrophication impacts on a regional scale (FAO, 
2018; FAO and World Bank, 2018; Scherer & Pfister, 2016a). Results show that the relative eutrophication impact tends to be 
higher in developed and emerging economies (higher application rates), as well as in regions with vulnerable climate, soils 
and ecosystems such as the tropics. Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia and the Pacific show the biggest regional 
overall eutrophication impact of fertilizer application (table 3.1).
Both eutrophication and toxicity impacts could be lowered by avoiding over-fertilization. The high relative impact in Latin 
America results from the vulnerable ecosystems and high application rates. By contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa soil nutrient 
depletion (or lack of fertilizers) is common (Sutton et al., 2013), and yields could be increased by appropriate fertilization. 
Future projections point to a major increase in fertilizer use due to population growth. Increasing urbanization may addition-
ally lead to nutrient flows far away from production areas and may thus limit reuse and recycling options (UNEP, 2016a).
FIGURE 3.18 Environmental impact of phosphate fertilizers 
(mining, fertilizer production and application)
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TABLE 31 Indices of phosphate fertilizer application and related eutrophication effects. The relative impact shows the 
magnitude of aquatic species loss per area of arable land (Azevedo et al., 2014; FAO, 2018; FAO and World Bank, 2018). 
Highest value per index is in bold. PDF: potentially damaged fraction of species (regional species loss).  
CF: impact assessment characterization factor
REGION APPLICATION RATE AREA OF  ARABLE LAND APPLIED AMOUNT
CF FOR SOIL 
EMISSIONS RELATIVE IMPACT
 [KG P2O5/HA] [HA] [T P2O5/YR] [PDF/KG P2O5] [PDF/HA]
Africa 4.34 227’982’370 988’628 2.79E-13 1.33E-12
Asia and the Pacific 51.44 478’296’130 24’604’563 2.12E-13 8.51E-12
EECAA 4.83 124’872’800 603’660 4.98E-14 2.31E-13
Europe 18.03 169’859’620 3’062’363 5.00E-14 9.89E-13
Latin America and the 
Caribbean
33.89 166’857’520 5’654’719 3.84E-13 1.20E-11
North America 23.14 194’637’300 4’503’709 9.00E-14 2.20E-12
West Asia 24.28 32’005’710 777’105 8.72E-14 1.36E-12
Regarding innovation, technologies exist to purify phosphogypsum and therefore to enable it to be used (for example in the 
building sector) instead of being disposed of. However these are mostly not yet economical (Tayibi et al., 2009). Potential 
alternative sources, such as phosphate seabed mining (which is on an advanced planning stage in Namibia and South 
Africa) could lead to unknown damage in the marine ecosystem. Technologies that recover phosphorus from sewage 
sludge (ash) are being developed (Egle et al., 2016). Some of these technologies produce fertilizer that is cleaner than 
conventional mineral fertilizer and saves the extraction of primary phosphorus resources at the same time (Mehr & Hellweg, 
2018). Other measures include the recycling of organic wastes by anaerobic digestion or composting, in a circular economy 
approach, which is already currently practiced around the world (while retaining large upscaling potential). Depending on 
the wastewater infrastructure, urine separation could be a another way to recycle phosphorus for agricultural uses (Wu et 
al., 2016). Finally, many countries have made improvements in fertilization efficiency, leading to lower application rates and 
less eutrophication and ecotoxicity impacts without a reduction in yields. Precision agriculture is likely to further improve 
agronomic phosphorus efficiency in the future (Iho & Laukkanen, 2012; Mallarino & Schepers, 2005). 
3.3.2 Impacts of Fossil Resources
Coal, oil and natural gas provide various forms of energy 
while also constituting the raw materials for numerous 
chemicals like pharmaceuticals, plastics, paints and many 
more. Extraction, processing, distribution and use are all 
major contributors to environmental pollution - especially 
in air. 
A key pollutant in the extraction of fossil fuels is methane, 
as it contributes to climate change impacts. Coal 
extraction has particularly large impacts (figure 3.19), 
and is therefore discussed in more detail below. Generally, 
larger amounts of methane are bound in coal at greater 
depths, so underground mining releases more coalbed 
methane than open cast mining. Underground methane is 
vented to prevent the formation of explosive methane-air 
mixtures, but still causes human casualties throughout the 
world. In addition to flaring methane and converting it to 
CO2, recent technological advances enable methane to be 
captured and fed into local natural gas networks or used 
in gas turbines to supply mining equipment with electricity.
FIGURE 3.19 Climate change and PM health impacts of 
fossil resource extraction and processing 
2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015
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0.00
 Climate change impacts PM health impacts
Extraction coal, lignite, peat Extraction crude petroleum
Extraction other fossilsExtraction natural gas Processing into coke
Plastics and chemicalsPetroleum reﬁnery Pipelines
From Exiobase 3.4 (Exiobase, n.d.; Stadler et al., 2018). Impacts of the year 2000 
indexed to 1.
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Polluting dust emissions occur from coal mining activities 
such as digging, blasting, coal handling and stockpiling, 
but also from increased wind erosion. This is relevant for 
underground and open-pit mining. The resulting emissions 
represent a health risk to workers and residents due to 
fine particulate matter release. Wet dust suppression 
and agglomerating agents are applied to the coal to 
reduce these emissions. Coal handling and stockpiling 
is increasingly taking place inside enclosures, which also 
helps to prevent leaching, keep coal dry and reduce noise 
pollution. In comparison to the particulate emissions from 
coal power plants, the share of health impacts from these 
emissions is small (figure 3.20), but may still have major 
local effects.
Crude oil and natural gas are recovered from deep wells. 
Moreover, unconventional extraction methods like shale 
oil and shale gas production (as well as production from 
oil sands) have gained interest in recent years due to 
technological innovation and the decline of conventional 
reserves. Overall, the total greenhouse gas emissions for 
oil and gas are in a similar range to that of coal extraction 
and processing impacts (figure 3.19). Mostly, they arise 
from venting, flaring and local energy supply, as well as 
from leaks and other sources of fugitive emissions (IPCC, 
2006). Mercury is released into the environment during 
oil and gas extraction with wastewater and solid waste 
streams. These emissions are judged to be major sources 
of mercury contamination in oceans but currently lack 
quantification (AMAP/UNEP, 2013). Additionally, some of 
the mercury is separated after the extraction of fossil fuels 
and then released to the environment during artisanal and 
small-scale gold mining (see section 3.3.1). Environmental 
impacts from extraction of fossil fuels may also come 
from the release of other toxic compounds (such as those 
in drilling fluids) to air, soil and water bodies, as well as 
from seismic surveys and the construction of extraction 
infrastructure like ocean-floor pipelines.
The recent increase in unconventional oil and gas 
extraction in North America has brought additional 
environmental challenges that have not yet been fully 
quantified. Unconventional oil extraction, such as from 
shale or tar sands, is found to be on the higher end of 
greenhouse gas emissions in comparison to conventional 
deep-well extraction (IHS Energy, 2014). Natural gas 
fracking from shale may lead to gas leakage and methane 
migration into drinking water reservoirs. Additionally, the 
injected slickwater (a solution of water and chemicals) for 
enhanced recovery may reach upper layers of the earth 
and local aquifers, as well as consuming large amounts 
of water. Concerns about biodiversity loss from surface 
mining of tar sands have also been raised (Rooney et al., 
2012).
The most impactful fossil processing step in terms of 
climate change impacts is the refining of crude oil into 
useful products (such as chemicals and fuels) (figure 3.19), 
primarily due to the large heat demand of this process. A 
key for human health effects and environmental impacts 
of acidification is the removal of sulfur from crude oil, 
which may cause acid rain and health effects from 
particulate matter formation during fuel combustion. A 
current technical challenge for global refineries is the new 
regulation on heavy fuel oil combustion for ships that 
will force refiners to produce ship fuel with 0.5 per cent 
sulfur by 2020, instead of the current level of 3.5 per cent. 
Several technical alternatives are being discussed to either 
produce compliant ship fuel or shift production to other 
products.
Fossil fuels, and coal in particular, are the main goods 
involved in global freight transport (UNCTAD, 2017). 
Global transportation of coal via ocean vessels has 
become more significant in recent years. The resulting 
environmental impacts are limited on the global scale 
but can be substantial on the local scale: for example, 
28 per cent of Japanese coal particulate matter health 
impacts come from transport (figure 3.20). Improvements 
of related pollution impacts can be achieved with larger, 
more efficient ships and cleaner fuel. In addition to ship 
transport, oil and gas are distributed by pipelines, which 
can be problematic when causing fugitive emissions 
or spills. Maintenance, especially in remote regions, is 
essential to avoid leakages. Altogether, pipelines cause 
3 per cent of the total greenhouse gas emissions from 
fossil fuel extraction and processing (figure 3.19), due to 
the energy demand for pumps and compressors and their 
fugitive emissions (particularly methane).
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BOX 3.3 Use phase emissions and impacts of fossil fuel combustion
Environmental and health impacts from the final use of fossil fuels play a crucial role in their life cycle. These impacts 
depend on the extracted resource quality, intermediate processing steps and the location of emissions, in addition to tech-
nical measures (for example flue gas cleaning equipment). Any mitigation actions must therefore consider the entire life 
cycle. Fuel properties vary largely (see coal in figure 3.21), and pollution therefore differs just as widely. For example, sulfur 
in fuel is converted into acidic SO2, and nitrogen is converted into NOx (fuel NOx). Both these air emissions act as precur-
sors of secondary particulate matter, which leads to human health impacts, as well as causing terrestrial acidification. 
In the case of coal, part of the coal ash forms particulate matter and leaves the boiler with the flue gases. Coal washing 
and coking, typically applied to coal for the steel industry, remove impurities (for example sulfur), do prevent subsequent 
pollutant emissions in the use phase but come with trade-offs, such as increased energy demand and related emissions. 
Additionally, some power plants use the impure washing rejects and other waste coal (gangue), thereby simply shifting the 
point of emission to power plants near mines without leading to a total net reduction in pollution.
Coal contributes 35 per cent to the anthropogenic emissions of mercury (Pirrone et al., 2010). There is large variation in 
the mercury share within raw coal composition (figure 3.21), and emissions can thus be prevented by sourcing coal with 
a low mercury content. Once released, mercury reversibly cycles between its different forms (two oxidation states and 
various organic forms, of which methylmercury is particularly toxic) and between environmental compartments globally. 
Post-combustion flue gas treatment eliminates considerable fractions of all forms of mercury pollutants, but health impacts 
from the fossil fuel use phase remain the highest in the entire supply chain (even in countries with modern flue gas cleaning 
systems) (figure 3.20). 
Pollution prevention from fossil fuels is largely driven by environmental legislation (Lecomte et al., 2017). In the past few 
years, there have been major reductions of allowable emission concentrations in China and India, which are now two of 
the countries with the world’s strictest emission limits. However, these emission limits are sometimes only applied to the 
newest plants (commonly the case in the United States of America and India), which may discourage innovation and mod-
ernization. In contrast, the Chinese government completely overhauled its electricity generation sector within one decade by 
shutting down old power plants and coal mines and replacing them with state-of-the-art ones. Furthermore, China equipped 
all its power plants with real-time monitoring devices to trace sources of pollution. Urban PM concentrations in China have 
dropped by 32 per cent in the last four years (Greenstone, 2018), but remain high due to the large amounts of coal used. 
FIGURE 3.20 Health impacts from primary and secondary particulate matter from coal electricity generation
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The x-axis shows the electricity generation, with the width of bars being proportional to the kWh of coal electricity generated within each country. The y-axis shows the 
average health impacts caused by the coal power production of each country related to electricity from coal power plants (in DALY/kWh). The area of the bars is proportional 
to total particulate matter health impacts from each country. Reference year: 2012. Regionalized health impacts were calculated with (Verones et al., 2016). Emissions of 
closed mines and spontaneous coal fires were not included due to lack of data.
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Similar improvements would be possible in India, where 
power plants are often old and use outdated and incom-
plete flue gas treatment. This is particularly urgent as the 
population density in India is very high, meaning there is 
high exposure. An effective way to avoid placing unneces-
sary burdens on plant operators can be to adapt emission 
thresholds for pollutants with mostly local effects based 
on the surrounding population, such as in the case of SO2 
in Japan, where emission limits are based on population 
densities for 19 different regions.
While there have been improvements in fossil power plant 
emission standards throughout the world, there has also 
been a dramatic increase in fossil electricity generation 
capacity in recent years, which contributes to increased 
access to affordable energy but has environmental and 
health trade-offs. Globally, the capacity increased by 
73 per cent from 2000 to 2015, with even higher increases 
in certain regions of the world (Lecomte et al., 2017). 
Due to high capital costs and long power plant lifetimes 
(sometimes exceeding 50 years), this poses the threat of 
a “lock-in” to environmentally harmful technologies. The construction of the least efficient subcritical coal power plants, 
which still make up the major share of new installations, has to be stopped to avoid compromising the achievement of 
global climate goals (World Steel Association, 2018), in line with SDG targets 7.3 and 7.a. Carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) is being discussed as an intermediate way to force the reduction of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, but 
comes with efficiency losses that will in turn push up fuel demand (Schakel, 2017) and increase other pollutant emissions 
for supply chains and facilities. Therefore, even with appropriate flue gas cleaning systems and CCS, fossil energy systems 
are bound to have substantial health and environmental impacts (UNEP, 2016c). Substitution of coal and other fossils with 
renewables appears to be the most effective way to lower the various types of environmental impacts (UNEP, 2016a, 2016c).
BOX 3.4 Plastics – A Global Challenge and Opportunity for Sustainable Consumption
Due to their low weight, durability and low cost, plastics have become one of the most used human-made materials. Global 
annual production increased from 2 million tons (Mt) in 1950 to 380 Mt in 2015, roughly 2.5 times the average annual growth 
rate of global gross domestic product in the same period (Geyer et al., 2017). In contrast to the rapid increase in the produc-
tion and diverse uses of plastics, the current management of plastics - particularly after the use phase - lags way behind: 
according to recent estimates from 2015, out of 6300 Mt of all plastic waste historically generated, only around 21 per cent 
has been either incinerated (12 per cent) or recycled (9 per cent), whereas the rest (79 per cent) has accumulated in landfills 
or the natural environment (Geyer et al., 2017). This major loss of plastics from value chains not only reduces overall 
resource efficiency (4 to 8 per cent of oil was estimated to be used annually for global plastic production (Hopewell et al., 
2009; World Economic Forum, 2016)), but has also led to substantial marine pollution (with recent estimates suggesting 
that 4.8 to 12.7 Mt of plastic waste entered the ocean in 2010), particularly in the coastal areas of developing and transition 
countries in Asia (Jambeck, 2015). The adverse effects of plastics on marine ecosystems has been recently reviewed 
elsewhere (for example Thevenon & Carroll, 2015; UNEP, 2016d; Worm et al., 2017). 
Table 3.2 summarizes the major causes of the current mismanagement of plastics along their life cycle, highlights major 
(upcoming) challenges and outlines some opportunities for future actions and examples of existing initiatives for the sus-
tainable consumption and production of plastics. Various factors in every stage of the plastic life cycle contribute to the 
current global mismanagement and resulting issues such as marine debris pollution. Therefore, holistic, transformative 
approaches throughout the entire value chain from production to waste management, in a circular economy approach, 
are needed. For example, one may argue that legal instruments that prohibit and/or use economic penalties to discourage 
microbeads and carrier bags, including those in operation in over 60 developing and transition countries in Africa, Asia, 
Oceania (including some islands states) and Central and South America (UNEP, 2018c; Xanthos & Walker, 2017), may be 
extended to all countries and to other single-use plastics.
FIGURE 3.21 Distribution of key constituents of coal from 
1464 global coal samples (Finkelman, 1999)
Composition of coal per wet coal mass (wt.-%)
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The boxes show the median as well as the lower and upper quartile, and the whiskers 
indicate the highest/ lowest datum within 1.5 times the interquartile range (Tukey 
boxplot; log-scale). Outliers are not shown.
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The common practice of trading plastics for recycling is problematic, as it may result in higher environmental impacts when 
materials are sent from countries with a high technological level to countries using technologies with lower efficiencies, 
or even to informal recycling sectors in developing countries. Due to a lack of consistent characterization and reporting of 
traded waste, it is not currently possible to assess these additional environmental impacts associated with plastic waste 
trade. In 2016, about half of all plastic waste intended for recycling (14.1 Mt) was estimated to be exported by 123 countries, 
approximately half of which (7.35 Mt) was taken by China (Brooks et al., 2018). Since January 2018, China has implemented 
a new import ban on low-quality plastic waste, resulting in great pressure on countries exporting waste plastics. It remains 
to be seen if this change will lead to the build-up of more recycling infrastructure in the previously exporting nations or 
whether it will simply result in a shift of exports to developing or transition countries. One starting point for addressing the 
plastic waste trade may be the Basel Convention, which provides a framework for knowledge transfer and promotes the 
proper management of waste. While it is mainly hazardous waste that is regulated within this framework, plastics waste 
could also arguably be included, including the harmonization of technical standards and practices for treatment (Brooks 
et al., 2018).
TABLE 3.2 An overview of major causes, additional (upcoming) challenges and opportunities for future actions relating to 
the current mismanagement of plastics throughout their life cycle
LIFE CYCLE 
STAGE
MAJOR CAUSES OF PLASTICS 
MISMANAGEMENT 
MAJOR 
(UPCOMING) 
CHALLENGES
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE ACTIONS AND EXAMPLES
Plastic 
production
  Rapid increase in production, 
diversity, and complexity of virgin 
plastics (and additives therein) 
(UNEP, 2016d).
  Difficulties in identifying and 
separating different plastics to 
ensure quality, purity and safety, 
thereby limiting plastic’s circularity.
  Cheap prices linked to a low oil price 
contribute to a steady demand for 
virgin plastics (Kramer, n.d.).
  Plastics 
production may 
further increase 
  Expansion into 
new markets 
and new uses 
for plastics 
(Dauvergne, 
2018) 
  To develop and foster:
  Best production practices, including (1) reduction of harmful 
substances and waste, (2) prevention of plastic pellet loss, (3) take 
back, reuse and recycling of plastic products (i.e. transition to a 
circular economy), and (4) transparency about ingredients and 
production process, for example via clear global labelling, to enable 
the sorting of plastics after use into high-value resource streams 
(GESAMP, 2015)
  Prevention and reduction (for example by light weighting and new 
materials) to do more with less plastic 
  Expansion of existing initiatives to constrain fossil fuel supply, for 
example the World Bank ending their support for new oil, gas and 
coal extraction (SEI 2018) 
Materials 
and product 
design
A large portion of plastics (36 per cent 
in 2015; (Geyer et al., 2017) is designed 
for single use. Some uses lead to 
direct releases of (micro)plastics into 
the environment, for example, the 
wash-off of microbeads in personal 
care products and synthetic fabrics in 
textiles (Browne et al., 2011), plus wear 
and tear of tires. 
 To establish incentives (and disincentives) for: 
  Reduction/elimination of single-use plastics, using, for example, 
existing prohibition and discouragement via economic penalties for 
microbeads and carrier bags in over 60 developing and transition 
countries in Africa, Asia, Oceania (including some islands States), 
and Central and South America as models (Xanthos & Walker, 
2017) 
  Design of new materials and products for a circular economy (for 
example minimized loss during use; easily reusable / recyclable; 
more durable; streamlined variations of plastics types and 
additives, using PET as a model)
Waste 
generation
A disposable / throwaway consumer 
culture 
 To educate and incentivize consumers to reduce plastic waste 
generation, for instance by using instruments such as bottle deposits 
to increase collection of recyclables and by fostering responsible 
disposal of non-recyclables.
Waste 
management
A lack of adequate management 
systems for most plastic waste 
worldwide (including collection, sorting 
and recycling). In addition, much of the 
plastic waste generated in developed 
countries is exported to developing and 
transition countries (87 per cent of all 
exports of plastic waste since 1988 
(Brooks et al., 2018).
The import ban 
of waste plastics 
by China since 
2018 puts great 
pressure on 
many developed 
countries that 
previously 
exported plastic 
waste for 
recycling (Brooks 
et al., 2018). 
  Combine waste reduction methods with proper waste collection, 
disposal and treatment methods worldwide. 
  Follow up and document trade flows of waste, similar to the 
regulation of hazardous waste through the Basel Convention.
  Plastic landfill bans in 11 European countries to enhance recycling 
(Worm et al., 2017).
  Define a set of clearly defined collection and sorting categories 
  Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), such as Norwegian 
Regulation 1289/2017. 
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3.3.3 Impacts of Biomass Resources
Biomass resources are used for food, material feedstock 
and for energy. Food is the most essential biomass 
extracted, as it is vital for humans and for SDG 2.4 (to end 
hunger). However, food production is also responsible for 
the majority of biodiversity loss, soil erosion and a large 
share of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (UNEP, 
2016a). Sustainable and productive agriculture is included 
in the SDGs in the form of indicator 2.4.1. 
Food is mainly provided in the form of crops but also as 
animal products, which might be either wild catch (highly 
important for fish and SDG 14 but also wild game, insects 
and honey), from pastures (mainly ruminants) or feed-
based production systems (mainly fish, chicken and eggs, 
pork and ruminants - including those bred for milk). Other 
animal biomass, such as insects or insect products (for 
example honey or silk), or mushrooms and algae can also 
be regionally important sources of biomass.
Crop yields per area have increased considerably over the 
last few decades (green revolution). However, growing 
population and increasing demand for high-quality food 
(including luxury products with a large biodiversity and 
water stress impact, such as coffee or cocoa) and cotton 
put pressure on water and land resources and add to 
eutrophying and toxic impacts through agrochemicals 
and fertilizer application (UNEP, 2016a). Land- and water-
related impacts are further discussed in section 3.3.5 and 
freshwater eutrophication and toxicity from heavy metals 
from phosphorus fertilizers in box 3.2.
In terms of climate change impacts, biomass extraction 
and processing account for more than 30 per cent of 
greenhouse gas emissions related to resources, not 
including emissions from land use change. Cattle farming 
has the highest share of direct emissions, mainly from 
enteric fermentation (CH4 emissions) and N2O emissions, 
which also relates to the high impacts of the dairy sector. 
Rice production includes the highest CH4 emissions 
besides ruminants and has the highest impacts from crop 
production (figure 3.22). The upstream impacts of cattle 
meat, dairy products and paddy rice production account 
for 60 per cent of climate change impacts of biomass 
production and processing (without land use change). 
Direct greenhouse gas emissions of all biomass extraction 
and processing have the following causes: 53 per cent by 
CH4, 26 per cent by CO2 and 21 per cent by N2O. Note that 
N2O emissions are highly variable and thus difficult to 
quantify on a global level, which leads to high uncertainties. 
Climate impacts of land use change are difficult to account 
for and allocate to sectors, but data from 2010 indicate 
that land use change potentially doubles the climate 
change impacts of biomass production (UNEP, 2016a).
From the production perspective, decoupling can be 
achieved through increased yields, as achieved in the 
previous century during the “green revolution”. In many 
developing countries in particular, there is still a large 
potential for yield increases by using state-of-the art 
crop management, including optimized fertilization and 
irrigation practices (UNEP, 2016a). Genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) are used to enhance yield and to save 
labour and agrochemicals, while at the same time being 
perceived as a potential risk to humans and ecosystems, 
as well as to production through the resulting herbicide 
tolerant weeds (UNEP, 2016a). Precision agriculture, new 
breeds and drone applications are promising technologies 
with the potential to further increase biomass production 
efficiencies globally. An example of precision agriculture 
technologies is found in chapter 5 (section 5.2.3.4).
FIGURE 3.22 Climate change impacts of biomass cultivation 
and processing, excluding land use change 
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Exiobase 3.4 (Exiobase, n.d.; Stadler et al., 2018). Land use change is estimated to 
double the climate change impacts (to a total of 10.6-14.3 gigatons CO2 equivalents 
for the food sector) (UNEP, 2016a).
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Greenhouse production can also increase yields by 
providing controlled and optimized growing conditions, 
especially for vegetables. Additionally, the efficiency of food 
production with regard to land and water resources (as 
well as emissions of agrochemicals) can be increased, but 
appropriate monitoring is still needed, since any efficiency 
gains can be offset by greater water depletion in some 
regions due to intensification (Ward & Pulido-Velazquez, 
2008). Increased irrigation efficiency can facilitate 
large-scale intensification of greenhouses, leading to an 
increase in total water demand in a region (for example 
Lake Naivasha in Kenya or southern Spain), even if the 
water demand per crop decreases. Moreover, greenhouse 
production requires additional material and, depending on 
the climate conditions, energy inputs. While the latter are 
often based on fossil fuels, there are greenhouses that run 
on renewable energy (such as heat pumps, geothermal 
heating, renewable electricity from wind and photovoltaics 
and so on). Some greenhouses also draw waste heat from 
industrial processes in the surrounding area. 
Another important food category is the wild catch of fish 
and other aquatic species. Per capita fish consumption has 
increased by more than a factor of two since 1960. In the 
last few decades, this increase has mainly been covered 
by aquaculture as wild catch levels had stagnated due to 
depleted fish stocks (see FAO, 2016b for a discussion of 
overfishing impacts).
Consumption patterns are relevant in terms of demand, 
as current diets vary considerably between people and 
cultures. For the first time in history, however, the number 
of overweight people exceeds those experiencing hunger 
(partly due to a tendency for kilocalorie overconsumption). 
This overconsumption can be associated with additional 
resource use for both the additional, unnecessary food 
production and for dealing with the resulting health 
impacts. Meat and milk demand have increased largely 
over the last decades and has been responsible for 
higher environmental impacts. Higher-income countries 
consume on average five times more meat per capita 
and year than lower-income countries (McMichael et al., 
2007). There might be benefits for nutrient cycling through 
some livestock activities, however these would be realized 
at a lower extent than current production levels. With 
reductions in the consumption of certain types of foods, 
such as processed foods containing trans fatty acids 
and red and processed meat products or paddy rice, both 
fewer environmental impacts and improved health can 
be realized simultaneously (Walker et al., 2018). However, 
this requires consumer knowledge about food choices and 
government policy to incentivize change.
Regional impacts of diets can vary depending on growing 
conditions, food preferences and season, which means 
diets optimized for an individual will be different depending 
on location (especially in the case of subsistence farming 
and limited trade activities, which is still the case for a 
large share of the global population in emerging and 
developing economies). In other areas, trade allows more 
independence from local conditions and could also help 
to improve global food production efficiency in case 
production is moved to the most suitable areas. However, 
global trade also leads to increased consumption of luxury 
products such as coffee, tea and cacao, which only grow in 
tropical regions and often induce considerable biodiversity 
impacts (Chaudhary et al., 2016a; Scherer & Pfister, 2016b). 
Furthermore, trade among regions with unequal incomes 
and subsidies leads to distorted food prices, which do not 
reflect the full prices. This can lead to increased demand 
for food quantities or food types (such as meat) beyond 
nutritional requirements and thus add to food waste 
and overconsumption of calories or proteins. Note that 
personal dietary habits are a consequence of price, as well 
as other factors such as quality and taste (Glanz et al., 
1998; Lappalainen et al., 1998). The role of culture strongly 
influences an individual’s food choices as well, though 
their awareness of this influence may be limited (Kittler et 
al., 2012). While inducing changes in personal diets may 
be difficult to implement, they could help to mitigate the 
various environmental impacts of biomass resources and 
lead to health benefits at the same time. 
Non-food biomass, such as wood, can also serve as 
feedstock for materials and energy. Material utilization 
ranges from the construction sector and furniture to 
packaging and various chemical applications, while 
the energy uses of wood include the residential and 
industrial sectors. Although wood is a renewable resource, 
its sustainable availability is limited. While overuse 
and deforestation are the norm in some countries, 
afforestation, reforestation and increasing wood stocks 
in existing forests are commonplace in others. This is 
often done intentionally to increase carbon storage in 
forests and mitigate climate change. The important role 
of afforestation (planting new forests) and reforestation 
(restocking of clear-cut forests) in carbon sequestration 
is undisputed, but the long-term success of harvesting 
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less wood from forests by reducing forest management 
is debated in the literature (Werner et al., 2010; Krug et al., 
2012): while initially the carbon pool in the forest increases, 
the rate of carbon uptake eventually declines, mortality 
increases in the long run and less wood is harvested 
and used in the economy to substitute other materials 
and fuels. Overall, models indicate that long-term carbon 
sequestration is highest when forests are harvested 
around their increment-optimized sustainable growth rate 
(for example Werner et al., 2010; Krug et al., 2012), and the 
harvested wood is used as a material or fuel (for example 
Seidl et al., 2007; Werner et al., 2010). Deforestation, on the 
other hand, results in severe environmental impacts due to 
loss of biodiversity, an increased risk of land degradation 
and carbon emissions (with deforestation causing up to 
17 per cent of global carbon emissions (IPCC, 2007)). A 
main driver of deforestation is agricultural production, 
especially animal farming and soy/palm oil plantations, 
which cause between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of total 
deforestation globally. Other reasons include resource 
mining, infrastructure development, as well as timber 
logging itself. Illegal logging is assumed to account for 
15 per cent to 30 per cent of all wood traded worldwide 
(Nellemann, 2012), a share that in the main tropical 
producer countries reaches 50 per cent to 90 per cent.
The biodiversity impacts of wood extraction depend largely 
on the intensity of forest management. While for extensive 
management systems (such as selection and retention 
forestry) no change in species richness is observed, 
intensive forestry (like clear-cut or slash and burn systems) 
can cause a loss of up to 50 per cent of local species 
(Chaudhary et al., 2016b). For the latter, biodiversity 
impacts in terms of species extinction is several orders 
of magnitudes higher in tropical regions than in Europe. It 
is therefore recommended to source wood from certified, 
extensively managed forests. However, only 8 per cent of 
forests worldwide are certified as sustainably managed, 
and over 90 per cent of these are located in Europe and 
North America (Nellemann, 2012). The climate targets of 
the Paris Agreement may result in increased bioenergy 
use (with or without carbon sequestration and storage) 
and intensification of forestry could increase, thereby 
impacting biodiversity.
The versatility of wood raises the question of how wood 
resources should be used in order to achieve an optimal 
environmental benefit. If sourced sustainably, the use of 
wood as a construction material or as material feedstock 
for products generally performs better in terms of climate 
change impacts compared to other material alternatives 
(Sathre & Gustavsson, 2006; Sommer & Kratena, 2017). 
Wood use is especially beneficial when high-impact 
products (like steel) are substituted and if a proper energetic 
use at the end of the life cycle is warranted (like replacing 
heating oil) (Suter et al., 2017). Furthermore, products with 
a long lifetime, such as buildings and furniture, store and 
thereby delay the emissions of carbon to the atmosphere, 
thereby reducing climate change impacts (Heeren et al., 
2015; Mehr & Hellweg, 2018). Although wooden buildings 
tend to have an increased space heating or cooling 
demand due to less thermal mass (and therefore less 
heat buffering capacity) than other materials such as 
brick or concrete, the overall life cycle impacts tend to 
be substantially smaller than those of massive buildings 
(Heeren et al., 2015). This is due to the environmental 
benefits of the material (carbon storage capabilities and 
less embodied energy) for impacts of climate change, 
but also for many other environmental indicators. It is 
now possible to construct modern multi-story buildings 
of (mainly) wood, which increases the application options 
in the building sector. A cascade use of wood in various 
successive product cycles can increase the efficiency 
and the environmental benefits of wood, especially when 
other materials and fossil energy sources are substituted 
(Höglmeier et al., 2015). Wood can also be beneficial if used 
as a fuel, but complete combustion and adequate flue gas 
cleaning must be ensured. Otherwise, outdoor exposure 
to pollutants such as particulate matter can be elevated, 
as for example measured in cities and municipalities with 
large shares of wood heating (Fuller et al., 2013). From a 
health perspective, indoor exposure from biomass use 
in households is even more relevant and represents one 
of the leading global health risks. On a worldwide level, 
approximately 3 billion people do not have access to clean 
fuels and cook with solid fuels (WHO, 2018b) such as 
wood, coal, charcoal and agricultural residue. This leads 
to unhealthy indoor pollution exposure and severe health 
impacts. The World Health Organization estimates that 3.8 
million people die prematurely every year due to inefficient 
cooking practices and related exposure to pollutants 
(WHO, 2018b). This problem is addressed by SDG 3.9, 
which aims for a substantial reduction of the number of 
deaths and illnesses from pollution. Improved ventilation 
and a switch to clean cooking fuels are technical solutions 
to mitigate this problem.
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Biomass plays a large role as an energy source in future 
climate scenarios. However, wood should preferably be 
used firstly as a material before exploiting it as an energy 
source, as focusing on wood as an energy source alone 
would miss opportunities to make better environmental 
use of this resource. A comprehensive management 
strategy is needed, including a careful assessment of 
the environmental benefits and impacts of each biomass 
use, considering substitution effects of replacing other 
materials and fuels, cascade use and temporary carbon 
storage, in order to make optimal use of limited renewable 
biomass resources.
3.3.2 Water Resource Impacts
Freshwater is a vital resource for humans and ecosystems 
and thus a special case among abiotic resources. SDG 
6 identifies several sub-goals for human access to 
freshwater, and under SDG 15.1 freshwater ecosystems 
ought to be sustainably used. The majority of water 
consumption occurs from renewable sources (rain, soil 
moisture, rivers, lakes and groundwater). Water scarcity 
is therefore mainly a function of demand and availability, 
which has been the basis for most approaches that 
quantify impacts in LCA (Kounina et al., 2013). If demand 
exceeds availability, non-renewable resources such as 
fossil groundwater reserves are tapped. In order to account 
for water scarcity beyond the common use-to-availability 
ratio (for example SDG indicator 6.4.2), the recent 
“AWARE” method, which was developed within a UNEP 
initiative (UNEP SETAC, 2016), includes natural scarcity 
and calculates the area required to sustainably supply 
a volume of water consumption in each of the >11,000 
watersheds globally. In a subsequent step, the result is 
normalized to global equivalents, applying thresholds of 
0.1 and 100 m3-eq/m3 (with the indicator ranging over three 
orders of magnitude).
Water resources are mainly impacted by agricultural 
activities, but also by electricity production. Overall, 
cultivation and processing of biomass are responsible 
for almost 90 per cent of global water stress impacts 
(figure 3.2, right column). Interestingly, the regions with 
the largest water-stress production impacts (West Asia 
and Asia and the Pacific) have a higher water scarcity 
footprint for production than for consumption, which 
means they “export” scarce water mainly through food and 
cotton products to other regions such as North America, 
Europe and Africa (which are net importers) (figure 
3.28). Increased efficiency in biomass extraction (yields) 
and supply (as discussed in section 3.3.4) will generally 
translate into reduced impacts on water. However, if a yield 
increase requires additional irrigation, water impacts will 
increase (but create benefits in terms of area decrease of 
land use and other impacts). Similarly, shifts in production 
areas might increase or decrease water consumption-
related impacts, usually as a trade-off with land use 
impacts (section 3.3.7), as naturally productive areas can 
reduce water consumption but increase land use impacts, 
while increasing irrigated agriculture can reduce land use 
change and deforestation.
Besides agriculture, power production and iron making 
cause high shares of water consumption-related 
impacts. In thermal power and iron making, water is often 
consumed for cooling purposes and thus efficiency gains 
in production decrease water consumption. Furthermore, 
cooling technologies can be water efficient (or even, as 
in dry/air cooling, involve near to no water consumption 
at all), which might, however, decrease the efficiency 
of the system if its cooling power is reduced, leading to 
FIGURE 3.23 Resource-related water stress split by most 
contributing resource sectors (mostly agriculture) 
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trade-offs with other impacts associated with thermal 
power production or iron making.
Hydropower has also been shown to play a major 
role in water consumption impacts. However, proper 
management of hydropower dams can even help to 
mitigate water scarcity (which is not accounted for in 
figure 3.23). This also applies to water-storage systems 
other than hydropower (for example irrigation ponds). 
Additionally, fragmentation of the river and run-off regime 
changes may have a larger impact on aquatic ecosystems 
than water consumption (Scherer & Pfister, 2016b). 
FIGURE 3.24 Biodiversity impact of land use in 2010 in per cent global species loss, summarized per ecoregion 
Total
Annual Permanent 
crops crops
Intensive Extensive
forestry forestry 
Pasture Urban 
< 0.0001
0.0001 – 0.0003 
0.0003 – 0.001 
0.001 – 0.003 
0.003 – 0.01 
0.01 – 0.03 
0.03 – 0.1 
0.1 – 0.3
0.3-1%
> 1% 
% global species loss
The impacts are calculated for total human land use (top map), as well as individual land use classes. Land use data from chapter 2 combined with biodiversity assessment 
Data sources: Chaudhary et al., 2015; UNEP SETAC, 2016
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3.2.3   Land Resource Impacts (Biodiversity Loss)
Land use gives rise to various environmental impacts 
including the destruction of natural habitats and 
biodiversity loss, as well as soil degradation and loss of 
other ecosystem services. The protection of terrestrial 
ecosystems is highlighted in various sub-goals of the 
SDGs (Wiedenhofer et al., 2018), and therefore efficient use 
and proper planning are required for land use change and 
management (Minx et al., 2013; UNCCD, 2017).
Land use caused global species loss of approximately 
11 per cent by the year 2010. Figure 3.24 shows that the 
impact of total land use is highly correlated with agricultural 
activities. Islands and tropical areas have a high share 
of impacts due to their high endemic species densities, 
meaning higher shares of global species loss per local 
species loss. For total cropland use, annual crops have a 
higher share of the impact (2.9 per cent of global species 
loss) and are distributed over the globe, but particularly 
large losses of biodiversity are observed in the Indian sub-
continent, Brazil, Central America, South East Asia, Eastern 
China, the Western Mediterranean region, Northern Black 
Sea shores and various parts of Australia. Permanent 
crop production (such as multiannual crops like coffee) 
causes total global species loss of 1.1 per cent. Pastures 
have a particularly high impact in South America, Africa, 
Madagascar, Australia and Southern China, and cause 
2.8 per cent of global species loss in total. The highest 
impacts of forestry occur in Indonesia and the Philippines, 
as well as different parts of Latin America (2 per cent of 
global species loss). Urban areas have generally smaller 
land use-related biodiversity impacts (0.2 per cent of global 
species loss in total, figure 3.24) due to their limited extent 
compared to agriculture and forestry, but urbanization 
may alter consumption patterns and hence indirectly 
lead to changes in land impacts. Pasture-related impacts 
are highly uncertain, as the actual associated extent is 
difficult to estimate. Similarly, the extent and intensity of 
extensive forestry are uncertain. The impact of mining is 
small in comparison to other land uses (IRP, 2017a), but 
it can lead to local biodiversity loss, especially because 
some mining sites are located in valuable and vulnerable 
ecosystems. This includes large mining projects as well 
as informal mining activities in rainforests. In addition 
to direct land use, there are also biodiversity impacts 
from building streets and cities in remote mining areas. 
Furthermore, increasing resource demand and depletion 
of easily accessible reserves pushes up mining activities 
in remote areas, including tropical forests and fragile areas 
(Allegrini et al., 2015; IRP, 2018a).
Many industrialized regions such as Europe, parts of the 
United States of America and Australia show decreasing 
land use impacts (figure 3.25), while others regions such 
as Indonesia, the Philippines, Brazil, tropical Africa and 
Peru see increasing land-use impacts. Many of these 
expansions occur in ecoregions with high species loss 
intensity (measured as per cent global species loss per km2 
in each ecoregion, see figure 3.25). Note that biodiversity 
loss and recovery are processes in time. Long-term species 
loss at steady state was assessed here, but species loss 
from additional land use may not occur right after the 
change. Biodiversity recovery is also not instantaneous 
and may occur over long time periods (Curran et al., 2014).
Between 2000 and 2010, while overall biodiversity impacts 
due to land use were fairly stable in the present analysis 
(based on chapter 2), the effects on regions with increased 
and decreased biodiversity (figure 3.25) do not necessarily 
outweigh each other. In fact, the significantly increased 
losses in many regions are alarming. Calculations based 
on other land-use data show that global biodiversity losses 
increased between 2000 and 2010, as documented in the 
previous edition of this report (IRP, 2017a). The reason for 
the discrepancy in assessing the trend of biodiversity loss 
lies in the uncertainty in land-use data, which can be based 
on statistics (for example of FAO), remote sensing data 
or a combination of both (as used in chapter 2). Remote 
sensing can provide a detailed assessment of total extent, 
but changes over the years are affected by high uncertainty 
due to the resolution of the image and the varying climate. 
Note that agricultural management intensity also 
influences biodiversity, which was not considered in the 
present section and impacts are therefore underestimated 
in this respect. On the basis of all the above, it is evident 
that continued attention and efforts are required to achieve 
the goals of SDG 15.5 to halt biodiversity loss, as well as 
the Aichi goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity to 
reduce the direct pressures on biodiversity and promote 
sustainable land use. Resources, especially biomass 
extraction, play a central role in this endeavour. Since the 
impact per m2 of land use varies geographically and by 
management intensity, Maron et al. (Maron et al., 2018) 
proposed to set up a series of area-based, quality-specific 
area targets for land use, which address protected areas 
and also used areas. 
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The results of this analysis support the findings of IPBES 
for the four world regions (Africa, Americas, Asia and the 
Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia (IPBES, 2018): in 
general there is a strong decline of biodiversity related 
to land use, but several regions have also been able to 
recover biodiversity. The high variability requires detailed 
assessments, including into vulnerability to loss of 
ecosystem services (which is especially high in Africa). 
Land use also affects soil systems. Soils are important 
environmental assets, particularly given the need for 
additional food for a growing future population and for 
the achievement of the SDGs (IPBES, 2018). SDG 15.3 
addresses this need by establishing land degradation 
neutrality as a global objective to be addressed at local 
to national levels. The United Nations Convention 
to Combat Desertification is promoting a number of 
initiatives to address SDG 15.3, in addition to its related 
ongoing work on drought and desertification. Land 
Degradation Neutrality has been defined by the Parties 
to the Convention as: “A state whereby the amount and 
quality of land resources, necessary to support ecosystem 
functions and services and enhance food security, remains 
stable or increases within specified temporal and spatial 
scales and ecosystems” (UNCCD, n.d.). Achieving land 
degradation neutrality requires an evaluation of the land 
potential (UNEP, 2016e). The recommendation is to adapt 
land use and management to this potential, such that 
the crops and production systems need to correspond 
to soil properties so they provide optimal yields with 
minimal degradation impacts. Systems, strategies, and 
tools for land evaluation are reviewed and presented in a 
previous IRP report (UNEP, 2016e). Land/soil degradation 
includes several degradation processes (for example 
erosion, compaction, salinization or acidification) and 
harms biotic productivity and the capacity of the land to 
deliver other ecosystem services (UNEP, 2016e). While 
land evaluation helps to predict which types of production 
systems are likely to cause such harm on which types 
of land (UNEP, 2016e), the environmental impacts of soil 
degradation have not yet been adequately quantified, for 
example by Life Cycle Impact Assessment methods (Vidal 
Legaz et al., 2017). Nevertheless, on a case study level, 
results show that productivity losses can be substantial. 
Compaction, for example, can lead to relative yield losses 
of up to double-digit percentages in the first few years 
after compaction stress and losses remain in the order 
of one-digit percentages in the long term (Håkansson & 
Reeder, 1994). Crops and production requiring intensive 
tillage and frequent tractor impacts associated with 
fertilizer and pesticide application (for example large scale 
potato production), increase compaction risk, particularly 
on soils with high clay and moisture content (Stoessel 
et al., 2018). Technological innovation therefore potentially 
leads to higher compaction risk, due to the trend towards 
more and larger machinery use. On the other hand, some 
innovations, such as those applied through precision 
farming, can reduce machinery passes on the field, and, 
in the future, agricultural robots could substitute the use 
of heavy machinery while lowering fertilizer and pesticide 
inputs (which are essential in no-till farming). 
Other forms of degradation that have been shown to cause 
significant yield reductions include erosion-driven soil 
organic matter losses, salinization, soil acidification and 
reductions in soil fertility driven by removal in crops and 
crop residues. Few other degradation processes have been 
strongly linked to yield or productivity losses but remain 
at the level of proxy indicators. The main single indicator 
used for soil “quality” in LCIA is soil organic carbon or soil 
organic matter (Milà i Canals et al., 2007), but this has not 
yet been applied to global agriculture, although it is one 
of the three indicators selected by the UNCCD to quantify 
SDG 15.3. Since productivity losses due to various soil 
degradation processes have not yet been consistently 
assessed at the global level, they are not assessed in this 
report. However, some of the existing tools for quantifying 
degradation, for example the Revised Universal Soil Loss 
Equation (RUSLE), give a clear indication about good 
agricultural practices: Panagos et al., 2015, estimate that 
contour farming may reduce (water) erosion rates by up 
to 40 per cent, while no-till practices may reduce them by 
up to 75 per cent on some soils and slopes. Prevention 
of soil erosion is mentioned alongside prevention of 
overgrazing, maintenance of soil organic matter content 
and maintenance or introduction of landscape elements 
providing ecosystem services as an option for more 
sustainable land use in a previous IRP report (UNEP, 
2016a). 
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FIGURE 3.25 Biodiversity impact of total human land use in 2010 normalized to area (in per cent global species loss per 
million km2), summarized per ecoregion
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Land use data from Chapter 2 combined with biodiversity assessment (UNEP-SETAC 2016a).
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3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has described the impacts of natural resource 
extraction and processing and, in selected cases, extended 
this coverage to economy-wide impacts. Natural resource 
extraction and processing make up approximately 
50 per cent of total GHG emissions. For water stress 
and biodiversity loss due to land use, the share resource-
related impacts of the total economy-wide impacts are 
even larger than 90 per cent, mostly driven by agriculture. 
An estimated 11 per cent of global species were lost by 
2010 due to global land use, while the consumption of 
water contributes to water stress, thereby threatening 
the sustainable supply of freshwater to humans and 
ecosystems (UNEP SETAC, 2016). In addition, while some 
low-income regions suffer from soil nutrient depletion, 
the overuse of fertilizers leads to eutrophication as well 
as ecotoxic effects in many other regions (with both 
ultimately leading to biodiversity loss). 
Between 2000 and 2015, there was a relative decoupling 
of resource-related environmental impacts from GDP 
and also a moderate relative decoupling of impacts from 
the extracted mass of resources. However, impacts still 
increased on an absolute scale, as did global average per 
capita climate change and health impacts. Climate change 
impacts increased by a factor of 1.4 between 2000 and 
2011, following a similar trend to that of total extracted 
mass of resources (increasing by a factor of 1.6). During 
the same time, water- and land use-related impacts also 
increased, but by a lesser degree (by a factor 1.2 for water 
stress) due to increased productivity in food production, 
whereas resource-related value added doubled. If the 
rising trend in resource-related impacts persists, the goals 
of the Paris agreement will become difficult to meet and 
the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, 
including SDG 15.5 to halt biodiversity loss, will be put at 
risk.
The impacts and value creation are not equally distributed 
around the globe. Per capita impacts of high-income 
regions are between three and six times larger than 
those of low-income regions. This is reinforced by trade. 
For example, Europe and North America outsource 
environmental impacts, such that a part of the total 
environmental impacts of consumption occurs abroad. 
At the same time, the value created through these traded 
materials in the countries of origin is relatively low.
Capital investments for the build-up of infrastructure were 
the main driver of resource use in emerging economies, 
while in industrial countries consumer goods dominate 
final demand. While general trends exist, such as increased 
impacts with increased income, there are also cases of 
low-emission households within high-income segments 
- showing that decoupling is possible.
Environmental impacts are not always correlated with 
each other, indicating that a set of indicators is needed 
to assess resource-related impacts in a comprehensive 
manner and avoid problem shifting. Potential measures of 
the simultaneous reduction of several impacts include food 
waste reductions and shifts in diets towards less meat 
and animal products from intensive livestock systems. 
Phasing out coal as a fuel reduces climate change impacts 
and also other impacts related to resource processing. 
Focusing on long-term material use of sustainably grown 
wood, in particular in the construction sector, can lead to 
co-benefits in terms of climate change and biodiversity 
loss. Similarly, conserving valuable forest ecosystems 
and avoiding deforestation contribute to reducing climate 
change and biodiversity impacts. However, if climate 
policy leads to increased use of bioenergy (combined 
with Carbon Capture and Storage as a negative emission 
technology), as foreseen in many climate scenarios, 
additional biodiversity loss may occur through an increase 
in intensive biomass production. Special attention is 
therefore needed to avoid problem shifting from mitigating 
climate change to accelerating biodiversity loss.
Overall, this chapter illustrates that further action is 
needed to reach absolute decoupling and remain within 
planetary boundaries. While improvements in processing 
technologies have greatly reduced impacts in the past, this 
trend has plateaued in recent years for some key materials 
and further efficiency gains are limited in potential. 
Therefore, a systemic change is needed. The future of 
innovation lies particularly in the efficient design and use of 
materials, following circular economy principles. Chapter 4 
will explore scenarios for a sustainable future, and chapter 
5 will discuss policy measures to foster this development.
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Main findings
  Resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and production policies can achieve significant decoupling, 
while achieving increased economic growth and a more equal distribution of income and resource use. 
  We find incomes and resource-based services increase significantly in the Towards Sustainability scenario 
across all groups of countries, while environmental pressures and impacts fall dramatically (as shown in 
figure 4.24 below).
  This contrasts starkly with the outlook under Historical Trends, which has similar projected increases in 
income, but higher resource extractions and escalating and clearly unsustainable environmental pressures 
– including rising greenhouse gas emissions, reductions in the quality and area of forests and other native 
habitat and increasing pressures on water sensitive ecosystems. 
  Material resource extraction more than doubles globally by 2060 under Historical Trends, with per capita 
resource use increasing from 11.9 tons to 18.5 tons per person.
  Water extraction by industry and municipalities increases by at least 50 per cent, more than doubling in many 
outlooks. Competition for water between cities and agriculture may become a serious problem.
  The area of agricultural land increases by more than 20 per cent, reducing forests by more than 10 per cent 
and other habitat (such as grasslands and savannahs) by around 20 per cent. As water withdrawal is often for 
agriculture and energy production, competition for water and land transformation could also be substantially 
reduced by enhanced material and energy efficiency in production and consumption.
  This scale of growth in resource use – without improvements to managing the impacts of extraction, use 
and disposal of materials and resources – would result in substantial stress on resource supply systems and 
unprecedented levels of environmental pressures and impacts. 
  Towards Sustainability policies and actions result in slower growth in global resource use, as well as supporting 
more equal per capita resource use across countries.
  Resource efficiency and sustainability actions are projected to result in slower growth of global natural 
resource use, with strong growth rates in emerging and other developing economies balanced by absolute 
reductions in per capita resource use in high-income countries. Global resource extractions are 25 per cent 
lower in 2060 than under a continuation of Historical Trends, equal to 47 billion tons of avoided resource 
extractions in that year alone. This reduction in growth would help take pressure off resource supply systems, 
and make it easier to avoid resource extraction and use that has relatively high social and environmental 
impacts per unit of resource throughput. 
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  Well-being indicators grow faster than resource extraction, with improved resource productivity and relative 
decoupling of well-being from resource use.
  Resource efficiency and sustainability actions are projected to achieve substantial relative decoupling of 
natural resource use from income and essential resource-based services, which we define for this purpose 
as average income (GDP per capita), energy use per person and food consumption per person. 
  Environmental pressures fall, with absolute decoupling of environmental damage from economic growth 
and resource use. 
  Resource efficiency and sustainability actions are projected to achieve absolute decoupling of economic 
activity and resource use from environmental impact, so that income and other well-being indicators improve, 
while key environmental pressures fall – including dramatic reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and 
substantial restoration of forests and native habitat from 2015 levels. 
  Sustainability measures promote stronger economic growth, boost well-being and help support a more equal 
distribution of income and reduced use across countries. 
  Implementing an integrated package of resource efficiency, sustainability and climate policy actions results in 
net economic benefits globally from 2030 onwards, with global GDP 8 per cent above Historical Trends in 2060, 
as projected gains from resource efficiency outweigh the near-term economic costs of achieving ambitious 
reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions. The suite of policies also supports more equal distribution of 
GDP per capita, increasing economic growth relatively more in low- and middle-income nations (11 per cent 
on average) than in high-income nations (4 per cent on average) relative to Historical Trends.
4.1 Introduction: Two Contrasting Outlooks for Resource Use,  
Well-being and Environmental Pressure
Patterns of natural resource use – including extraction, 
transformation, distribution and disposal of resources – 
are central to the dynamic links that connect human well-
being and essential natural and social capital. 
Past achievements in human development and rising 
standards of living in many parts of the world came at 
a cost of rapidly increasing environmental pressures 
(see chapter 2) and associated environmental impacts 
(see chapter 3). Problems of natural resource depletion, 
climate change, water shortages, biodiversity loss and 
environmental degradation have been increasing at an 
unprecedented pace, and are becoming increasingly 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing. In this chapter, 
we use scenario analysis and modelling to analyse two 
potential futures: a continuation of Historical Trends and 
a Towards Sustainability pathway, enabled by ambitious 
actions to promote resource conservation, greenhouse gas 
abatement and sustainable production and consumption.
In the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, 
natural resource use connects essential material needs 
for food, water, energy and shelter (represented by SDGs 
2, 6, 7, and 9) and natural and social capital (represented 
by SDGs 13, 14, 15, and 17) that underpin all life and earth 
system functions. 
Decoupling resource use from well-being and from adverse 
social and environmental impacts is thus central and 
essential to achieving sustainable development, as shown 
in figure 4.1. SDG targets 8.4, 12.1 and 12.2 recognize this, 
calling for resource efficiency and decoupling of economic 
growth from environmental degradation, sustainable 
consumption and production and the sustainable 
management and efficient use of natural resources. 
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We refer to the two dimensions of this task as ‘well-
being decoupling’, which increases the service provided 
or satisfaction of human need per unit of resource use, 
and ‘impact decoupling’, which decreases environmental 
pressures and impacts per unit of economic activity or per 
unit of resource use. 
This chapter explores these issues through two potential 
outlooks for resource use, well-being and environmental 
pressure, drawing on world-leading integrated modelling 
and analysis. It begins by describing the baseline Historical 
Trends scenario, focusing on projections for resource 
extractions and use. Additional projections for water 
and land follow. It then outlines the policy and other 
assumptions for the Towards Sustainability scenario, and 
presents the key results for resource use, human well-
being and environmental impacts and implications for 
economic performance. Essential technical information is 
provided at the end of the chapter, with additional material 
provided in a separate Technical Annex.
Resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and 
production policies can achieve significant decoupling, 
while achieving increased economic growth and a more 
equal distribution of income and resource use.
As set out in more detail below, the modelling and analysis 
find that decoupling of economic growth, resource use 
and environmental impacts is possible, so that human 
well-being improves while resource use and environment 
impacts reduce (see figure 4.24 below). Specifically, the 
modelling and analysis find that decoupling results in 
slower global growth in resource use, and a decrease in 
per capita resource use in high-income countries. Incomes 
(GDP per capita) and resource-based services (particularly 
energy and calories per person) increase significantly in 
the Towards Sustainability scenario, across all groups of 
countries. This occurs while environmental pressures 
and impacts fall dramatically. In addition, the package of 
policies and actions provides an overall boost to economic 
growth, across all groups of countries. This projected 
decoupling contrasts starkly with the outlook under 
Historical Trends, which has similar projected increases in 
income, but higher resource extractions and escalating and 
clearly unsustainable environmental pressures – including 
rising greenhouse gas emissions, reductions in the quality 
and area of forests and other native habitat and increasing 
pressures on water-sensitive ecosystems. 
While possible and economically attractive, shifting 
from our historical – and unsustainable – patterns of 
resource use and environmental impact towards ‘a future 
we want’ would require decisive action by governments 
and business around the world to support innovation for 
environmental challenges and sustainable consumption 
and production practices.
FIGURE 4.1 Dual decoupling to promote sustainable development
ESSENTIAL DEVELOPMENT NEEDS  
AND PROVISIONING SYSTEMS
NATURAL AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
REQUIRED TO UNDERPIN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
DUAL DECOUPLING 
OF RESOURCE USE LINKS DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY
  WELLBEING DECOUPLING INCREASES THE SERVICE DELIVERED PER 
UNIT OF RESOURCE USE;
  IMPACT DECOUPLING DECREASES ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
PRESSURES AND ADVERSE IMPACTS PER UNIT OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY OR RESOURCE USE
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4.2 Overview of the Historical Trends Baseline Scenario
The Historical Trends scenario provides projections 
of resource use, economic activity, essential services 
(such as per capita energy and protein supply) and key 
environmental indicators (such as greenhouse gas 
emissions and loss of native habitat) on the assumption 
that observed trends and relationships over the decades 
to 2015 continue into future decades. These driving trends 
include population growth and per capita economic growth 
(both sourced from parallel OECD work), along with trends 
in the material intensity of economic activity, rates and 
patterns of urbanization, technological change within 
sectors and climate policy outcomes. Population data 
and data for GDP were sourced from the OECD and are 
compatible with the trends used in the OECD’s RE-CIRCLE 
project (OECD, 2018) to facilitate comparability between 
the modelling results of the OECD and the IRP. Climate 
policy outcomes assume only partial implementation of 
Paris commitments. 
The analysis uses two models to provide scenario 
projections for land use under Historical Trends, while the 
projections for water are based on existing literature.
4.2.1 Population and Economic Growth
All scenarios, including Historical Trends, assume 
population grows from 7.3 billion people in 2015 to 
10.2 billion people in 2060, an average annual growth of 
0.7 per cent. This is slower than growth seen in previous 
periods, reflecting the slowdown in the rate of population 
growth. Consistent with observed trends, growth is slowest 
in middle-income countries including transition countries 
(averaging 0.3 per cent per year to 2040 before stabilizing), 
and quite low in high-income countries at an average of 
0.3 per cent per year to 2040 and then 0.1 per cent per year 
to 2060, while remaining relatively strong in low-income 
countries, which grow by an average of 1.3 per cent per 
year to 2040 and 0.9 per cent per year to 2060. Population 
is contracting in a number of high-income countries and 
in some developing countries. Population is projected to 
grow strongly in Africa.
Global living standards and GDP are projected to grow 
strongly from US$ 82 trillion in 2015 to US$ 216 trillion 
dollars in 2060 (real 2011 dollars), at an average rate of 
2.2 per cent per year. The OECD growth forecast points 
to a certain convergence of living standards between 
countries, with growth highest in low-income countries at 
4.0 per cent average yearly growth. Economies in middle-
income countries are projected to grow by 2.3 per cent per 
year, with high-income countries experiencing the slowest 
growth in GDP at 1.4 per cent yearly growth. 
4.2.2 Historical Trends Outlook for Materials
Projections of Historical Trends show that global material 
use would grow by 110 per cent from 2015 levels to 
reach 190 billion tons by 2060, if the material demands 
of a growing world economy and population are delivered 
FIGURE 4.2 Population, all scenarios including Historical 
Trends, 2015 – 2060
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FIGURE 4.3 Economic activity (GDP) by country group, 
Historical Trends, 2015 – 2060 
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with current patterns of production, consumption and 
associated policies and infrastructure. This would see 
resource use rising from 11.9 tons per person to 18.5 
tons per capita in 2060. This scale of growth in resource 
use – without improvements in managing the impacts of 
extraction, use and disposal of materials and resources 
– would result in substantial stress on resource supply 
systems and unprecedented levels of environmental 
pressures and impacts. 
Resource extraction more than doubles by 2060 under 
Historical Trends.
Under current trends, global domestic extraction would 
grow from 88 billion tons in 2015 to 190 billion tons in 2060, 
a yearly average growth of 1.8 per cent driven by strong 
growth in GDP and population. Non-metallic minerals for 
construction would see the strongest yearly growth of 
2.2 per cent, reflecting the additional needs of buildings 
and infrastructure. Metal ores would grow at a yearly 
average of 1.7 per cent, biomass by 1.4 per cent per year 
and fossil fuels at 0.2 per cent. The share of non-metallic 
minerals would grow to 59 per cent of overall extraction in 
2060, biomass would have a share of 23 per cent, followed 
FIGURE 4.4 Average income (GDP per capita) levels and relativities by country group, 2015 – 2060
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FIGURE 4.5 Global material extraction by material 
categories, Historical Trends, 2015 -2060 
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FIGURE 4.6 Global material extraction by country group, 
Historical Trends, 2015 -2060.
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by fossil fuels at 9 per cent and metal ores at 9 per cent of 
total global extraction.
The group of middle-income countries focusing on imports 
continue to have the highest share of global materials 
extraction and reaches 65 billion tons by 2060, or a third of 
overall extraction. The highest rate of growth is expected 
for low-income countries focusing on exports of primary 
materials at 3 per cent annual growth (figure 4.6).
Global material productivity improves marginally from 
0.93 US$ per kg of material use in 2015 to 1.14 US$ per 
kg in 2060, increasing by 0.4 per cent per year on average 
under Historical Trends, as shown in figure 4.7. Material 
productivity improves most in low-income countries by a 
yearly average of 1.4 per cent, compared with an average 
improvement of 0.7 per cent per year in high- and middle-
income countries. In 2015, high-income countries used 
materials six times more productively in generating goods 
and services compared to low-income countries. There 
is some degree of convergence in material productivity, 
with high-income countries being just four times more 
productive than low-income countries in 2060.
4.2.3 Historical Trends Outlook for Water
Future water withdrawal by industries and for domestic 
purposes has been modelled extensively. Modelling 
future water use in agriculture – which is the dominant 
consuming sector – is still under way, while expected use 
for irrigation shows diverging options.
A set of three global water models was used to model 
global and regional water withdrawal by the industrial 
sector under three shared socioeconomic pathways 
(SSP) scenarios (Wada et al., 2016). Depending on which 
scenario is used, the level of 2010 (850 km3/year) may 
more than double and reach nearly 2000 km3/year or 
become reduced by about one third (figure 4.8).
Under the trend scenario (SSP2), industrial water 
withdrawal is expected to increase by at least three 
quarters to more than double the level of 2010. Assuming 
isolationist policies leading to reduced international trade 
(SSP3), the increase may range from 50 per cent to more 
than double. Only under more sustainable conditions 
(SSP1), in particular when – as in H08 model results – a 
significant shift to more water efficient technologies is 
assumed, could a decrease of industrial water withdrawal 
be expected.
Depending on the technological development, the 
dynamics of industrial water withdrawal exhibit high 
variability. Whereas the models largely converge to project 
a declining or at least stabilizing trend for countries like 
the United States of America and Germany, they differ 
widely across SSP scenarios with regard to possible 
developments in emerging economies. For the trend 
scenario (SSP2), they jointly point to an expected increase 
FIGURE 4.7 Resource productivity (dollars GDP per ton of 
resource extraction), world and three country groups, 
2015-2060
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FIGURE 4.8 Global industrial water withdrawal projections 
modelled by three water models (H08, WaterGAP, and 
PCR-GLOBWB (PCR) under three SSP scenarios (Wada et 
al. 2016)
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in withdrawal, although this can range from a one-third 
increase to more than tripling the level of 2010 by 2050. 
Municipal (domestic) water withdrawal is expected to 
increase due to population growth and rising demands 
(figure 4.9). The level in 2010 was 400 to 450 km3/year. 
Depending on the scenario, global withdrawal is projected 
to reach 700 to 1500 km3/year (an increase of between 
50 per cent and 250 per cent).
For domestic water withdrawal, the three models project 
similar orders of magnitude and trends between moderate 
increase or decrease to stabilization for countries like the 
United States of America and Germany. For some major 
developing countries, however, the projected level of 
municipal water withdrawal in 2050 differs by between 
a factor of 2.5 and 4.5. The models jointly point to an 
increase, but project the trend between moderate and 
severe. The results depend on varying assumptions. The 
results indicate the value of using a suite of models (Wada 
et al., 2016) in order to cover potential ranges of future 
developments.
FIGURE 4.9 Global domestic water withdrawal projections 
modelled by three water models (H08, WaterGAP, and 
PCR-GLOBWB (PCR) under three SSP scenarios (Wada et 
al. 2016)
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BOX 4.1 Growing Water competition between 
cities and agriculture
Urban water demand will increase by 80 per cent by 2050, 
while climate change will alter the timing and distribution of 
water availability. Flörke et al. (2018) quantify the magnitude 
of these twin challenges to urban water security, combining 
a data set of urban water sources in 482 of the world’s 
largest cities with estimates of future water demand (based 
on the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment scenarios) and predictions 
of future water availability (using the WaterGAP3 modelling 
framework). The authors project an urban surface-water 
deficit of between 1,386 and 6,764 million m³ in 2050. More 
than 27 per cent of cities studied, containing 233 million 
people, will have water demands that exceed surface-water 
availability. An additional 19 per cent of cities, which are 
dependent on surface-water transfers, have a high potential 
for conflict between the urban and agricultural sectors, 
since both sectors will not be able to obtain their estimated 
future water demands. In 80 per cent of these high-conflict 
watersheds, improvements in agricultural water use effi-
ciency could free up enough water for urban use.
This indicates that the pressure of growing competition for 
water resources could be reduced not only by investing in 
improving agricultural water use as an important global 
change adaptation strategy, but also through an efficient 
use of biomass (including a reduction of food waste). 
 
 
FIGURE 4.10 Top 20 cities under urban surface-water 
deficit affected by climate change and socio-economic 
development (including urbanization). 
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Future water withdrawal for agriculture is currently 
being modelled and has not yet been available for this 
report. Although the expansion of irrigated land has been 
diminishing over past decades, relevant projections are still 
being developed. First results for the water demand from 
the area already under irrigation were obtained by multi-
model projections under climate change assumptions 
(Wada et al., 2013). The authors forced a set of seven 
global hydrological models with climate projections from 
five global climate models to project water demand and 
water consumption by irrigation. Although most models 
indicate a rising trend, the uncertainties of the model 
outcomes are substantial. In this case, the ensemble 
mean values may not be reliable: only one of the global 
hydrological models (LPJmL) considers CO2 fertilization 
effects on crop synthesis and transpiration, and as a result 
projects decreasing trends of water demand for irrigation, 
while all other models that neglect this effect project 
increasing trends.
Altogether, one may expect rising water withdrawal globally 
for industries and municipalities, and probably growing 
risks resulting from uncertainties in water supply and 
distribution in agriculture due to climate change. These 
trends might be associated with an increasing competition 
for water between sectors, such as between expanding 
cities and neighbouring agriculture – particularly in water-
scarce regions (see box 4.1). 
4.1.4   Historical Trends Outlook for Land Use
The analysis of land use and the loss of forests and other 
natural habitats uses two modelling frameworks: Land 
SHIFT (as described in sections 4.7.3 and 4.7.5 below) and 
the CSIRO/IIASA GNOME3 framework (used for all other 
analyses in this chapter, except water use). More details 
are provided in the separate Technical Annex.
Earlier studies have shown that uncontrolled expansion of 
settlement and infrastructure area may lead to a coverage 
of up to 5 per cent of total land in 2050 (UNEP, 2014 and 
references therein). By 2030, urban expansion is expected 
to result in a 1.8 to 2.4 per cent loss of global croplands, 
with about 80 per cent of the loss taking place in Asia 
and Africa where the lost area has twice the productivity 
compared to national average (d’Amour et al., 2017).
From 2010 to 2060, significant land-use change is 
expected in the Historical Trends scenario. In particular, 
shrubland, grassland and savannahs are converted to 
cropland and pasture (figure 4.11). 
Under the Historical Trends scenario between 2010 and 
2060, the LandSHIFT analysis finds total global cropland 
area increases by 21 per cent from 15.4 million to 
18.6 million km² (figure 4.12). The largest increases are in 
Africa, Europe (including all countries in the former Soviet 
Union) and North America. An important reason for this 
area expansion is that the projected yield increases are 
FIGURE 4.11 Land conversion to cropland and pasture between 2010 and 2060 under the Historical Trends scenario as 
calculated by the LandSHIFT model
Source: UniKassel/CESR.
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not sufficient to compensate the production increases 
necessary for food provision, especially in Africa.
Global pasture area increases by 25 per cent, from 
30.9 million km² in 2010 up to 38.6 million km² in 2060. 
The largest increases are located in Africa and Latin 
America. Only in North America do pasture and rangeland 
areas decrease slightly (figure 4.13). Worldwide, the share 
of intensively used pasture increases from 52 per cent in 
2010 to 60 per cent in 2060.
Considering only drivers outside the forest sector, relatively 
small net forest losses are modelled on all continents. 
Total forest area would decrease from 42.8 million km² in 
FIGURE 4.12 Cropland expansion under the Historical 
Trends scenario between 2010 and 2060 (LandSHIFT)
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FIGURE 4.13 Development of pasture area under the 
Historical Trends scenario between 2010 and 2060 
(LandSHIFT)
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FIGURE 4.14 Loss of forest area under Historical Trends 
(LandSHIFT)
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FIGURE 4.15 Loss of grassland, shrubland, and savannahs 
under Historical Trends scenario (LandSHIFT)
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2010 to 38.3 million km² in 2060 (figure 4.14). Hot spots of 
deforestation are located in Africa, Latin America and Asia. 
Figure 4.15 shows the development of grassland, 
shrubland and savannahs. Their total area decreases by 
20 per cent, from 25.8 million km² to 20.7 million km² in 
2060. The largest losses are in Africa, Latin America and 
Europe. This trend seems most alarming, as those natural 
ecosystems harbour a significant share of terrestrial 
biodiversity (MEA, 2005).7 
7 See also regional assessments of IPBES: https://www.ipbes.net/deliverables/2b-regional-assessments [accessed 8 Nov. 2018].
The analysis based on the GNOME3 modelling framework 
also found significant shifts, with agricultural land 
projected to increase by 8 per cent, while forest area 
reduces by about 80 million hectares (2 per cent) and other 
natural habitat reduces by about 320 million hectares 
(9 per cent) from 2015 to 2060 (see figure 4.22(b) and 
figure 4.23 below).
4.3 Overview of the Towards Sustainability Scenario
The Towards Sustainability scenario presents an ambitious 
and broad-based suite of actions by government, business 
and households to improve resource efficiency, decouple 
economic growth from environmental degradation and 
promote sustainable production and consumption, as 
called for by SDG 8.4 and SDG 12.1. We contrast the results 
for the Towards Sustainability scenario with the baseline 
Historical Trends scenario. 
Sustainable Consumption and Production is interpreted 
broadly, with the analysis covering key aspects of resource 
efficiency (SDGs 8 and 12); food (SDG 2), water (SDG 6), 
energy (SDG 7), climate (SDG 13), and life on land (SDG 15) 
as shown in figure 4.8 below. The resource efficiency and 
sustainability action policies that underlie the Towards 
Sustainability scenario are described in the next section, 
with more details on scenario definitions and modelling 
assumptions provided in the next section and in table 4.1 
below in the technical notes.
The modelling builds on previous analysis by the 
International Resource Panel for G7 leaders (Hatfield-
Dodds et al., 2017; UNEP, 2017), which was more 
closely focused on resource efficiency rather than SCP, 
and potential synergies with reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. The new analysis for this report builds on this 
to assess actions to promote sustainable and productive 
food, water and landscape systems – along with better 
protection of biodiversity and native habitat. It also 
assumes a greenhouse emissions pathway consistent 
with 1.5°C rather than 2.0°C, involving a more rapid decline 
in net greenhouse gas emissions in the climate action 
scenarios than the 2017 analysis, reducing the need for 
net negative emissions later in the century while achieving 
a similar cumulative emissions budget to 2100. While 
the modelling also accounts for some economic impacts 
of climate change, particularly in relation to agricultural 
production, these impacts are not well represented in this 
analysis.
We describe the scenario as Towards Sustainability 
because the modelling framework focuses on the 
extraction and use of natural resources, as well as two 
major environmental issues – greenhouse gas emissions 
and protection of terrestrial biodiversity. Each of these 
FIGURE 4.16 Scenarios for resource efficiency and 
sustainable consumption and production
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has well-understood drivers, dynamics and linkages to 
economic activity and supply of key resource-based 
services such as stationary energy, transport, land use and 
production of food and fibre. We anticipate being able to 
extend and deepen the scope of the analysis over time to 
include issues such as air quality, mobility, urban design, 
water use, aquaculture and ocean fisheries. We are also 
already working to improve our analysis of resource use, 
particularly in relation to urban systems, resource recovery 
and the circular economy.
4.4 Policy Packages and Societal Shifts that Underlie the Towards 
Sustainability Scenario
The modelling assumes three policy packages and one 
shift in societal behaviour that combine to produce the 
Towards Sustainability scenario outcomes relative to 
Historical Trends. 
4.4.1 Resource Efficiency Policies
The resource efficiency policy package (RET in table 4.1) 
uses three measures to reduce global resource extraction 
and use, thereby achieving absolute reductions in per 
capita resource use (DMC) in high-income countries 
and slower growth of resource use in low- and medium-
income countries. Resource efficiency innovation and 
improvement reduces the amount of virgin resources 
required to produce basic materials (including iron and 
steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals/plastics and forestry 
products), as well as the amount of basic materials 
required in manufacturing (machinery and durable 
goods) and construction (buildings and infrastructure). 
In practice this measure could be implemented through 
policies such as public research programmes, incentives 
for private research and development (R&D); support for 
demonstration projects, business incubators and other 
incentives for innovation and technology adoption. This 
reduces resource inputs per unit of output, and thus 
reduces the supply cost of manufactured goods, buildings 
and infrastructure – generating a significant ‘rebound 
effect’ that offsets much of the potential reduction in virgin 
resource demand. The second suite of measures involves 
changes to regulations, technical standards, planning 
and procurement policies that act to progressively lower 
resource intensity of economic activity while maintaining 
or improving the services or amenity provided (such as 
the space and comfort provided by buildings). These 
measures are modelled as promoting manufactured 
items and buildings that require lower inputs of basic 
materials and associated raw resource inputs, without 
inducing increased overall demand. Finally, to manage 
the rebound effect, a range of policies is implemented to 
ensure resource scarcity is reflected in economic decision-
making, including avoiding environmental damage from 
resource extraction (such as mining), use and disposal. 
These policies are modelled as a progressive increase to 
the cost of resource extraction, encouraging more efficient 
use and higher recycling rates, through a modest shift of 
taxation from income and consumption (including wages, 
payroll and sales taxes) to resource extraction. 
Modelling implementation builds on previous IRP 
analysis, with the same approach to resource efficiency 
innovation and improvements in technical standards 
implemented from 2020 to 2060 (see Hatfield-Dodds et 
al., 2017). Policies to signal resource scarcity, represented 
by the extraction tax, are implemented in the same way 
in medium- and low-income nations, but set 25 per cent 
higher in high-income nations. 
Consistent with previous analysis, the effectiveness 
and economic impacts of resource efficiency measures 
crucially depends on the relative weight given to each 
of these three measures, and on the detailed design 
and implementation of the policies used. While the 
package of resource efficiency measures implemented 
in the modelling boosts economic growth and provides 
net economic benefits, poorly designed and badly 
implemented strategies could slow growth and result in 
net economic costs.
It is also important to note that the modelling of the current 
Towards Sustainability scenario does not explore the full 
potential of circular economy policies, including ambitious 
resource recovery and recycling, which would be expected 
to deliver greater reductions in resource use (relative to 
Historical Trends) than presented in this report. 
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4.4.1 Climate Policies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions and Remove Atmospheric Carbon
The climate policy package involves two measures.
A global emissions reduction policy is implemented 
through a carbon levy and dividend (referred to as CPT[1] 
in table 4.1). For simplicity and transparency, the levy is 
modelled as applying equally to all countries and to all 
emissions sources, including emissions from land clearing. 
Equity issues associated with emissions reductions are 
dealt with through returning all net carbon revenues as a 
uniform per capita global dividend, regardless of where the 
revenue is raised. This is simpler and more transparent 
than implementing differentiated emission targets and 
tradable emissions rights, and is consistent with evidence 
that using revenues to provide a carbon dividend payment 
to households could promote equity objectives and help 
ease some of the political challenges associated with 
implementing ambitious emissions reductions (see Klenert 
et al., 2018). Sequestration from biodiversity plantings and 
reafforestation receives a subsidy at the same rate per ton 
of carbon as the levy. To maximize biodiversity outcomes, 
monoculture plantings are not eligible for the carbon 
subsidy. 
The level of the levy is set to achieve an emissions pathway 
consistent with limiting climate change to 2°C (matching 
the cumulative emissions budget for RCP2.6), in a world 
with medium population and no resource efficiency 
measures. This mitigation effort is similar to the climate 
policy settings in previous analysis by the International 
Resource Panel for G7 leaders. Consistent with the climate 
policy literature (summarized by Stern & Stiglitz, 2017), 
the levy begins at US$15/tCO2e in 2020, rising rapidly 
to US$100/tCO2e in 2030, after which it increases by 
5 per cent per year above inflation. 
An additional carbon removal policy (referred to as CPT[2] 
in table 4.1) builds on the emissions reductions policies 
above, responding to growing attention to the benefits of 
keeping global warming well below 2°C (see IPCC, 2018), 
through more rapid decarbonization and limiting the extent 
of emissions ‘overshoot’. 
This policy package supports early deployment of two 
carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies: bioelectricity 
with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and direct 
air capture (DAC) of CO2 (see Obersteiner et al., 2018). 
Implementation is supported by a technology subsidy 
that covers capital and operating costs of BECCS and 
DAC, with deployment ramping up from 2020 to 2030 to 
achieve 1.2 GtCO2e of CDR per year from 2030 through 
to 2100. Like any 1.5ºC scenario, this assumes that a 
range of technical challenges will be overcome to allow 
large scale deployment of technologies that have not yet 
been demonstrated (IPCC, 2018). To manage concerns 
about competition for land and upward pressure on 
food prices, BECCS accounts for one quarter of total 
CDR, contributing 0.3 GtCO2e per year and 17,250 TWH 
of ‘negative emissions’ energy once mature, while DAC 
contributes 0.9 GtCO2e per year from 2030. The cost of 
the subsidy declines gradually after 2030, as technology 
costs fall. The subsidy is funded by high-income countries 
in proportion to per capita GDP above US$15,000 (in real 
2011 dollars), consistent with capacity to pay and general 
notions of historical responsibility. 
Policies to support resource efficiency and increased 
biodiversity (beyond the carbon subsidy) and societal 
shifts to reduce food waste and lower meat consumption 
all reduce emissions even further. 
The combined result of the emissions reductions 
and carbon removal policy packages, as well as the 
contributions of other policies and societal shifts, result 
in cumulative emissions in the Towards Sustainability 
scenario well below the benchmark IPCC 2°C pathway 
(RCP2.6), with a 50 per cent chance of limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels in 2100. 
4.4.1 Policies to Protect Landscapes and Life on 
Land 
The third policy package adopts an integrated approach 
to protecting landscapes and biodiversity (referred to as 
LBT in table 4.1). This ensures climate mitigation and 
energy policies are aligned with land and food system 
goals, and minimizes the additional actions required 
to achieve desired biodiversity outcomes. Applying the 
carbon levy to emissions from land clearing helps avoid 
deforestation, and payments for land sector sequestration 
are only provided where this contributes to improvements 
in biodiversity. To reduce competition for land and avoid 
upward pressure on food prices, policy incentives for crop-
based biofuels are phased out by 2020, and bioenergy for 
electricity generation is focused on BECCS (with carbon 
capture and storage) - on the basis that this contributes to 
net negative emissions. 
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Additional conservation policies are implemented, where 
required, to ensure the Aichi target of a least 17 per cent 
of each ecoregion is protected. This is modelled through 
preventing loss of native vegetation in areas identified 
as key biodiversity areas (BirdLife International, 2017) or 
wilderness (Watson et al., 2016) and providing additional 
incentives where required for land use change providing 
biodiversity benefits (Leclère et al., 2018). The package 
also supports higher agricultural productivity, particularly 
in low- and medium-income nations (which converge 
towards productivity levels in high-income nations), and 
reduced barriers to agricultural trade. 
Together, these policies limit the extension of agricultural 
land and promote dramatic improvements in biodiversity 
outcomes, so that the area of forests and natural land 
increases by 11 per cent rather than falling by 5 per cent 
from 2015 to 2060 under Historical Trends. This prevents 
the loss of around 400 million hectares and re-establishes 
around a further 800 million hectares of forests and natural 
land, including 430 million hectares of reafforestation. 
The smaller area of agricultural land in the Towards 
Sustainability scenario is offset by higher yields per hectare, 
improved food system efficiency, changes in livestock mix 
(with fewer cattle and sheep and more pigs and chicken) 
and shifts in diet towards plant-based protein. 
4.4.1 Healthy Diets and Reduced Food Waste
The Towards Sustainability scenario assumes a shift in 
societal behaviour towards healthy diets (consistent with 
international dietary guidelines) and reduced food waste 
throughout the food supply chain. This shift is referred 
to as FDT in table 4.1. The shift towards healthy diets is 
supported by rising average incomes, reduced poverty and 
improved public understanding of the long-term benefits of 
a healthy diet and lifestyle. Reduced food waste provides 
savings to producers, processors and consumers, as well 
as increasing food availability and reducing environmental 
pressures. 
The shift in diets is modelled as a shift from animal to 
plant protein, involving a 50 per cent reduction in meat 
consumption relative to Historical Trends by 2050, except 
in regions with a low share of meat in diets. The modelling 
assumes that total losses in harvest, processing, 
distribution and final household consumption decrease by 
50 per cent relative to Historical Trends from 2020 to 2050, 
and then remain stable. 
4.5 Towards Sustainability Outlook for Resource Use, Well-being and 
Environmental Impacts
This section reports our key findings for resource use 
and the potential for resource efficiency and sustainable 
consumption/production actions to decouple economic 
growth, resource use and environmental impacts, so that 
human well-being improves while environmental impacts 
reduce. We report our findings on resource use, well-being 
(and resource-based services) and environmental impacts, 
with a focus the distribution of each of these across 
countries. This is followed by a discussion of the economic 
impacts of the decoupling policies modelled. 
4.5.1  Towards Sustainability Policies and Actions 
Result in Slower Growth in Global Resource Use, 
and Support More Equal Per Capita Resource Use 
Across Countries
Resource efficiency and sustainability actions are projected 
to result in slower growth of global natural resource use, 
with strong growth rates in emerging and other developing 
economies balanced by absolute reductions in per capita 
resource use in high-income countries. Global resource 
extractions are projected to increase by 1.6 per cent per 
year from 2015 to 2060, around one quarter below the 
average for Historical Trends (and the observed increase 
from 2000 to 2017), to reach 143 billion tons in 2060. This 
is 25 per cent lower in 2060 than under a continuation 
of Historical Trends, equal to 47 billion tons of avoided 
resource extractions in that year alone (figure 4.17). This 
reduction in growth would help take pressure off resource 
supply systems, and make it easier to avoid resource 
extraction and use - with their relatively high social and 
environmental impacts per unit of resource throughput.
Non-metallic minerals (used primarily in construction) 
account for two thirds (65 per cent) of total resource 
extractions and four fifths (82 per cent) of the growth 
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from 2015 to 2060 (figure 4.17) - a little higher than their 
proportion in Historical Trends. Extractions of fossil fuel 
resources are projected to decline from current levels in 
the Towards Sustainability scenario, as renewable energy 
technologies outcompete non-renewable options in both 
electricity and transport, supported by concerted action 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Resource efficiency 
policies result in substantially slower growth in the 
extraction and use of metal ores, which grow by 10 per cent 
to 2060 in this scenario, compared to 111 per cent growth 
under Historical Trends. Reductions in per capita biomass 
extractions associated with reductions in food waste 
are outweighed by population growth and uptake of 
bioelectricity with carbon capture and sequestration – a 
crucial potential ‘negative emissions’ technology. These 
factors combine to produce a 40 per cent increase in global 
biomass extractions by 2060, compared to 88 per cent 
under Historical Trends. 
Resource use (DMC) adjusts resource extractions (DE) in 
each country or region by accounting for physical trade in 
basic resources. Resource use is thus equal to resource 
extraction at the global level in each year, but is not equal 
for individual countries and regions. 
Resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and 
production measures slow the growth of resource use 
significantly, without impacting negatively on income 
and other well-being indicators (see below). The Towards 
Sustainability scenario sees world resource use reach a 
level that is 25 per cent lower in 2060 than under Historical 
Trends. Per capita resource use in the Towards Sustainability 
scenario converges across different country groups by 
2060: falling by 17 per cent from 2015 levels (in absolute 
FIGURE 4.17 Global material extractions (DE) by major categories, Towards Sustainability and other scenarios, 2015-2060
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(a) Extractions by major category (stacked) (b) Extractions by major category (individual)
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
HistoricalTrends Resource Efﬁciency Towards Sustainability
-60%
-50%
-40%
-3%
-20%
-10%
0%
-
Resource 
Efﬁciency
Emissions reduction 
policies only
Towards 
Sustainability
0
10,000 
20,000 
30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
60,000 
70,000 
80,000 
90,000 
100,000 
m
ill
io
n 
to
nn
es
0
25,000 
50,000 
75,000 
100,000 
125,000 
150,000 
Biomass Fossil fuels Metal ores Non-metalic minerals Biomass Fossil fuels Metal ores Non-metalic minerals
2015 2030 2045 2060
Biomass Fossil fuels Metal ores Non-metalic minerals
(c) Deviation from Historical Trends by category in 2060 (d) Deviation from Historical Trends, total extractions
Back to the content 113 
1
2
3
4
5
6
| 04 TWO OUTLOOKS FOR RESOURCE USE
terms) to an average of 13.6 tons per capita in high-income 
countries, and increasing 44 per cent to an average of 8.2 
tons per capita in low-income countries. Global demand 
for manufactured products drives strong growth in 
resource use (DMC) per capita in the case of resource 
importing middle-income nations, which increase from 
high current levels in all scenarios. Although this results 
in higher apparent per capita use in medium-income 
countries, a substantial portion of these resources is likely 
to be exported as manufactured products. Sustainability 
measures have smaller impacts on per capita resource 
use in lower income nations and on net resource importing 
nations, as shown in figure 4.18. 
4.5.2 Well-being Indicators Grow Faster than 
Resource Extraction, with Improved Resource 
Productivity and Relative Decoupling of Well-
being from Resource Use
We find resource efficiency and sustainability policies are 
projected to achieve substantial relative decoupling of 
natural resource use from income and essential resource-
based services, including average income (GDP per capita), 
energy services and food. Global resource productivity 
(resource extractions per dollar of economic activity) 
increases by 27 per cent 2015 by 2060, while average 
GDP per person doubles. Energy productivity more than 
doubles, as electricity generation decarbonizes. It is also 
important to note that substantial improvements in energy 
efficiency will result in increased ‘energy services’ (such 
FIGURE 4.18 Global resource use (DMC), total and per capita for six country groups, Towards Sustainability and other 
scenarios, 2015-2060
2015 2030 2045 2060
HistoricalTrends Resource Efﬁciency Towards Sustainability
m
ill
io
n 
to
nn
es
2015 2030 2045 2060
0
40,000 
80,000 
120,000 
160,000 
200,000 
high income, net importer middle income, net importer
low income, net importer
high income, net exporter middle income, net exporter
low income, net exporter
0
4 
8
12 
16 
20 
0
15 
30 
45 
2015 2030 2045 2060
-50%
-30%
-10%
10% 
2015 2030 2045 2060
high income, net importer middle income, net importer low income, net importer
high income, net exporter middle income, net exporter
low income, net exporter
(a) Levels of economic activity and resource services, 
Toward Sustainability
(b) Measures of resource productivity, 
Toward Sustainability
(c) Deviation in economic activity and services, 
Towards Sustainability vs Historical Trends
(d) Deviation in economic productivity, 
Towards Sustainability vs Historical Trends
to
nn
es
to
nn
es
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
GLOBAL RESOURCES OUTLOOK 2019: NATURAL RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE WE WANT |
114 Back to the content
as indoor comfort or vehicle passenger mobility) per unit 
of energy use – which is not reflected in the chart below. 
The analysis finds that reductions in food system waste 
improve food access and prevent declines in the supply of 
calories per capita (which would otherwise be adversely 
impacted by measures to reduce greenhouse emissions 
from agriculture). This results in per capita calorie intake 
increasing modestly from 2015 levels. Supply tracks 
the baseline projection for Historical Trends to 2045, but 
grows more slowly than the baseline from 2045 to 2060. 
Improved diet, air quality (from reduced fossil fuel use) 
and more active mobility (supported by sustainable urban 
systems) would deliver additional health benefits and 
economic gains, although these are not fully accounted 
for in the analysis.
4.5.3 Environmental Pressures Fall, with 
Absolute Decoupling of Environmental Damage 
from Economic Growth and Resource Use
Resource efficiency and sustainability actions are 
projected to achieve absolute decoupling of economic 
activity and resource use from environmental impact, so 
that incomes and other well-being indicators improve, 
while key environmental pressures fall – including 
dramatic reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and 
substantial restoration of forests and native habitat from 
2015 levels. 
Ambitious emissions reduction and carbon removal 
policies, along with other scenario assumptions, see 
global greenhouse gas emissions fall by 5 per cent per 
year from 2015 in the Towards Sustainability scenario. This 
sees annual emissions fall by 90 per cent to 4.8 GT CO2e 
in 2060, rather than rising 43 per cent to 70 GT CO2e in 
FIGURE 4.19 Global resource productivity for materials, energy, and food, 2015-2060
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FIGURE 4.20 Resource-based wellbeing indicators for country groups, 2015-2060
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FIGURE 4.21 Greenhouse gas emissions and abatement, Towards Sustainability and other scenarios 2015-2060
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2060 under Historical Trends. (One GT CO2e is one billion 
tons of CO2-equivalent emissions.) In practice, the climate 
mitigation policies would be expected to achieve even 
greater emissions reductions, but the modelling framework 
does not account for expected electrification of industrial 
heat or substitution of renewable energy based synthetic 
gases, and so the modelling assumes continued reliance 
on natural gas. Resource efficiency policies are projected 
to reduce GHG emissions by 19 per cent compared to 
Historical Trends by 2060, in the absence of other climate 
policies (shown as the difference between Historical Trends 
(dark blue) and Resource Efficiency (dotted light blue) lines 
in figure 4.21 panels (b) and (d)). 
This results in the Towards Sustainability scenario having 
cumulative emissions well below benchmark IPCC 2°C 
pathway (RCP2.6), with a 50 per cent chance of limiting 
global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and a 
much better chance of limiting warming to 2°C or lower.
BECCS, reafforestation and direct air capture of CO2 
emissions (using artificial trees and soda lime processing) 
accounts for around one third of the total abatement 
achieved by the Towards Sustainability scenario relative to 
Historical Trends. 
The Towards Sustainability scenario delivers outcomes 
for land use that meet the food and fibre requirements 
of a growing population, while increasing the area of 
forest and other natural land to enable carbon capture 
and limit biodiversity loss through delivering additional 
habitat for species. Global habit loss is reversed, thereby 
preventing the loss of 1,300 million hectares of forests 
and other native habitat and restoring a further 450 million 
FIGURE 4.22 Land use and land use change for two scenarios, 2015-2060
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hectares of forests by 2060, while per calorie consumption 
increases by 4 per cent globally and 19 per cent in low-
income countries from 2015 levels (after accounting for 
reduced food system waste). This is achieved without 
increasing agricultural water extractions in water-
stressed catchments. The area of cropland in the Towards 
Sustainability scenario is 9 per cent below Historical Trends 
in 2060, while the area of pastureland is 30 per cent 
below. This sees the area of natural land increasing by 
11 per cent from 2015, with 11 per cent more forest and 
26 per cent more natural land than Historical Trends in 
2060 (figure 4.22).
4.5.5 Sustainability Measures Promote Stronger 
Economic Growth, Boost Well-being and Help 
Support More Equal Distribution of Income and 
Reduce Resource Use Across Countries
We find implementing an integrated package of resource 
efficiency, sustainability, and climate policy actions results 
in net economic benefits globally from 2030 onwards, 
with global GDP 8 per cent above Historical Trends in 2060, 
as projected economic gains from resource efficiency 
outweighing the near-term economic costs of achieving 
ambitious reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions. 
The suite of policies also supports more equal distribution 
of GDP per capita, increasing economic growth relatively 
FIGURE 4.23 Economic impacts of resource efficiency and sustainability actions, 2015-2060
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more in low- and middle-income nations (11 per cent 
on average) than in high-income nations (4 per cent on 
average) relative to Historical Trends. 
As shown in figure 4.23, in Historical Trends GDP per 
capita increases from 2015 to 2060 in every income 
group: increasing 3.8 times (275 per cent) on average 
in low-income countries, 2.9 times (192 per cent) in 
middle-income countries and 1.8 times (76 per cent) in 
high-income nations. Sustainability measures reinforce 
this trend, increasing GDP and GDP per capita in every 
country group: lifting average incomes by an average of 
8 and 13 per cent in low- and medium-income countries 
respectively by 2060, and by an average of 4 per cent in 
high-income countries. Middle-income resource exporting 
nations are the most adversely affected by the suite of 
sustainability actions, particularly the slower growth in 
world resource demand, and only become net beneficiaries 
in around 2050 as the longer-term benefits mature. These 
results do not account for likely second round economic 
benefits of improved diets, air quality and mobility, and 
only consider limited aspects of avoided climate change 
impacts. 
Various aspects of the Towards Sustainability scenario 
have different economic effects, with improved resource 
efficiency and reduced food waste overcoming the near-
term dampening effects of emissions reductions on GDP 
and GDP per capita (see figure 4.23b). Resource efficiency 
measures in particular impact differently across different 
groups of nations, with less positive effects on net resource 
exporters and on higher income nations (see figure 4.23d).
4.6 Conclusions
The analysis and modelling results presented in this 
chapter represent a first attempt to develop coherent 
scenario projections for resource efficiency and 
sustainable production and consumption that decouple 
economic growth from environmental degradation as 
called for by SDG Target 8.4 and SDG Target 12.1. This 
decoupling seeks to meet essential human needs for 
food, water, energy and shelter (represented by SDGs 2, 
6, 7 and 9), while protecting the natural and social capital 
(represented by SDGs 13, 14, 15 and 17) that underpins all 
life and earth system functions. 
Our central finding is that well-chosen and coordinated 
sustainability actions – particularly resource efficiency and 
sustainable consumption and production policies – can 
achieve significant decoupling, while achieving increased 
economic growth and a more equal distribution of income 
and resource access. Ambitious actions modelled in 
the Towards Sustainability scenario see incomes and 
resource-based services increase significantly across all 
groups of countries, while environmental pressures and 
impacts fall dramatically. This contrasts starkly with the 
outlook under Historical Trends, which has similar projected 
increases in income, but higher resource extractions 
and escalating and clearly unsustainable environmental 
pressures – including rising greenhouse gas emissions, 
increasing pressures on water sensitive ecosystems and 
reductions in the quality and extent of forests and other 
native habitats (see figure 4.24).
While possible and economically attractive, shifting 
from our established – and unsustainable – patterns of 
resource use and environmental impact towards ‘a future 
we want’ would require decisive action by governments 
and business around the world to support sustainable 
consumption and production practices. 
An integrated analysis of this scale is complex, and is 
subject to many assumptions and caveats. We consider, 
however, that the insights generated are both important 
and robust. We hope that the methods and results 
presented will generate interest and debate, along with 
suggestions for improving and extending the analysis of 
these issues in the future. 
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4.7 Technical Notes
4.7.1 Overview of Scenario Definitions and 
Assumptions
The analysis extends previous modelling of resource 
efficiency to assess the broader concept of Sustainable 
Consumption and Production, which is referenced in the 
title of SDG 12, and in SDGs 8.4, 12.1 and 12.a (UN, 2015). 
We make this broader approach tangible by interpreting 
resource efficiency and SCP through the lens of related 
SDG targets for food (SDG  2), water (SDG  6), energy 
(SDG 7), climate (SDG 13) and life on land (SDG 15), as 
detailed in table 4.1 below. 
The baseline Historical Trends scenario has been 
constructed to align with the ‘middle of the road’ shared 
socioeconomic pathway narrative (SSP2) (O’Neil et al., 
2017), with updated economic and population parameters. 
Population growth and per capita GDP projections are 
based on, or calibrated to, OECD (2018), thereby facilitating 
comparisons with current and future OECD analysis. 
FIGURE 4.24 Resource efficiency and sustainable consumption and production (SCP) achieve significant decoupling to 
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TABLE 4.1 Summary of scenario treatments and assumptions
HISTORICAL TRENDS TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY SCENARIO TREATMENTS* SDG
Resource use and 
efficiency 
Historical trends in per 
capita resource use and 
resource intensity.
Policies achieve a step change improvement in resource efficiency, 
slowing the growth of global resource extractions and use.
RET 8.4
Sustainable 
production and 
consumption (SCP) 
No specific measures Towards Sustainability interprets SCP as resource efficiency plus 
action on food, water, energy, climate, life on land food and water, 
and ensuring levels of non-renewable resource extraction are 
consistent with managing environmental impacts.
all 12.1
12.2
Climate and GHG 
emissions 
Scenario calibrated 
to RCP6.0 cumulative 
emissions, with historical 
trends in greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Emissions reductions calibrated to achieve RCP2.6 cumulative 
emissions (with medium population and no resource efficiency).
Carbon removal (reducing atmospheric concentrations) through 
early deployment of BECCS and DAC technologies, avoiding the 
need for large scale negative net emissions later in century. 
Note other treatments also contribute to lower net emissions, as 
described in text. 
CPT[1] 
 
CPT[2]
13 
plus Paris
Energy No specific measures Emissions reductions actions substantially increase renewable 
energy share relative to HT. Bioenergy is limited to BECCS, and 
other biofuels not allowed.
Rate of energy efficiency improvement at least doubles by 2030, 
relative to HT.
CPT[1] 7.2 
 
7.3
Land No specific measures Limit the extension of agricultural land. 
Eliminate crop-based biofuels by 2020, reducing competition for 
land and food price pressures.
Ensure zero net global deforestation by 2030, with net 
restoration of native habitat supported by payments for carbon 
biosequestration. 
Ensure Aichi target of at least 17 per cent of each ecoregion 
protected globally by 2030.
LBT 2.4
15.2 
15.5
15.9
Water No specific measures Eliminate or substantially reduce irrigation-related water stress. LBT 6.4
15.1
Food No specific measures Consumer driven shift to healthy diets (including access to safe, 
nutritious and sufficient food), supported by higher incomes and 
public policies. 
Reduce food waste per person 50 per cent by 2030.
FDT 2.1 
 
12.5
Population Medium: 10.2 billion in 2060, matching OECD reference scenario. n.a n.a
Shared 
Socioeconomic 
Pathway 
SSP2: Historical trends 
continue, with uneven 
development and a weak 
focus on sustainability. 
SSP1: The world shifts to a more sustainable path, emphasizing 
inclusive development and respecting environmental boundaries. 
Assumptions generally align with Towards Sustainability scenario. 
Diet and bioenergy assumptions go beyond SSP1.
n.a n.a
Economic 
assumptions 
Calibrated to OECD reference 
scenario. 
Towards Sustainability accounts for economic impacts of 
policies and actions set out above, with no additional economic 
assumptions. 
n.a n.a
Notes: * Treatment codes are RET = Resource Efficiency Treatment; CPT = Climate Policy Treatment; [1] reducing greenhouse gas emissions, [2] removing atmospheric carbon; 
LBT = Land and Biodiversity Treatment; FDT = Food and Diet Treatments. SDG refers to SDG goal and target number. 
The Towards Sustainability scenario is developed through 
four modelling treatments that together shift the world 
from Historical Trends to a well-rounded SCP-compatible 
pathway, broadly consistent with the narrative for the 
‘sustainability’ shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP1) 
(O’Neill et al., 2017). The four treatments involve policy 
packages supporting resource efficiency, reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions and protection of landscapes 
and life on land, along with a societal shift towards healthy 
diets and reduced food system waste. The scenario 
assumptions and links to the SDGs are summarized in 
table 4.1 above, with detailed explanations provided in the 
main chapter text above. 
More details on the contributions and impacts of the 
modelling treatments are provided in the separate 
Technical Annex. 
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4.7.2 Modelling Regions and Country Groups
Reporting and discussion of results is based on the 28 
regions, aggregated into three economic and geopolitical 
groups (based on GDP per capita), each of which is 
divided into net importers versus net exporters based 
on physical trade balance in 2030. Each of these groups 
shares substantial common features and patterns 
of consumption and production, notwithstanding 
considerable variation across regions. Details of the 28 
regions, including the countries within each, are provided 
in the separate Technical Report. 
Table 4.2 provides summary statistics for economic 
groupings and net resource importers and exporters, 
based on projected results for 2030 under Historical Trends. 
TABLE 42 Projected GDP per capita and shares of economic activity and population in 2030 by country groups
ECONOMIC / FUTURE INCOME GROUP
GDP PER CAPITA
(REAL US$ 2011)
WGP  
SHARES POPULATION SHARES
Developed / high
all 56,700 49 per cent 12 per cent
importers 52,300 27 per cent 7 per cent
exporters 61,700 22 per cent 5 per cent
Emerging and transition / medium
all 15,000 34 per cent 32 per cent
importers 14,900 23 per cent 21 per cent
exporters 14,100 11 per cent 11 per cent
Developing / low
all 4,100 17 per cent 55 per cent
importers 5,100 11 per cent 29 per cent
exporters 3,100 6 per cent 26 per cent
World
all 14,200 100 per cent 100 per cent
importers 15,100 61 per cent 57 per cent
exporters 13,000 39 per cent 43 per cent
Notes: Projections for Historical Trends in 2030. Average GDP per capita is real USD 2011, and rounded to three significant figures. WGP = World Gross Product, the global 
equivalent of GDP. Percentages may not add to total or subtotals shown due to rounding. 
The economic groupings are based on projected real GDP 
per capita in 2030 under Historical Trends: high spans US$ 
35,000 to US$ 85,000; medium spans US$ 10,000 to US$ 
25,000 and includes emerging economies (except India) 
and transition economies; while low spans US$ 1,000 to 
US$ 8,500 in real US$ 2011). There are no countries with 
GDP per capita between US$ 25,000 and US$ 35,000 
or between US$ 8,500 and US$ 10,000 in 2030. At the 
boundary between medium- and low-income, the GDP 
per capita of the lowest member of the medium-income 
group (South Africa) is 8 per cent lower than the next 
highest region in that group and 26 per cent higher than 
the highest member of the low-income group, in 2030 
under Historical Trends. 
4.7.3 Integrated Assessment and Modelling 
Framework
The analysis uses GNOME3 (Global and National Outlooks 
for Materials, Energy, Emissions and Environment): a 
multi-model framework developed by CSIRO and IIASA 
that links a multi-sector multi-region global computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) economic model (GTEM) to 
several sectoral models of electricity supply, road transport 
and land use (including agriculture, forestry and nature 
conservation) to a simple climate model. Model linking 
and coordination is implemented through a linking engine, 
coded in python, which also automates version control and 
archives input and output data files. An urban settlements 
and built assets model is under development, but not used 
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in this analysis. The multi-model approach builds on the 
strengths of CGE economic models, including the analysis 
of second round employment and investment effects 
across sectors and regions, with improved representation 
of sectors where activity is strongly shaped by stock 
dynamics and asset turnover (Allen et al., 2016; Kelly et 
al., 2013).
Multi-model frameworks are able to leverage the 
established capacity and track record of all component 
models, which are familiar to a pre-existing research 
and policy community. Implementation requires up-front 
collaborative investment by the teams who operate each 
of the models, to establish appropriate cross-model 
linkages and identify any adjustments to the component 
models, such as to align sectors or regional structures. 
Once established, the multi-model framework allows 
considerable flexibility in how it is used and applied. In 
most cases, each component model can continue to be 
used on a stand-alone basis, and improvements within 
each model automatically become available to the 
framework as a whole. 
More details on the component models and linking 
arrangements are provided in the separate Technical 
Report. 
4.7.4 Material Flows and Resource Use 
Projections
Projections for natural resource domestic extractions (DE), 
physical trade balance (PTB) and use (domestic material 
consumption, DMC) are developed using the methods 
demonstrated in our previous analysis (Hatfield-Dodds 
et al., 2017; McCarthy et al., 2018). The method derives 
physical volume indexes from the CGE model for sub-
categories of natural resources and applies them to base-
year data from the UNEP International Resource Panel in 
order to generate scenario projections. This is consistent 
with methodological guidelines and international 
standards for material flow indicators (EUROSTAT, 2013) 
and national and global material flow accounting (Fischer-
Kowalski et al., 2011). More details are provided in the 
separate Technical Report. 
Resource extractions in the baseline scenario are driven 
by three main factors: economic growth (from OECD, 
2018), structural change and the pace of technological 
change within each sector – particularly material intensive 
sectors. Structural change (the relative size of different 
economic sectors) is driven largely by rising incomes, 
which change the relative demand for different types of 
goods and services, along with demographic changes. For 
Historical Trends, the CSIRO/IIASA modelling calibrated 
technological change to observed trends in material 
intensity of sector output at the country and sector level, 
based on econometric analysis of historical IRP material 
flows data. As shown in figure 4.25, the major difference 
between the OECD and CSIRO/IIASA baseline projections 
of resource use relates to different views of the likely future 
within sector technological change, with our projections 
being less optimistic about technological change than the 
OECD baseline.
4.7.5 Modelling of Land Use in Historical Trends
Scenarios for land use change under Historical Trends were 
developed using two modelling frameworks: GNOME3 
(described above) and the LandSHIFT global land system 
model (Schaldach et al., 2011). The LandSHIFT model 
does not include the forest sector, and dynamics of logging 
and changes in forest composition are not considered. The 
shown trend results for forest area reflect changes mainly 
driven by agriculture.
Model drivers used as input data for the LandSHIFT 
simulations were derived from a study conducted with the 
GLOBIOM model (Havlík et al., 2011) for a scenario that 
follows the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2 (SSP2). This 
SSP describes a world that “follows a path in which social, 
economic, and technological trends do not shift markedly 
from historical patterns” (Riahi et al., 2017; p. 5).
FIGURE 4.25 OECD and CSIRO/IIASA baseline projections 
of material flows and resource use
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4.7.6 Limitations of the Analysis
The modelling has a number of limitations that are relevant 
to interpreting the results. 
The scenarios represent combinations of stylized policy 
settings and are intended to assess the economic and 
environmental implications of broad alternative future 
directions and governance choices, with a particular focus 
on the period from 2030 to 2060. The scenarios are not 
intended to assess detailed specific real-world policies or 
proposals, or related near-term transition or adjustment 
pathways. For transparency, input assumptions for 
population growth (in all scenarios), GDP growth per capita 
(in Historical Trends) and the carbon price trajectory (in CPT 
and the Towards Sustainability scenario) are each based on 
authoritative sources, while cumulative greenhouse gas 
emissions are benchmarked to the IPCC representative 
concentration pathways (RCP6.0 in the HT scenario and 
RCP2.6 in the CPT treatment). 
Scenario modelling is intended to provide insights 
into impacts of different events or courses of action 
by comparing the results of different scenarios. Each 
scenario represents a plausible and internally coherent 
future pathway, and is not a prediction of the future (Allen 
et al., 2016; Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013). The modelling and 
analysis assume smooth future pathways, and do not 
account for variability and instability – such as ‘booms and 
busts’ in global economic markets; weather and climate 
related events; or wars, social unrest and geopolitical 
disturbances. 
The analysis does not quantify the extent of improvements 
in diet, air quality or active mobility that would be expected 
to occur as part of the scenario definitions, nor does it 
account for or quantify the flow of social and economic 
benefits of these changes (Heal, 2009; West et al., 2013).
While the modelling accounts for some near-term impacts 
of climate change, it does not explore the full range of 
plausible impacts (New, 2011; OECD, 2015; World Bank, 
2012) or provide a comprehensive analysis of climate risk 
and uncertainty (including potential catastrophic climate 
impacts (Fisher & Ley, 2014; Stern, 2013) or positive 
climate feedbacks that might trigger ‘runaway climate 
change’ (Steffen et al., 2018).
Lastly, the modelling framework is focused on the physical 
economy and selected environmental and earth-system 
interactions, and does not attempt to represent the 
evolution of social systems (Allen et al., 2016; Hatfield-
Dodds et al., 2015), including social relations or the 
distribution of access and entitlements within and across 
nations (central to issues of poverty, inequality and gender, 
reflected in SGDs 1, 4, 5, and 10). 
Additional limitations of the modelling are discussed in the 
separate Technical Annex. 
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Main findings
  Decoupling environmental impacts and resource use from economic activity and human well-being is a key 
strategy that can support the achievements of the Sustainable Development Goals while remaining inside the 
planetary boundaries. This strategy further contributes to the achievement of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, the Aichi Targets of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the Land Degradation Neutrality objectives supported by the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification.
  Achieving decoupling is possible and can deliver net positive gains environmentally, socially and economically. 
Innovative solutions to achieve decoupling can address environmental challenges and drive fundamental 
transformations towards sustainable consumption and production.
  Indicators and targets used at all levels of governance can help monitor natural resource flows and guide 
transitions towards sustainability. These indicators and targets include both the production and the 
consumption perspectives.
  National plans for the sustainable use of natural resources would enable governments to identify priorities 
and proceed in a coordinated way to achieve the set targets. National plans are typically backed by scientific 
work and accompanied by the engagement of important stakeholders across specific action areas. Engaging 
in dialogue to connect with citizens, civil society and the private sector builds consensus and facilitates the 
development of an optimal set of measures.
  Achieving sustainable transitions will not happen spontaneously, but rather requires well-designed and 
concerted policy packages. The scope and context of each set of instruments will depend on the national 
situation. Innovation and capacity building are necessary drivers of SCP. The concept of the circular economy 
operationalizes SCP ambitions and promotes value-retention and environmental impact reduction, while 
simultaneously reducing costs and creating economic opportunities. Leapfrogging can be harnessed for 
decoupling by policymakers and decision makers. For some countries, a redistribution policy that shifts 
resources toward the poor and vulnerable in society is an appropriate tool to use when implementing policies 
for decoupling and sustainability.
  International exchanges and cross-country cooperation can accelerate transitions towards sustainability. 
They also can support national decisions and help to creating a level playing field for international businesses 
and traded goods. These exchanges make it easier to navigate obstacles, promote shared experiences 
and find ways to leapfrog. While it is clear that resource, well-being and impact decoupling and resource 
efficiency improvements should be internationally pursued efforts with the involvement of all countries, 
due consideration will have to be given to the different responsibilities and capabilities of countries. These 
different aspects call for a global discussion.
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5.1 Introduction
Any response to the increasing use of natural resources 
and the corresponding impacts involves influencing the 
key drivers of the use and enabling fundamental changes 
throughout the entire socioeconomic system. The 
findings from the previous chapters in this report support 
an integrated response to transforming the way natural 
resources are used in our economies and societies.
5.1.1   The Current Use and Management of 
Natural Resources are Unsustainable 
Trends leading up to 2017 have indicated a glaring increase 
in natural resource use. Since the 1970s, the annual global 
extraction of natural resources grew from about 27 billion 
tons to 92 billion tons. This increase is linked to various 
factors, including higher consumption due to changing 
consumer habits and purchasing power, population growth 
and out-dated business models embodying inefficient 
production technologies.
The Historical Trends scenario shows that this use will 
continue to grow by 110 per cent, reaching 190 billion 
tons of natural resource extracted per year in 2060, unless 
a fundamental change is achieved that drives natural 
resource use away from the status quo.
5.1.2   With Increasing Use Come Increasing 
Negative Impacts
The extraction and processing of material resources 
(biomass, fossil fuels, metals and non-metallic minerals) 
currently contribute more than 90 per cent to global 
biodiversity loss and water stress impacts, and around 
50 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions (not 
including climate impacts related to land use change). 
Additionally, land use caused global species loss of 
approximately 11 per cent up to 2010.
There was a relative decoupling of resource-related 
environmental impacts from GDP and a moderate relative 
decoupling of impacts from extracted mass of resources 
from 2000 to 2015. However, negative environmental 
impacts and global average per capita climate and health 
impacts still increased on an absolute scale.
While the analysis in this report extends only to the 
extraction and processing of natural resources, the use 
phase of natural resources is also causing increasingly 
serious impacts. Both outdoor and indoor air pollution are 
linked to the use phase of natural resources (WHO, 2018a; 
WHO, 2018b). The World Health Organization states that 
4.2 million premature deaths occurred in 2016 due to 
outdoor air pollution, with 91 per cent of these premature 
deaths in low- and middle-income countries (WHO, 2018a). 
An additional 3.8 million deaths per year are attributed to 
indoor exposure to smoke from dirty cookstoves and fuels 
(WHO, 2018b). 
5.1.3   Natural Resource Use and the Related 
Impacts are Unevenly Distributed Around the 
World
Low-income countries with agriculturally based 
economies are not typically driving the increased 
consumption of natural resources that is leading to 
negative environmental and human health impacts 
around the world. The billion richest individuals account 
for 72 per cent of the consumption of global resources, 
while the poorest 1.2 billion consume only 1 per cent (IRP, 
2017a). Moreover, in 2017, the material footprint per capita 
of high-income nations was approximately 27 tons, while 
the material footprint per capita was around 17 tons for 
upper-middle income countries, almost 5 tons for lower-
middle income countries, and only 2 tons per capita for 
low-income countries. While the material footprint per 
capita is increasing for upper-middle income countries, 
it is remaining stagnant for low-income countries. Per 
capita material footprints are the largest for high-income 
countries, but the striking growth in domestic materials 
consumption since 2000 can be attributed to the upper-
middle income group, with very little growth seen in low-
income countries. 
The per capita climate impacts of low-income countries 
are four times lower than the global average. The per-
capita environmental impacts generated by consumption 
of high-income countries are between three and six times 
larger than those impacts in low-income countries. A 
picture is emerging where the richest in global society 
are consuming the most natural resources and facing the 
fewest consequences.
This situation stems from an increasingly connected 
global economy, with high-income countries specializing in 
high value-added product development and management 
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activities while resource-intensive added manufacturing 
is located in low-cost countries. This calls for stronger 
global partnerships in sharing the benefits and mediating 
environmental impacts of resource extraction and 
processing.
The following sections in this chapter provide a response 
to mitigate the above-mentioned trends by describing the 
policy actions that drive the Towards Sustainability scenario 
presented in chapter 4, providing relevant examples of 
action and suggesting eight elements for multi-beneficial 
policymaking. 
5.2 Reaching a Sustainable World: Implementing the Policy Actions 
Adopted in the Towards Sustainability Scenario 
5.2.1   Innovative Solutions and Sustainable 
Consumption and Production
Innovative solutions are not necessarily specific 
technologies, but rather they are novel or noteworthy 
approaches. Simply put, innovative solutions can be 
thought of as “business unusual” ways to achieve 
sustainability (UNEP, 2018a). These innovative solutions 
include policy interventions, implementing environmentally 
sound technologies, sustainable financing schemes, 
capacity building and private-public partnerships. 
Innovative solutions also include new business models 
that focus on selling a service instead of products – such 
as lighting instead of lightbulbs. Where relevant, examples 
of these solutions are flagged throughout this chapter.
Sustainable consumption and production promotes 
decoupling natural resource use from negative 
environmental and health impacts (see chapter 4; One 
Planet Network, 2017). Within SCP, the entire life cycle of 
economic activities is considered from the extraction of 
resources to the reuse, recycling or disposal of products 
made from material resources. Innovation and systemic 
changes within this life cycle promote SCP and directly 
mitigate the negative impacts linked with environmental 
challenges (UNEP, 2018a). Therefore, achieving decoupling 
is possible through innovative solutions for environmental 
challenges and sustainable consumption and production. 
The Towards Sustainability scenario in chapter 4 included 
technical assumptions that enabled absolute impact 
decoupling and relative resource decoupling. After 
providing a brief summary of the Towards Sustainability 
scenario, this section explains how these assumptions 
can be translated into real actions using innovations and 
policy solutions.
5.2.2   A Summary of the Towards Sustainability 
Scenario
The Towards Sustainability scenario is based on a 
collection of actions by governments, the private sector 
and households aimed at improving resource efficiency, 
decoupling economic growth from negative environmental 
impacts and promoting sustainable consumption and 
production. 
Under this scenario, global resource use grows but at a 
decreasing rate compared to Historical Trends (which 
provides an outlook to 2060 based on historical and current 
patterns of natural resource use). The lower growth rate is 
attributed to a slowdown in natural resource use in high-
income countries, despite the increasing use in emerging 
and developing economies. Annual global extraction is 
25 per cent lower than the estimate under Historical Trends, 
reaching 143 billion tons in 2060. 
In addition to a decrease in natural resource growth rates, 
well-being indicators grow faster than resource use. This 
leads to a sizable relative decoupling of natural resource 
use from income and essential services such as GDP 
per capita, energy and food. The Towards Sustainability 
scenario also shows an absolute decoupling of negative 
environmental impacts from economic growth and 
increasing resource use, meaning total environmental 
pressures fall in this scenario. These results indicate a dual 
decoupling of both well-being and impact.
The absolute impact decoupling and relative resource 
decoupling achieved in this model are not at the expense 
of economic growth. The policy packages implemented 
in this scenario lead to net global economic benefits from 
2030 onwards. Global GDP is 8 per cent above Historical 
Trends in 2060, and economic growth increases relatively 
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more in low- and middle-income countries at 11 per cent 
on average compared to high-income nations at 4 per cent 
on average (which represents a more equitable distribution 
of GDP per capita,) while all country groups still benefit 
from economic gains.
5.2.3 Policy Packages and Changes in Societal 
Behaviour 
The Towards Sustainability scenario shows that changes 
in policies and behaviours can achieve decoupling. The 
model assumes three policy packages and one shift in 
social behaviour that, when implemented together, lead 
to a relative decoupling of natural resource use from GDP 
per capita and an absolute decoupling of environmental 
damage from economic growth and resource use. This 
section explains which policies and actions are adopted, 
and provides insight into their real-world implementation.
Resource efficiency policies
Measures implemented in the model
The Towards Sustainability model embodies a resource-
efficiency policy package that includes three measures 
to reduce global natural resource extraction and use. This 
amounts to absolute reductions in domestic material 
consumption in high-income countries and slower growth 
rates of DMC in low- and medium-income countries. 
The first suite of measures are innovative policies and 
actions for resource efficiency, including public research 
programmes; incentives for private research and 
development; and support for demonstration projects, 
business incubators and other incentives that drive the 
adoption of innovation and technology. These initiatives 
lead to a reduction in resources needed per unit of output, 
thereby reducing the overall amount of resources used and 
leading to an overall reduction of supply costs. However, 
the cost reduction causes a ‘rebound effect’ that offsets 
the achievements of resource-efficiency policies, thereby 
pointing to the need for additional policies to counteract 
this effect.
The second suite of measures encompasses changes 
to regulations, technical standards and planning and 
public procurement policies. These measures help reduce 
the demand for materials and associated raw inputs 
without increasing the demand for manufactured items 
and infrastructure because they can actively lower the 
resource intensity of economic activity while maintaining 
or improving the service or amenity provided. Innovative 
public-private partnerships (such as Peru’s ‘Works for 
taxes’ law presented in box 5.1) are an example of how 
governments can implement new regulations and engage 
with the private sector to support sustainable projects.
Finally, the third suite of measures is implemented to 
compensate for the rebound effect. This includes a 
combination of policies that introduce resource scarcity 
in economic decision-making, signalling a tax shift from 
income and consumption to resource extraction. Such a 
tax leads progressively pushes up the cost of resource 
extraction and encourages the efficient use of materials 
and recycling.
Real examples of implementation
Resource efficiency policy packages can take the form of 
R&D tax incentives, including tax credits, tax allowances 
and payroll withholding tax credits for R&D wages, to name 
but a few. Research shows that tax incentives for R&D help 
support innovation (Westmore, 2014). Many countries 
across Europe already have R&D tax incentives. For 
example, France has an R&D tax incentive for operations 
related to prototype designs by small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, while Romania has a personal income tax 
exemption for the salaries of researchers and employees 
working in R&D. These policies are also seen in South 
Africa, where an R&D tax incentive was introduced to offer 
a 50 per cent tax deduction on qualifying R&D revenue 
expenditure in 2006 (KPMG International, 2017). 
Such R&D incentives can actively promote sustainability 
to drive change. Germany implemented programmes 
targeted at improving R&D in the private sector to align 
domestic action with the Europe 2020 strategy for ‘smart, 
sustainable, and inclusive growth’. One notable programme 
to improve innovative technologies was introduced for 
biotechnology and sustainable agricultural production 
(KPMG International, 2017). Countries can aim to not 
only promote sustainable innovations but also to ensure 
that R&D respects ecological limits. Belgium provides 
tax deductions for fixed assets that aim to promote new 
technologies with no effect on the environment or that aim 
to minimize the negative effect on the environment (KPMG 
International, 2017).
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BOX 5.1 Alternative Mechanism for Public 
Projects Funding: “Works for Taxes - Peru”
By: Marcos Gabriel Alegre Chang
Law No. 29230, “Works for Taxes” (Ley de Obras por 
Impuestos), is a regulation adopted by the Peruvian 
government in 2008 that seeks to accelerate the imple-
mentation of priority public infrastructure projects across 
the country. By using the Works for Taxes mechanism, the 
public entities of national, regional and local governments 
enter into funding agreements with private companies. 
This mechanism facilitates the financing and implemen-
tation of public investment projects that are considered 
to be a priority by the authorities, and that have a national, 
regional or local impact.
The law allows a private company, individually or in a con-
sortium, to fund and implement public projects chosen by 
regional and local governments, and then to later recover 
the total amount of investment from its tax. In 2017, 
76  projects with a US$ 300 million budget were funded 
using the Works for Taxes mechanism in Peru. These 
projects were across several sectors, including water 
and sanitation, roads, health and education. The Ministry 
of Environment is actively promoting Work for Taxes 
mechanisms in environmental projects including forestry, 
biodiversity conservation and solid waste management. 
The first projects on solid waste management with the 
Works for Taxes mechanism began in 2018.
Climate Policies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Remove Atmospheric Carbon
Measures implemented in the model
Two measures are included in this package. First, policy 
packages for climate mitigation to lower greenhouse gas 
emissions. These policy packages include a carbon levy 
and dividend, which are modelled as applying equally to all 
countries and to all emission sources. Biosequestration 
from reforestation and afforestation, such as biodiversity 
plantings, receives a subsidy at the same rate per ton of 
carbon as the levy. The level of this levy is consistent with 
limiting climate change to 2 degrees Celsius8. Notably, all 
net carbon revenues are returned as a uniform per capita 
global dividend, regardless of where the revenue is raised. 
The second measure focuses on carbon removal to 
reduce concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. The carbon removal policy package builds 
on the aforementioned policies to support a faster rate of 
8 The analysis for the scenario models was undertaken prior to the release of the International Panel on Climate Change report advocating a 1.5 
degrees Celsius limit to warming . That report demonstrates the necessity and urgency of putting in place the policy practices described in this 
report.
decarbonization and efforts to limit the extent of emissions 
‘overshoot’. This policy package is in response to efforts 
to keep global warming well below 2 degrees Celsius. In 
particular, the early deployment of two carbon dioxide 
removal technologies is supported by this package. The 
first technology is bioelectricity with carbon capture and 
storage, and the second is direct air capture of CO2. In 
order to support these interventions, a technology subsidy 
is introduced that covers capital and operating costs of 
BECCS and direct air capture. In the model, the cost of the 
subsidy begins to decline gradually in 2030 as technology 
costs fall. The subsidy is funded by high-income countries 
in proportion to per capita GDP above US$ 15,000 (in real 
2011 dollars). This duty is consistent with ability to pay and 
the general notions of historic responsibility. 
Real examples of implementation
Until climate mitigation policies are implemented at a global 
scale, countries can consider carbon taxes at the national 
level. In 2008, the province of British Columbia, Canada, 
introduced the first fully comprehensive carbon tax in North 
America. Although this tax was initially opposed by the 
public, within three years of implementation public opinion 
shifted to support the measure. The concept of the carbon 
tax is to be revenue neutral, which means that - instead of 
raising taxes - the revenues obtained through the carbon 
tax are used to reduce business and personal income taxes 
(specifically aimed at poorer households), as well as to 
provide direct grants to rural households. Between 2008 
and 2015, the carbon tax generated C$6.1 billion (Canadian 
dollars) in revenue while tax cuts equalled more than C$7.1 
billion. Therefore, while the tax is not completely neutral, it did 
enable reductions in personal income tax, corporate taxes 
and GHG emissions despite an increasing population. The 
GHG emissions have decreased 5 to 15 per cent compared 
to the counterfactual level (Murray & Rivers, 2015). 
Moreover, since 2010, British Columbia has been carbon 
neutral across public sector organizations. To achieve 
this, the government buys offsets, including emission 
reductions from project investments in the province. The 
portfolio of offset projects for 2017 included sequestration 
in forest conservation projects, energy efficiency in the oil 
and gas sector and fuel switching to less GHG-intensive or 
renewable sources (B.C. Government, 2017).
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It is important to note that, at this stage, carbon removal 
technologies are not currently widely used. In fact, in 
2018 the Illinois Industrial Carbon Capture and Storage 
fermentation plant in Decatur, Illinois (United States) was 
the only BECCS system functioning well at a large scale 
(approximately 1 Mt CO2yr -1) (Haszeldine et al., 2018). 
This highlights the space for governments to step in with 
domestic support for this technology and similar methods 
of carbon dioxide removal, while requiring caution in terms 
of promoting the ability of these technologies to mitigate 
climate impacts. However, emerging companies are 
stepping up to offer solutions. Climeworks successfully 
tested a Direct Air Capture and Storage technology in 
Iceland and found that capturing CO2 and subterranean 
sequestration is feasible. Climeworks is currently working 
to expand their operations (Climeworks, 2018).
Landscapes and life on land policies 
Measures implemented in the model
The final policy package protects landscapes and biodiversity 
by ensuring that climate mitigation and energy policies are 
consistent with land and food system goals. Applying the 
carbon levy to emissions from land clearing helps avoid 
deforestation, while payments for land sector sequestration 
are granted only where this contributes to enhancing 
biodiversity. Phasing out the incentives for crop-based 
biofuels by 2020 leads to a reduction in land competition 
and helps avoid food price hikes. These objectives are further 
supported by focusing bioenergy for electricity generation on 
BECCS, as this contributes to negative net emissions.
Additional conservation polices are included in this 
package to meet the Aichi target of protecting at least 
17 per cent of each ecoregion. Polices include those aimed 
at preventing loss of native vegetation in key biodiversity 
areas, increasing agricultural productivity and reducing 
barriers to agricultural trade. This policy package limits the 
increase of agricultural land and promotes improvements 
in biodiversity outcomes, leading to an increase of 
15 per cent in forests and natural land area from 2015 
to 2060 (compared with a decrease of 5 per cent in the 
Historical Trends scenario). In total, the cumulative effects 
of these policy packages prevent the loss of 400 million 
hectares, and further lead to an increase of 800 million 
hectares of forests and natural land.
Real examples of implementation
An example of existing conservation polices can be 
seen in the European Union (EU). The EU is home to 
the largest coordinated network of protected areas in 
the world, encompassing 18 per cent of EU’s land area 
and approximately 6 per cent of its marine territory. The 
EU developed Natura 2000, a system of privately and 
publicly owned lands that works to conserve valuable 
and threatened species and habitats by mandating that 
Member States manage the sites in an ecologically 
and economically sustainable way (EC, n.d.). While land 
conservation is designated as a top priority, marine 
resources must also be protected. Box 5.2 describes 
planned regulation to protect marine resources. 
BOX 5.2 Marine Resources and Their 
Management in Areas Beyond Natural 
Jurisdiction
By: Steve Fletcher 
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ) occupy more 
than 60 per cent of the surface of the global ocean (UN 
Environment, 2006; Rogers et al., 2014) and 95 per cent of 
its volume (Katona, 2014). The deep waters in these areas 
underpin many of the Earth’s life support systems includ-
ing climate regulation, nutrient cycling and biological pro-
duction, as well as containing key natural resources such 
as fish, metals and genetic material. Until the mid-twenti-
eth century, their remoteness and challenging conditions 
provided deep-sea ecosystems with some degree of pro-
tection from human activities. This is no longer the case. 
Fishing, bioprospecting, tourism, waste disposal and 
deep-sea mining are all under way or planned (in the case 
of mining) in the deep ocean ABNJs. At present, resource 
use is either controlled by activity- and location-specific 
regulation or is entirely unregulated. It has therefore been 
argued that the current sectoral framework leaves legal, 
governance and geographical gaps in management of 
activities within ABNJ and is insufficient to address the 
cumulative impacts of the wide range of sectoral activi-
ties (Gjerde et al., 2016; Ringbom & Henriksen, 2017; UN, 
2017b). However, this may be set to change. The United 
Nations General Assembly has initiated a process to 
develop a new legally binding instrument under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea to manage:
  Marine Genetic Resources (including issues of benefit 
sharing);
  Area-Based Management Tools (including Marine 
Protected Areas);
  Environmental Impact Assessments; and 
  Capacity building and the transfer of marine technology.
This process is planned to conclude in 2020 and, if success-
ful, will for the first time provide a framework for the con-
servation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity and 
associated resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
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As mentioned in the policy package, increasing agricultural 
productivity supports life on land. Agriculture is crucial 
for life, as global society depends on crops for food, fuel 
and feed, as well as being required to meet certain SDGs 
such as SDG 2.4 to end hunger. However, some regions 
are suffering from soil nutrient depletion and could benefit 
from increased fertilization to increase yields, which 
can lead to decoupling. Other regions have overused 
fertilizer, which has led to an oversupply of nutrients 
with serious environmental consequences. Striking a 
balance, especially in situations with poor infrastructure, 
is a difficult task. Precision farming, using satellite images, 
weather forecasts and soil sensors can facilitate crop 
management. A Nigerian precision farming company, 
Zenvus, analyses the soil and provides farmers with the 
information needed on how to use fertilizer for their farms. 
Zenvus is paired with a web application for easy use. 
Other start-up companies are using ICTs to link farmers 
with pricing data for their crops or to provide farmers with 
the weather forecast. Some of these initiatives use simple 
SMS messages, such that they are accessible to farmers 
who have only the most basic technological capabilities 
(Ekekwe, 2017).
Other agricultural innovations include agroforestry 
systems (AFS), which are agricultural techniques that 
combine trees and crops (and in some cases, pastures/
cattle) on the same parcel of land. Practising AFS can 
increase productivity, while also maintaining biodiversity 
and providing positive benefits to the farmer. AFS 
further helps mitigate climate change through carbon 
sequestration that occurs in woody components of the 
system and in soils. The benefits of AFS can be seen 
through the lens of the SDGs. To name but a few synergies, 
AFS promotes SDG 2 on hunger, SDG 5 on gender equality, 
SDG 13 on climate action and SDG 15 on sustainable 
forestry and reforestation (Montagnini & Metzel, 2017).
The AgFor Sulawesi Project, which lasted from 2012 to 
2017, was deployed across multiple provinces on Sulawesi 
island in Indonesia to support agroforestry and forest 
livelihood systems in rural communities. The AgFor project 
promoted mixed AFS involving cacao and other tree crops 
to build agricultural resilience. Nurseries of excellence, 
which helped farmers produce superior seedlings and 
provide AFS training, were established to further support 
this initiative. As a result, over 25,000 people improved 
their knowledge of sustainable agriculture and natural 
resource management through workshops, training and 
meetings, as well as 286 individual or group nurseries 
producing over 1.3 million seedlings. Importantly, AgFor 
places a strong emphasis on gender equality. By 2016, an 
impact survey found that over 630,000 people - of which 
52 per cent were women - improved their incomes after 
adopting AgFor-promoted technologies. This survey also 
found that 738,000 hectares on the island were secured 
under improved sustainable management (Montagnini & 
Metzel, 2017).
Shift in societal behaviour 
Measures implemented in the model
In addition to the implementation of three complementary 
policy packages, the Towards Sustainability scenario 
assumes changes in societal behaviour. The changes 
include adopting healthier diets that are consistent 
with international dietary guidelines and reducing food 
waste throughout the food supply chain. Healthier diets 
are envisioned through a 50 per cent reduction in meat 
consumption relative to Historical Trends by 2050, except 
in regions with a low share of meat in their diets. This 
reduction involves replacing animal protein with plant-
based proteins. Higher average incomes, reduced poverty 
and improved public knowledge contribute to the change 
in diets. 
Real examples of implementation
Social norms have been identified as a major component 
in transitioning away from meat-rich diets, and major 
gains can be made with societal level diet changes. In 
many cultures, however, social norms around heavy 
meat consumption act as a barrier to reducing number 
of animals and dairy products consumed in daily life. 
Shifting these social norms can help change a society’s 
overall caloric make-up to a diet that emphasizes less 
intensive food products. Well-known ways to shift the 
norms surrounding meat consumption include providing 
information about the environmental impacts of eating 
meat (Stoll-Kleemann & Schmidt, 2017). For example, while 
83 per cent of the respondents of one international study 
agreed that human activity contributes to climate change, 
in the same study a mere 30 per cent of respondents 
agreed that meat and livestock are significant contributors 
(Garnett et al., 2015). Increasing public knowledge about 
the links between animal products and environmental 
damage helps drive the needed shift in behaviour.
Back to the content
GLOBAL RESOURCES OUTLOOK 2019: NATURAL RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE WE WANT |
132 
5.3 Eight Elements for Multi-Beneficial Policymaking 
Achieving sustainable transitions will not happen 
spontaneously, but rather will require well-designed 
and concerted policy packages to effect the desired 
changes. Using eight elements, this section identifies 
policy solutions for stimulating fundamental changes 
in consumption and production systems that enable 
economic growth and improvements in human well-being 
without putting unsustainable stress on the environment. 
Innovative solutions, such as novel policy interventions, 
progressive environmentally sound technologies, 
sustainable financing, novel capacity-building ideas and 
new forms of public-private partnerships can also help 
drive these changes.
5.3.1   Set Targets and Use Indicators to Measure 
Progress 
Targets and indicators used at all levels of governance can 
help monitor material flows and guide transitions towards 
sustainability. Regular reporting on the metrics of resource 
use and efficiency that is consistent across different 
entities can raise the profile of these measures, thereby 
mobilizing support to improve them. Box 5.3 provides one 
example of why monitoring improvements are necessary.
National natural resource-efficiency targets
Natural resource-efficiency targets can guide policy and 
provide context for a progress-monitoring framework. By 
setting objectives at the national level, complementary 
policy packages can be implemented to achieve these 
defined goals. Having a defined target to achieve facilitates 
the policymaking process, as policymakers know which 
direction to move in to reach the goal. To measure 
progress, a country can track the indicators used to 
measure resource efficiency. Targets help shape national 
plans.
One category of indicators is based on domestic material 
consumption, while another category is based on the 
material footprint. The indicators for domestic material 
consumption highlight the production side. Footprint 
indicators are used to measure environmental impacts 
beyond the production perspective by quantifying 
environmental impacts caused by domestic consumption 
inside and outside a country. It is recommendable to use 
both types of indicators.
Eight European Union Member States (Austria, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal and Slovenia) 
have adopted national material resource-efficiency targets 
related to resource productivity. These targets, in most 
cases, are formulated by the ratio of GDP to DMC, which 
is the main productivity indicator in the EU. For example, 
France has a two-fold goal to have a 30 per cent increase 
in resource productivity (GDP/DMC) along with a decrease 
in per person DMC between 2010 and 2030 (EEA, 2019 
forthcoming; IRP, 2017a). 
The use of targets for industry and business 
In addition to national and regional targets, industries and 
individual companies can develop their own targets to steer 
their activities. For instance, EDP is an electricity generator, 
distributor and supplier with 9.8 million electricity and 
1.5 million gas customers across 14 countries that has 
worked with the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) to 
introduce resource targets. The company committed to 
reduce direct and indirect GHG emissions from electricity 
production by 55 per cent per TeraWatt hours (TWh) by 
2030 (compared with 2015 levels). Over the same time 
period, EDP has committed to reducing absolute value 
FIGURE 5.1 8 ELEMENTS FOR MULTI-BENEFICIAL POLICY 
MAKING
8 elements for multi-beneficial policy-makding
1. Use targets to achieve objectives
2. Develop a national plan
3. Implement a policy mix
4. Enable access to finance
5. Unlock the resistance to change
6. Promote innovation for a circular economy
7. Take advantage of leapfrogging
8. International exchanges and cooperation
Source: Based on IRP 2017a
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chain emissions by 25 per cent. The overarching goal for 
EDP is to reduce CO2 emissions by 75 per cent by 2030, 
compared to 2005 levels (Science Based Targets, 2017). 
Global targets for resource use 
Although resource-efficiency targets at the national 
level are an important first step to improving resource 
use, international targets for sustainable levels of global 
resource use will also be needed (IRP, 2017a). To guide 
transitions towards sustainability, targets for biodiversity, 
climate change and land degradation neutrality are already 
in place at an international level, and the 17 goals of the 
SDGs include 169 associated targets. Natural resources 
are within the scope of many current targets, but a direct 
process to monitor resources and guide resource use is 
still lacking. 
Developing new science-based targets for natural 
resources would support the mitigation of impacts that 
are being felt around the world. The process for science-
based targets for resource use should consider how to 
limit impacts and guarantee human well-being. Targets 
developed in this way refer to direct limits in stocks of 
resources and to ‘indirect’ limits focused on mitigating 
negative impacts.
Generally speaking, in order to be useful for policymakers 
and decision makers, targets on impacts will need to be 
translated into a meaningful resource-use target paired 
with applicable indicators applicable at a global scale. 
In this way, the benefits of targets can be shared across 
borders and modified for domestic circumstances. Other 
concerns that can be addressed by resource targets 
include scarcity for certain resources (such as water), or 
ensuring that future generations have access to “high-
quality” resources.
The development of global resource targets is still in 
its infancy. Individual countries can lead the way by 
implementing targets at a national level. The Netherlands, 
for example, set an interim objective to achieve a 
50 per cent reduction in the use of primary raw materials by 
2030 (Government of Netherlands, 2016). Until decisions 
on targets are accepted internationally, the International 
Resource Panel will continue to provide research, analysis, 
and policy options that support resource and impact 
decoupling.
BOX 5.3 Impact of Sand Mining on the 
Environment
By: Pascal Peduzzi and Janyl Moldalieva, United Nations 
Environment Programme
Sand and gravel are mined worldwide and account for 
the largest volume of solid material extracted globally. 
Formed by erosive processes over thousands of years 
(John, 2009), they are now being extracted at a pace far 
greater than their renewal rate. Sand is being used mostly 
by the building sectors, for sea reclamation and beach 
nourishment, as well as for many other applications (elec-
tronics, agriculture, cosmetics, glass and so forth). With an 
estimated 40 to 50 billion metric tons per year, extraction 
of such large volume has a major impact on rivers, deltas 
and coastal and marine ecosystems. It results in loss of 
land through river or coastal erosion, lowering of the water 
table and decreases in the amount of sediment supply. 
Despite the colossal quantities of sand and gravel being 
used, our increasing dependence on them and the signif-
icant environmental impact of their extraction, the issue 
has been mostly ignored by policymakers and remains 
largely unknown by the general public.
There is a need to generate environmental and social 
standards on how sand is mined, as well as to consider 
how to reduce the demand for this resource. Currently, 
there is no monitoring system in place, and legislation is 
either insufficient or not adequately enforced - leading to 
significant environmental and social impacts.
Photo credit: TomDiTOm, Flickr.
5.3.2   Establish a National Plan to Create a 
Feasible Pathway for the Sustainable Use of 
Natural Resources 
National plans allow governments to identify priorities 
and proceed in a coordinated way toward the targets 
set. National plans are typically backed by scientific work 
and are accompanied by the engagement of important 
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stakeholders across specific action areas. A national plan 
includes two aspects. The first step involves an evaluation 
of a country’s situation. The second step is to develop an 
action plan for decoupling. 
Evaluate the domestic situation
An evaluation of the domestic situation provides the factual 
foundation for the national plan. This includes an analysis 
of the natural resources extracted and processed within 
the borders of a country, the natural resources traded 
internationally, whether the country is a net exporter or a 
net importer of resources, how natural resources play a 
role in the overall economy and what the impacts of natural 
resource use within the country. A full understanding 
of natural resources in the national context can help to 
identify leverage points for action and to develop national 
programmes relevant to domestic circumstances.
Kenya’s Vision 2030 is a long-term development plan 
that aims to achieve economic growth and promote 
a prosperous society while ensuring environmental 
protection, including the sustainable extraction, use 
and management of natural resources. Vision 2030 has 
successive five-year plans and three pillars: economic, 
social and political. As natural resources are a key 
component of this plan, Kenya sought to identify the 
most relevant challenges related to resources and its 
domestic situation. This process identified six challenges: 
continued deforestation and poaching; human-wildlife 
conflicts; increased occurrence of alien and invasive 
species, depletion of marine resources; lack of an 
effective policy, regulatory, and institutional framework; 
and environmental degradation and encroachment in 
fragile ecosystems. With clear challenges identified, 
Kenya is now developing targeted approaches to 
overcome obstacles. Notably, this includes a focus on 
increasing resource efficiency through technological 
progress, conservation efforts and pollution and waste 
management (UNIDO, 2016). The Kenyan process serves 
as an example of how countries can evaluate their 
national situation for targeted action.
Construct a national plan for decoupling
After leverage points are identified, countries can 
formulate a national plan for decoupling. Such a national 
plan identifies relevant areas to be covered by actions 
and programmes for resource efficiency and sustainable 
consumption and production.
Resource efficiency programmes can help strategically 
coordinate national institutional arrangements and 
policies. Countries in Europe, such as Austria, Finland and 
Germany, are already pursing national policy programmes 
that focus on natural resource management and resource 
efficiency (IRP, 2017a). Progress is also observable in 
emerging and developing economies. In India, for example, 
an Action Plan for resource efficiency was introduced 
in 2017 to outline policies to be pursed at a domestic 
level up to 2020. This plan begins by developing a multi-
stakeholder, inter-departmental group, then sets up a task 
force to support institutional development and highlights 
the need for resource efficiency education and awareness 
programmes. In the following years, it outlines resource 
efficiency promotion strategies and public policies. The 
recently established Indian Resource Panel will help 
drive these comprehensive national resource efficiency 
objectives and pursue decoupling (NITI Aayog & European 
Union, 2017).
In addition to resource efficiency, fundamental changes 
to the current patterns of consumption and production 
are needed. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Brazil designed and implemented a national action plan 
for SCP. The first in this region, the Brazilian SCP national 
plan worked with 26 institutions (including ministries, 
government offices and NGOs) to monitor, guide and 
encourage activities that adhered to the SCP plan. From 
this cooperation, six areas were identified as top priorities 
for change. As an example outcome from this plan, 
local shops were supported in collaborating to pursue 
sustainable retail and consumption practices. This led, 
among other achievements, to the collection of 70,000 
litres of cooking oil each year, which is transformed into 
biodiesel. The first cycle of the national plan ran from 
2011 to 2014, and the second cycle is under way and will 
continue until 2020 (One Planet Network, 2018).
5.3.3   Develop an Integrated Policy Mix for Natural 
Resource Management
Policy mixes are comprised of instruments that a 
government uses to achieve national targets and the 
objectives from the national plan. Using a broad toolbox with 
aspects of multiple approaches leads to beneficial decision-
making. Consider the successful strategy by the EU to 
combat plastic waste that incorporates a combination of 
elements such as enforcing rules, partnerships and market-
based instruments. The fusion of different governance 
Back to the content 135 
1
2
3
4
5
6
| 05. A SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO DETERMINE OUR SHARED FUTURE
styles embodies ‘metagovernance’, which is the combining 
or switching between governance styles to develop an 
effective combination for a particular situation. A variety of 
tools builds more resilient approaches (Meuleman, 2018). 
Public policies, notably when backed by broader society, 
can influence producer and consumer choices through 
incentives, regulations and improved knowledge.
Moreover, the Towards Sustainability scenario embodied 
three policy packages on resource efficiency, climate 
mitigation and carbon removal and the protection of 
landscapes and biodiversity. The success of the overall 
strategy to improve resource efficiency, decouple 
economic growth from environmental degradation and 
promote SCP is contingent upon the combined actions 
represented in these policy actions. 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution
Achieving a sustainable transition requires multiple, 
complementary measures. A policy package needs to be 
feasible and relevant to the targets set and the national 
plan developed. Policies can be seen as instruments 
to reach domestic and international goals, and the set 
of instruments required will differ in context and scope 
depending on the national situation. 
One option for policymakers to drive innovative solutions 
in their country’s policy mix is by integrating legislation on 
natural resources with biodiversity and climate policies. 
This innovative solution is important because the improved 
use of natural resources, including enhanced resource 
efficiency, will be necessary to achieve national and 
international objectives on climate, biodiversity and land 
degradation neutrality. Developing integrated resource, 
climate and biodiversity policies can drive coordination 
and collaboration across government ministries, leading 
to further policy innovations.
A recent IRP report (UNEP, 2017) modelled four different 
scenarios: an Existing Trends scenario based on historical 
resource trends and a climate commitment broadly 
consistent with the Paris pledges to 2030; a Resource 
Efficiency scenario that assumes the same GHG setting 
as Existing Trends but also a package of tools to promote 
resource efficiency; an Ambitious Climate scenario that 
assumes the world follows historical trends for resource 
use but shifts to a 2 degree Celsius climate pathway, 
indicating global GHG emission abatement policies; and 
an Efficiency Plus scenario that combines the measures of 
Resource Efficiency and Ambitious Climate. The results of 
this report show that the combination of climate policies 
and resource efficiency policies is better at reducing 
resource use per capita and global GHG emissions than 
each package separately at a global level. Bundling the 
policies also led to a higher Gross World Product compared 
to Existing Trends. The same overall trends held true for the 
Group of 7 countries. This analysis shows that pursuing 
policies that abate emissions and increase resource 
efficiency together leads to a more advantageous outcome.
Effective and efficient policy mixes
The policy package used needs to be effective in achieving 
the domestic objectives outlined by the targets and 
national plan. Implementing policies in steps can help 
reduce the burden of a drastic policy shift. In this way, even 
if the final target is not reached in the short term, progress 
towards defined goals is nonetheless achieved. 
In addition to effectiveness, the policy objectives should 
be designed to be efficient in their use of personnel and 
resources (including money, materials and energy). 
Efficiency can be increased by taking advantage of shared 
domestic experiences from actors across sectors, and 
also internationally by collaborating with individuals in 
different countries.
One way to ensure effectiveness and efficiency is through 
adaptive management. Adaptive management is one form 
of natural resource management that promotes learning 
and consequent management changes in based on 
discoveries during the policymaking process. Depending 
on the outcome, the course of action is adjusted. It is an 
iterative process that helps reduce uncertainty, develop 
knowledge and ultimately improve the management of 
natural resources (Allen et al., 2011).
Capacity building will support policymaking
Policymakers, decision makers and those supporting them 
need training to devise informed and effective policy mixes. 
Capacity building acts as a catalyst for change (UNEP, 2006) 
and equips these actors with the information and know-how 
to make substantial improvements in policy. Innovation in 
education and capacity building have been flagged up as 
ways to mitigate environmental challenges and drive SCP. 
The Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence (BCURE) 
ran from 2013 to 2017 and supported six projects 
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across 12 countries to focus on building skills, networks 
and organizational systems for evidenced informed 
policymaking (EIPM) during this time. In Bangladesh, the 
BCURE programme developed EIPM guidelines in three 
ministries, one of which was the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests. A pilot EIPM training course was designed 
to teach technical skills to evaluate policy formulation, 
and BCURE further collaborated with national training 
institutions to integrate EIPM training in existing civil 
servant training courses. The pilot training course 
was predicted to reach 400 civil servants during the 
programme, and has the potential to reach thousands of 
civil servants per year (Vogel & Punton, 2018).
5.3.4   Enable Access to Finance for Decoupling 
Oriented Businesses and Projects
Innovative sustainable financing schemes can be 
leveraged to promote SCP. It has been estimated that 
financing a sustainable transition, by achieving the SDGs 
and the Paris Agreement commitments, will require 
investment amounting to trillions of US$ per year for the 
next decade or more (UNEP, 2018b). Governments are 
called on to help finance sustainable projects, but private 
sources will need to provide much of the funding. 
Innovative financing tools
A specific instrument for financing projects that provide 
environmental and climate benefits, or “green projects”, is 
the green bond. Each type of green bond specifies what the 
proceeds from the bond sale will be used for, and how the 
debt will be repaid to the investor. However, at the moment 
there is no common framework to define a “green bond”. 
This motivated the European Commission to present its 
Sustainable Finance Action Plan in March 2018 to provide 
transparency about what is sustainable or not through a 
common taxonomy and then to develop labels for financial 
products (EC, 2018b).
The green bond market has gained strong traction as a 
funding instrument. In 2017, US$ 157 billion was issued, 
up from US$ 37 billion in 2014 and US$ 11 billion in 2013. 
Local and national governments, along with private 
companies and international organizations, have been 
involved in issuing green bonds for sustainability projects 
around the world (Climate Bonds Initiative, n.d.). Other 
stakeholders include Climate Action 100+, a group of 
institutional investors that aim to secure decarbonization 
of the most carbon intensive companies (UNEP, 2018b). An 
example of a green bond is the “Climate Awareness Bond” 
issued by the European Investment Bank (EIB) (Climate 
Bonds Initiative, n.d.). The EIB agreed to provide US$ 
100 million through green bonds to support sustainable 
development in emerging markets by investing in the 
“Amundi Planet – Emerging Green One” Fund (EIB, 2018). 
Another example of adapting the bond market for 
sustainability is from the multi-stakeholder initiative 
Tropical Landscapes Finance Facility (TLFF). In 2018, TLFF 
announced that a US$ 95 million sustainability bond issued 
by BNP Paribas (one of the partners) would be used to 
fund a sustainable natural rubber plantation in Indonesia. 
The plantation will protect a national park in Indonesia 
and provide around 16,000 fair-wage jobs. This type of 
investment shows how the private sector can become 
involved in sustainability projects backed by trustworthy 
organizations and ultimately deliver a profit (TLFF, 2018). 
Ensuring access for local actors
Financing tools must be accessible to local actors. 
Multinational organizations and domestic governments 
can engage with local actors to encourage green supply 
chains, innovation and resource efficiency at the local 
level. In order to connect global institutional investors to 
small businesses and entrepreneurs on the ground, these 
institutional investors can open local offices in developing 
and emerging economies to create accessible solutions in 
local markets. 
Other mechanisms to help financing reach the local level 
include tax incentives, such as preferential withholding 
tax rates to entice foreign investors into domestic bond 
markets. A preferential withholding tax rate was deployed 
in India to attract infrastructure investment. This policy 
was one of the first to use the preferential withholding tax 
rate incentive for green bonds. At an international level, 
existing organizations such as the Financial Stability 
Board, the G20 or OECD can help encourage support 
for local green bond markets or other green financing 
instruments (Climate Bonds Initative, 2015).
5.3.5   Unlock the Resistance to Change
Addressing the resistance to change that may arise during a 
sustainable transition is another key element, in addition to 
capacity building, that will help policymakers and decision 
makers support their national strategy for decoupling.
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Provide transition support for vulnerable groups
The policies adopted in a policy mix to drive a sustainable 
transition will probably entail phasing out certain 
industries and sectors to move toward less polluting 
and more efficient economic activities. New policies and 
incentives can encourage new labour opportunities, but 
those individuals who are negatively affected during the 
transition stand to benefit from targeted government 
support. This support can take the form of education 
and training programmes that help people adjust to the 
changing labour market. Notably, if environmental taxes 
are included in conjunction with support programmes, the 
revenue raised from taxes can be used to fund training or, 
more broadly, mitigate distribution impacts that arise from 
a transition (OECD, 2017).
Indeed, for some countries a redistribution policy that 
shifts resources toward the poor and vulnerable in society 
is an appropriate tool to use when implementing policies 
for decoupling and sustainability. In these situations, 
suitable tools include cash transfers or supplementary 
social safety nets to support redistribution. 
Engage in dialogue and listen to concerns
Engaging in dialogue to connect with citizens, civil society 
and the private sector provides these members of the 
public with a way to share concerns and participate in the 
policymaking process. The R&Dialogue project across 
Europe promoted ten low-carbon dialogues between 
different groups, including those in energy, the low-carbon 
R&D community and social actors. National Dialogue 
Councils were developed to host multiple meetings 
from 2014 to 2015. These meetings focused on a range 
of issues, including economic aspects of the energy 
transition and how to bridge the divide between scientific 
findings and society. Some dialogues took the form of a 
round-table discussion, to stimulate listening and increase 
interaction among participants (Øye et al., 2015).
A panel in Scotland serves as a specific example from this 
project to show how dialogue can work in action. A citizen’s 
panel organized on energy technologies in 2014 found that 
participants were open to accepting higher taxes to fund 
the development of renewable energy technologies if the 
taxation process was fully transparent (Øye et al., 2015). 
The R&Dialogue project can be used as a model of how to 
collaborate with society during a sustainable transition. 
Both formalized and informal dialogue – through social 
media, for example – enables members of society to share 
their fears, express concern and inform policymakers about 
their priorities. Dialogue is a critical aspect of the political 
process between the government and citizens, while 
strong communication with society helps policymakers 
garner support for change.
Provide scientific information
In both the private sector and the public sector, informing 
citizens and private businesses of all sizes about how 
to improve their natural resource consumption can go a 
long way towards improving the current state of natural 
resource use and management. 
Businesses can also develop innovative solutions and 
tools to promote resource-efficient practices. For example, 
Winnow is a company working to prevent food waste 
(Magoni, n.d.). Stopping food waste is a global priority, as 
it represents a large portion of global waste and causes 
more than 3.3 Gt of CO2-equivalent emissions annually 
(FAO, 2013). In developed countries, 40 per cent of the total 
estimated food waste occurs at the retail and consumer 
level, equalling out to around 222 million tons. The total 
net food produced in sub-Saharan Africa alone is around 
230 million tons (UNEP, 2016a), so preventing this waste 
has huge implications. Notably, SDG 12.3 focuses on 
halving food waste, which if achieved would contribute 
to the prevention of climate change, water stress and 
biodiversity impacts. 
The Winnow Waste Monitor collects data on food waste 
in commercial kitchens by putting the waste receptacles 
in the kitchen on scales. Food is weighed as an employee 
throws it away and a pre-programmable system allows the 
employee to categorize the food (lasagne, lunch buffet and 
so forth). The results are compiled into reports, which are 
then sold to the organization using the Winnow system. 
Kitchens using Winnow have cut food waste by 40 to 
70 per cent. As an estimated US$ 100 billion of food is 
thrown away by the hospitality industry, these reductions 
in food waste translate into significant financial savings 
for commercial kitchens. In addition to the prevention of 
food waste, an unanticipated result is that employees 
working in these kitchens are more aware of food waste. 
After Ikea began using Winnow in their kitchens, it was 
found that around 50 per cent of workers involved in food 
production wanted to reduce food waste (Magoni, n.d.). 
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Winnow simply informs its customers of their food waste, 
and from there they are able to more efficiently manage 
their food resources.
Leverage social norms
Leveraging social norms is another way to change 
behaviours regarding natural resource use. Social norms 
refer to either imagined or real knowledge of how another 
person would act in one’s own situation. When an individual 
believes or knows that their neighbours and friends are 
using resources more responsibly than them, this can 
trigger a change in resource consumption. Peer behaviour 
and social norms are a strong predictor of environmental 
behaviours for energy and water use, and can sometimes 
be more influential than changes in the price of a natural 
resource (Stoknes, 2015). Governments can also lead the 
way through their own behaviour.
A concrete example of leveraging norms to achieve change 
is provided by the company Opower, which provides 
electricity utilities to households. Opower began giving 
customers easy access to their power consumption and 
also enabled customers to compare their energy-saving 
performance with their neighbours through an online 
application. Opower states that during their start-up phase 
from 2007 to 2013, its services could power a city such 
as San Francisco for one year with the energy saved. This 
service leverages the influence of social norms to change 
behaviours (Stoknes, 2015).
5.3.6   Promote Innovation for a Circular Economy 
to Reduce Material Demand and Increase 
Resource Security
Promotion of the circular economy by decision makers and 
policymakers can complement the other components of 
an integrated policy-mix.
The concept of the circular economy
Historically, linear models of production and consumption 
have characterized economic systems. Raw materials 
are extracted, processed and then transformed into 
manufactured goods. These goods are consumed and 
then disposed of, effectively taking natural resources 
from the earth as virgin material and putting them back as 
waste. Throughout the linear production process, value is 
lost through inefficiencies and waste (EMF, 2015).
According to the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, an 
organization dedicated to the circular economy, the 
circular economy rests on three principles: preserving and 
enhancing natural capital by controlling finite resource 
stocks and balancing renewable resource flows; optimizing 
resource yields by circulating products, components, and 
materials at the highest utility possible; and fostering 
system effectiveness by revealing and designing out 
negative externalities. By adhering to these principles, firms 
have the potential to realize lower input costs or create 
new profit streams, while decreasing their dependence 
on commodity imports (EMF, 2015). Effectively, firms that 
strive to adopt the circular economy principles “close the 
loop” of the production system by creating products that 
can be broken down and replaced by new pieces or products 
that can be reverse engineered to recover used materials. 
The circular economy promotes value-retention and 
environmental impact reduction, while simultaneously 
reducing costs and creating economic opportunities. 
Value retention processes (which include direct reuse, 
repair, refurbishment and remanufacturing) also offer 
additional options for consumers. Remanufacturing has 
the highest value retention potential of the processes 
previously mentioned, as it restores the end-of-life 
goods to their original working condition. By embracing 
remanufacturing and refurbishing processes in the United 
States, manufacturers of industrial printers, vehicle parts 
and off-road equipment saved up to 98 per cent in new 
materials input. They further reduced production waste 
by 90 per cent, embodied material emissions by up to 
99 per cent and process emissions by up to 87 per cent. 
The remanufactured products are of the same quality as 
new products, and moreover led to cost savings per unit of 
up to 44 per cent (IRP, 2018b).
The circular economy model often involves innovative 
technologies and processes that help close the loop. Selling 
services instead of products is one emerging solution to 
promote circularity. Philips recently began offering Light 
as a Service, with contracts for LED lighting and a service 
and warranty solution where Philips maintains ownership 
until the product’s end-of-life, thus facilitating refurbishment, 
parts harvesting and recycling (Phlips Lighting, 2015). New 
environmentally sound technologies are also highlighted 
as innovative solutions that promotes circularity and 
additionally SCP. Box 5.4 provides an example of an 
innovative technology to develop a circular wastewater 
system.
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BOX 5.4 Helio Pure Technologies
Helio Pure is an environmental engineering company with 
the principal idea that 100 per cent of water is reusable 
with the right treatment, if it is correctly sorted and recu-
perated. The current water management model used in 
most systems around the world is single use. Water flows 
from the tap, is used once, and then – irrespective of water 
source – is disposed of in a common sewer. This practice 
results in water waste and unnecessary energy lost due to 
the common application of water purification techniques 
applied to all water in the shared sewer. Helio Pure pro-
poses a new method. First, water is sorted at source. Then, 
improved environmentally friendly treatment methods are 
applied to the sorted water. Subsequently, the water is put 
back into the system, depending on the next use of the 
water. This type of recycling already exists for materials, 
and this model can be applied to water with decentralized 
action: the end user must participate in sorting the water, 
because water can no longer be sorted after it flows into 
a sewer.
To purify the water, Helio Pure developed Bio-Solar Purifi-
cation (BSP). This is a scientifically tested process that 
converts water with high organic and nutrient loads into 
purified water suitable for irrigation, water or industrial uses 
using solar energy (de La Rochebrochard et al., 2016).
This integral solution can be applied for industry, agricul-
ture and residential areas. Water management solutions 
are already deployed in water stressed areas in Algeria, 
France, Saudi Arabia, Spain and the United States. The 
new method of wastewater management is especially 
appropriate for areas affected by water stress, high water 
prices or conflict driven by water competition. 
Photo: Helio Pure operation in Algeria, printed with permis-
sion from Helio Pure.
Policies tailored to supporting a circular economy
Policies for the circular economy should be designed 
to defeat the present throw-away culture seen in both 
consumer and producer behaviour, and to keep value 
within the production and consumption system. An initial 
step is to establish effective waste management and 
recycling infrastructure, though decision makers will need 
to look to the whole life cycle of products to encourage 
sustainable design, longevity of use and re-use and finally 
disposal to waste. Policymakers can further assess their 
existing policies to ensure that the current regulations do 
not create barriers to the development of value-retention 
processes by producers or the adoption of these processes 
by consumers (IRP, 2018b). 
The EU has actively been promoting this since the Action 
Plan for the Circular Economy, which established concrete 
objectives to drive circularity and measures to address 
the life cycle of economic activities in Europe. It further 
seeks to increase global competitiveness and create new 
jobs. A 2018 update states that, within only two years of 
adopting the Action Plan, over 50 per cent of the planned 
initiatives have been delivered. Along with this plan, revised 
legislation establishes targets for waste reduction and 
improved waste management. For example, common EU 
targets include recycling 65 per cent of municipal waste 
by 2030 and recycling 75 per cent of packaging waste by 
2030 (EC, 2018a). Another example of policies aimed at 
driving circularity from China is described in Box 5.5.
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BOX 5.5 Circular Transformation of Industrial 
Parks in the People’s Republic of China
By: Bing Zhu, Dingjiang Chen and Bomin Liu 
The “Circular Transformation of Industrial Parks (CTIP)” 
Programme is a policy from the Chinese Government to 
push and support various types of Industrial Parks (IPs) 
to follow circular economy principles (such as “reduce”, 
“reuse” and “recycle”, with priority given to “reduce”). The 
parks optimize spatial layout, adjust industrial structure, 
develop key technologies for linking various components 
of a circular economy, extend the industrial chain appro-
priately and link its various parts into a circular loop. They 
further build infrastructure and public service platforms, 
and renovate organizational and administrative mech-
anisms to implement an efficient and circular utilization 
of resources and “zero discharge” of wastes, thereby 
continuously strengthen the Industrial Park’s capacity for 
sustainable development.
In order to tackle the resource and environmental prob-
lems during rapid economic growth, China has been 
implementing CTIP since 2011 to promote resource 
efficiency during production. China has 2,543 national or 
provincial-level Industrial Parks. They are an important 
pillar of the Chinese economy, and engage in the highly 
concentrated use of raw materials and energy. According 
to the Chinese Government, by 2020 CTIP will be imple-
mented in 75 per cent of all national Industrial Parks and 
50 per cent of all provincial Industrial Parks. Currently, 
the government has supported the establishment of 
129 National Demonstration Industrial Parks for Circular 
Transformation. An evaluation of the 30 earliest national 
demonstration or pilot IPs has shown that, in aggregate, 
the 30 Industrial Parks have utilized approximately 23 
million tons of solid waste and reduced carbon emission 
by 30 million tons. 
FIGURE 5.3 SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL 
PARKS PARTICIPATING IN CTIP DURING 2011-2017 
Source: Bing Zhu, A Good Practice Example on Resource-Efficient Solutions from 
China: Circular Transformation of Industrial Parks (CTIP), presentation at Inaugural 
Meeting of the G20 Resource Efficiency Dialogue, 27-28 November 2017, Berlin, 
Germany.
5.3.7   Take Advantage of Leapfrogging 
Opportunities
Leapfrogging possibilities for decoupling
The concept of leapfrogging embodies the idea that 
industrializing countries can bypass the resource-intensive 
conventional pathway of development paved by high-
income, industrialized countries to “leap” to the most 
advanced technologies (Gallagher, 2006). One leapfrogging 
example is the off-grid solar industry in sub-Saharan Africa 
with the pay-as-you-go solar home system (PAYG SHS), 
explained in box 5.6. 
Leapfrogging can be harnessed for decoupling by 
policymakers and decision makers. Developing countries 
that are not yet locked in to long-term infrastructure, 
industry or cities have an opportunity to leapfrog and 
satisfy demands using substantially fewer natural 
resources with new technologies. Even in developed 
countries, opportunities exist for regions, businesses and 
households to take advantage of new technologies or 
organization patterns to drive a sustainable transition.
5.3.8   International Exchanges and Cooperation
The previous seven approaches depend on international 
exchanges and cross-country cooperation. Three topics 
warrant particular attention: a level playing field, exchanges 
to navigate obstacles and share experiences and the 
currently unequal burden sharing. 
Exchanges to navigate obstacles
Exchanges between countries can help navigate obstacles 
by sharing experiences. Countries can exchange among 
themselves to share examples and best practices in their 
country that may be relevant and helpful to other countries. 
This transfer of experiences and knowledge is especially 
beneficial to encourage leapfrogging processes and 
technologies. 
The Resource Efficient and Cleaner Production (RECP) 
programme supported by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) and UNEP was 
developed to encourage the adoption of RECP around 
the world. From this programme, RECPnet (a voluntary 
network that connects members across the globe) was 
created in 2011 to encourage knowledge and expertise 
sharing. RECPnet members include organizations or 
initiatives delivering RECP services in developing or 
transitioning countries. RECPnet further collects and 
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shares information about its operations to a larger set of 
stakeholders (RECPnet, 2015). At the Central University 
of Nicaragua, the implementation of RECP measures, 
including energy efficiency methods and using renewable 
energies, led to annual savings of US$ 34,450 and a yearly 
reduction of 26.78 tons of CO2 (UNIDO, 2017).
Moreover, international exchanges can enhance global 
governance of a particular resource. For example, if 
carefully managed, particularly in low-income countries, 
the extractive sector can provide opportunities to advance 
sustainable development through the generation of taxes 
for governments, creation of jobs and transfer of technology 
(Pedro et al., 2017). However, effective governance is key for 
mitigating the negative impacts from resource extraction 
and maximizing the benefits from the sector. Numerous 
extractive resource governance policies and initiatives have 
emerged across geographical locations, or even at global 
levels. These range from comprehensive policy frameworks 
to platforms for dialogues; from legally-binding instruments 
backed by UN sanctions and national laws to voluntary 
instruments; and from single stakeholder-led to multi-
stakeholder platforms. These initiatives play an important 
role in the extractive sector, but still face limitations. As 
an example, some instruments are voluntary in nature, 
which results in low compliance. In order to address the 
governance gaps, an international agenda is required to 
ensure impacts are limited and benefits are maximized 
within the sector. This agenda can consider resource 
security, resource efficiency, limiting negative impacts 
and promoting sustainable development in the sector. An 
emerging concept called the Sustainable Development 
Licence to Operate, which will be included in an upcoming 
IRP report, aims to support governance in this sector.
Collaboration to create a level playing field
Actors, governments and businesses should reflect 
together about how to ensure level playing fields for the 
competition between businesses in international trade. 
These will have to consider the existing international 
settlements and agreements, such as those on trade, 
intellectual property rights and environmental goals. 
International cooperation to share burdens
Although internationally pursued efforts with the 
involvement of all countries can help achieve the goals of 
impact decoupling and improving resource efficiency, due 
consideration must be given to the different responsibilities 
and capabilities of individual countries.
BOX 5.6 Pay-As-You-Go Solar Home Systems 
(PAYG SHSs)
In sub-Saharan Africa, 612 million people (62.6 per cent of 
the population) have no access to electricity (IEA, 2017). The 
kerosene lamp is the primary lighting option for households 
that are not connected to an electricity grid (Wogan, 2013). 
Using kerosene lamps leads to carbon dioxide and black 
carbon particle emissions, which contribute to climate 
change and have negative health impacts (Lam et al., 2012).
To provide electricity, companies are developing leapfrog-
ging technologies using mobile phones. PAYG SHSs are 
solar panel devices for individual households that are paid 
for using an initial down payment and subsequent small 
incremental mobile payments, making them affordable for 
an increasingly large population. PAYG SHSs can be small 
simple lanterns for lighting at night, or an extensive bundle 
of products including multiple charging stations for mobile 
phones, a television or other small devices such as fans.
The adoption of PAYG SHSs has avoided at least 26.8 
million tons of GHGs, and one study found that 63 per cent 
of solar light owners who had previously used kerosene 
before adopting a solar home system saw an improve-
ment in their health (GOGLA, 2018).
Governments can encourage PAYG SHSs by eliminating or 
reducing duties on renewable energy hardware imports. 
Kenya and Tanzania adopted policies similar to these, 
and are credited with supporting the PAYG SHS industry 
(Amankwah-Amoah, 2014; Pailman et al., 2015). 
Photos printed with permission from Azuri Technologies.
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High-income countries have enjoyed a more significant 
use of resources (thereby contributing to the related 
negative environmental impacts) and access to finance 
and technology. As such, they have often stepped forward 
to take the lead in resource efficiency policies (UN, 2014). 
High-income countries still have high capacity to act, but 
their share of consumption is decreasing. The material 
footprint per capita is still the most pronounced in high-
income nations, but it is growing for upper-middle income 
countries. Moreover, this report found that the share of global 
domestic material consumption in the upper-middle income 
group surpassed those of the high-income group by 2012. 
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that obstacles (such as 
environmental challenges and fundamentally driving 
change in the current consumption and production 
systems) go hand in hand with opportunities. In particular, 
improvements in how natural resources are extracted, 
processed, used and disposed of around the world can be 
harnessed through collective action by governments, the 
private sector and civil society organizations.
The forward-looking scenario developed for this report 
–Towards Sustainability– shows that fundamental 
changes to policy packages used by governments and 
societal behaviour can lead to a relative decoupling 
of natural resource use from income (GDP per capita) 
and an absolute decoupling of environmental damage 
from economic growth and increasing resource use. 
This chapter helps actualize the assumptions made in 
the Towards Sustainability scenario in a useful way for 
policymakers and decision makers.
Indicators and targets that inform national plans for 
a sustainable use of natural resources at all levels of 
governance enable governments to identify priorities and 
proceed in a coordinated way. Achieving a sustainable 
transition will require complementary measures that 
combine to achieve domestic objectives. The context and 
scope of the instruments will depend on the domestic 
circumstances of each country. In all cases, the policy 
mixes developed to improve the use and management 
of natural resources should be closely coordinated with 
policies for climate mitigation and biodiversity protection.
Engaging in dialogue to connect with citizens, civil society 
and the private sector builds consensus. International 
exchanges and cross-country cooperation can accelerate 
transitions towards sustainability and support national 
decisions, thereby helping to create a level playing field for 
businesses and goods, navigate obstacles, promote shared 
experiences and find ways of leapfrogging. Although impact 
decoupling and improving resource efficiency should be an 
internationally pursued effort involving all countries, due 
consideration must be given to the different responsibilities 
and capabilities of countries involved. 
These different aspects call for a global discussion.
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This report has evaluated the historical trends of natural resource use and the impacts of their use on the 
environment and human well-being. In this report, only the impacts of resource extraction and processing are 
analysed, as additional research is needed to fully understand the use phase of natural resources. In addition to 
this analysis, this report presents two scenarios: Historical Trends and Towards Sustainability. The Historical Trends 
Scenario shows that the current trajectory of natural resource use and management is unsustainable, while the 
Towards Sustainability scenario explores a transformative global society that achieves large gains in resource 
efficiency and absolute impact decoupling. 
The analysis of natural resource trends, impacts and the two diverging scenario pathways underscores the 
urgency for a new era of multi-beneficial and innovative policymaking. The previous chapter offers examples 
and novel ideas for policies. In the effort to embark on a sustainable transition to achieve decoupling, fulfil the 
SDGs and abide by international agreements such as the Paris Agreement on climate change, each country will 
need to construct its own pathway and set of policies. A unique policy mix is needed, as every country faces 
unique circumstances. 
Having said that , a handful of essential strategies and tools will be useful for all countries. First, indicators and 
targets used across governments and sectors can help monitor material flows and guide sustainable transitions. 
After these targets are set, a national plan for the management of natural resources can be developed to provide 
a framework for progress. The policies and best practices suggested can help achieve resource and impact 
decoupling, leading to environmental improvements, economic gains and benefits for human health and well-
being. Developing policy mixes must consider the need to build capacity at a national level, mitigate resistance 
to change by making provisions to those who experience hardship during the transition, discover ways to 
promote circularity in the economy and find opportunities to leapfrog over outdated technologies or models. 
These strategies for a national transformation will greatly benefit from international exchanges and cooperation. 
Sharing ideas, best practices, technology and basic knowledge will support a systemic shift in global society.
Throughout this process, policymakers and decision makers can engage with stakeholders across sectors 
to motivate action and promote these strategies. This includes a continued collaboration with international 
organizations to accelerate the improved use and management of natural resources, such as the International 
Resource Panel. Academics and research departments can also reach out to policymakers to ensure a dynamic 
conversation. While national policymakers are focused on their domestic natural resource targets, a discussion 
is needed at the international level to develop global science-based targets for natural resource use. This report, 
as it provides a scientific analysis of natural resource use and related impacts and policy suggestions, serves as 
an overarching body of knowledge that can be used to help promote the idea of targets at a global level. Building 
on this knowledge will further strengthen the collective drive for internationally applicable natural resource use 
targets.
Much is at stake as global society approaches the final decade before the SDGs are set to be achieved in 2030. 
A world without resource efficiency and improved impacts will create a future featuring potentially irreversible 
damage to the environment, ongoing dramatic inequalities between countries and increasing stress on human 
health. This report has reviewed the dangers of inaction. Human actions place extreme burdens on the Earth 
system. Respecting the planetary boundaries reduces the risk that human activities could lead to an alteration 
of the Earth system toward a much less hospitable state (Steffen et al., 2015). This catastrophic outcome would 
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benefit no one. As our global society becomes increasingly complex and interconnected, we must be aware that 
negative changes across the world can have serious implications at home.
A recent IPCC report on climate change helps drive home the urgency of this situation and the importance of 
understanding what is at stake for our environment and our livelihoods. The IPCC reported with high confidence 
that biodiversity loss is projected to be lower at a 1.5 degrees Celsius increase in global temperatures compared 
to a 2-degrees increase. There is also a high confidence that limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels will lower the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater and coastal ecosystems (IPCC, 2018).
The IPCC report further details the differences between a world with a 1.5 and 2 degree Celsius-increase. 
Limiting global warming by 0.5 degrees increases projected food availability, decreases exposure to water stress, 
decreases health risks (including vector-borne diseases such as malaria) and decreases the risks of climate-
change related impacts to global aggregated economic growth (IPCC, 2018).
The results of this Global Resources Outlook complement these findings, and further extend the scope to focus 
on the role of natural resources and actions in terms of environmental degradation and human well-being. It is 
worth remembering that extracting and processing material resources is currently responsible for approximately 
50 per cent of the global greenhouse gas emissions (not including climate impacts related to land use change) 
and more than 90 per cent of global biodiversity loss and water stress impacts. Solving the current problems 
faced by global society requires a fundamental change in how we use natural resources.
The final message of this report should be one of hope and optimism. While additional research is needed, 
there is an extensive knowledge base about natural resources use and their impacts. Existing or feasible 
technologies can be applied in the short term across all sectors and countries to improve natural resource 
use and management. Emerging business models and best practices that embrace the circular economy 
and leapfrogging technologies can generate enormous resource and economic savings, while still driving 
development. Policymakers and decision makers have tools at their disposal to advance transformative change. 
Importantly, this involves national actors working together across borders to achieve this change. Using the 
results from this report, multi-stakeholder collaboration and innovative solutions, we can resource the future 
we want.
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Much is at stake as global society approaches the final 
decade before the Sustainable Development Goals are 
fixed to be realized in 2030. The international community 
has set high ambitions for global prosperity, the 
protection of our biological diversity and land resources, 
and limiting global warming. Progress towards these 
ambitions is within our grasp – but a fundamental change 
in how natural resources are used around the world is 
necessary to succeed.
Since the 1970s, global population has doubled and 
global Gross Domestic Product has grown fourfold. 
These trends have required large amounts of natural 
resources to fuel economic development and the 
attendant improvements in human well-being this has 
brought across the globe. However, these gains have 
come at a tremendous cost to our natural environment, 
ultimately impacting human well-being and exacerbating 
inequalities within and between countries.
The analysis and modelling presented in this report 
are a first attempt to understand the impacts of our 
growing resource use, and to develop coherent scenario 
projections for resource efficiency and sustainable 
production and consumption that decouple economic 
growth from environmental degradation. A Historical 
Trends scenario shows that the current trajectory of 
natural resource use and management is unsustainable, 
while a Towards Sustainability scenario shows that 
implementing resource efficiency and sustainable 
consumption and production policies promotes stronger 
economic growth, improves well-being, helps to support 
more equal distribution of income and reduces resource 
use across countries.
The final message of this report is one of hope and 
optimism. While additional research is needed, an 
extensive knowledge base from the International 
Resource Panel about natural resources use and 
their impacts exists. Well-chosen and coordinated 
sustainability actions can achieve our international 
ambitions for prosperity within planetary boundaries. 
Using the results from this report, multi-stakeholder 
collaboration, and innovative solutions, we can resource 
the future we want.
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